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 i
ABSTRACT 
 
In the contemporary political setting, the emergence of transnationalism represents a 
significant challenge to traditional state-centred depictions of international relations and 
raises many questions concerning its purpose, legitimacy and effects. This study is 
concerned with one aspect of the transnational debate: the dynamics of power that drive 
consensus formation within informal, and collaborative, elite transnational networks.  
 
Situated in debates related to international relations, political economy, policy science, 
political sociology and social network theory, this study identifies the role played by 
transnational elites in articulating, as well as interpreting, structural determinants of 
policy. In short, transnational elite interactions are responsible, often unconsciously, for 
the legitimisation of pervasive social constructs within the wider elite community. The 
process of legitimisation within such settings is highly contested and, as a consequence, 
power relations are critical to our understanding of eventual consensus. 
 
Utilising Steven Lukess (1974) third dimensional form of power, this study considers 
the discrete mechanisms of preference formation at play within transnational elite 
networks. Exploring processes of socialisation, acculturation, familiarisation and 
fraternisation within such communities, the complex, and highly personal, demands of 
elite membership are revealed. The study suggests that these demands have a 
considerable bearing upon the nature and substance of consensus formation activity 
within elite networks. It also makes clear, however, that any resulting consensus is far 
from absolute and highly idiosyncratic.  
 
This qualitative study is the first of its kind concerned with the interactions of 
transnational elites. It reports the findings of interviews conducted with sixteen 
members of the Atlantic transnational network  arguably the most powerful and 
interconnected of all transnational networks. In presenting an analysis of the first-hand 
accounts of these individuals, and exploring the dynamics of power within such a 
context, this study represents an original contribution to knowledge in the field. 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
 
In the contemporary political setting, the emergence of transnationalism represents a 
significant challenge to traditional state-centred depictions of international relations. 
The absence of a global regulatory framework, and the persistent failure of collective 
action initiatives to transcend protectionist agendas in international politics, has seen the 
gradual emergence of many informal, multi-stakeholder, transnational networks. While 
the notion of a policy elite is nothing new (see Hunter, 1969; Mills, 1956), the 
development of these transnational policy networks, comprised primarily of elite 
representatives from the worlds of business, finance and politics, has received scant 
scholarly attention. Recent journalistic coverage (see Rothkopf, 2008) has ignited 
popular interest in the subject but, whether social scientists can overcome a collective 
reticence to entertain ideas of a global elite or ruling class (Sklair, 2001), remains to be 
seen. It is hoped that this study of the dynamics of power within elite transnational 
networks during the post-Cold War period will prompt others to recognise the 
significance and importance of further scholarly inquiry in this area. 
 
This chapter outlines the rationale for a study of the dynamics of power in the elite 
transnational setting and details the research context, objectives and methodology. It 
also describes the key findings and contribution of the study before presenting an 
overview of the chapters.  
 
1.1 Research rationale 
 
Broadly speaking, there are two components to the research rationale for this study: a 
personal perspective; and a literature perspective. Each has played a significant role in 
defining the eventual form of the research. 
 
1.1.1 A personal perspective  
 
I came to the PhD process after spending several years as a senior executive in the 
European media and internet sectors. Although it was clear to me that something was 
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driving my interest in the development of regulation in the area of digital media, it took 
some time for me to recognise, and articulate, the underlying emancipatory aspects of 
my interest. The seeds of this interest emerged from having worked in a truly 
transformational industry during its most expansive period of growth. For many people 
involved in the internet revolution during this period of the mid-1990s, anything 
seemed possible. For me, the internet promised to transform many traditional 
relationships and, chief among them, the relationship that existed between government 
and citizen. In a remarkably short period of time, however, this promise became little 
more than a rhetorical device for the preservation of existing relationships and 
processes. Moreover, the shape and tenor of regulation related to the internet began to 
reflect the interests of those who stood most to lose from any such transformation.  
 
Although my first degree was in the subject of government, I would never have been 
described by those who knew me as a political radical. And, after many successful years 
in the media sector, and the completion of a Cranfield MBA, its fair to suggest that my 
political views were reasonably benign. It was interesting, therefore, that my 
experiences of the internet sector acted as a catalyst for an interest in the political 
dimensions of change in society. In academic terms, what began as an investigation into 
the public policy relationship that exists between business and state in the digital 
information sector quickly broadened into a macro level interest in the structural 
interdependency that exists between politics and markets in liberal democracies. In 
specific terms, I began to concern myself with the question of how objectives are 
defined by collaborative elites for the purposes of public policy intervention.  
 
1.1.2 Literature perspective 
 
The rationale for this study also emerged out of an iterative process of discovery related 
to the development and understanding of philosophical perspective and the 
identification of significant theoretical questions in the multi-disciplinary literature 
domain. The emergence of a literature gap was implicitly related to my increased 
understanding of ontological perspectives and, in particular, that of social 
constructionism (Berger & Luckman, 1966). Indeed, it is fair to suggest that without 
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such a philosophical approach it would have been difficult to conceive of the research 
opportunity. It has enabled an understanding of profound conceptual challenges within, 
and between, a number of literature domains.  
 
In the policy sciences field there are significant theoretical issues related to questions of 
policy initiation and change. Understanding of the origins of public policy within the 
domain have evolved over the past fifty years from decisional and system based 
heuristic devices (Lasswell, 1956; Easton, 1957) through structural (Hofferbert, 1974; 
Simeon, 1976) and institutional depictions (Kiser & Ostrom, 1982; Immergut, 1998) 
and, most recently, into post-structural descriptions of issue definition and causes of 
change (Kingdon, 1984; Fischer & Forester, 1993; Baumgartner & Jones, 1993; 
Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993). The latter have been complimented by a considerable 
amount of interest in policy agendas and the question of how issues are framed prior to 
processes of policy formation and change.  
 
As with systems theory contributions elsewhere, however, system based 
transformational change is viewed as practically inconceivable by policy theorists. A 
longstanding tradition, within the field, of viewing policy change as inherently 
incremental (see Lindblom, 1959) has, to an extent, continued to influence the work of 
post-structuralists (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999). 
While there is significant empirical support for this contention, it has resulted in a belief 
that structural determinants, while exposing the policy system to a broader set of 
influences, are largely irrelevant to a consideration of day-to-day policy processes. As 
Sabatier (1993:20) suggests, the scope of broader system determinants overwhelmingly 
discourages actors from making them the object of strategising behaviour. For post-
structuralists, policy change has little to do with exogenous structural forces; it is 
brought about when system based definitions of political problems fall out of kilter with 
environmental demands (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993) or when one advocacy coalition 
replaces another as the dominant referential within the system (Sabatier & Jenkins-
Smith, 1993).  
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These theories of initiation and change within the policy sciences domain are invariably 
linked to conceptions of pluralism in liberal democracies. Such systems, frequently 
characterised as being in a state of equilibrium, exhibit an inherent resistance to change 
and a set of policy processes that are bound by incrementalism, checks and balances, 
and a host of incoherent relationships and conflicting demands that, at times, defy both 
logic and explanation. Against this backdrop, the market functions within a largely 
predictable regulatory framework, content, where able, to influence the direction and 
detail of government policy. The extent of this ability, however, is governed by factors 
that serve to protect the overall stability and integrity of existing socio-economic 
arrangements. The structural interdependency of politics and markets in liberal 
democratic societies has, for some time, been the subject of intense theoretical debate in 
the field of political economy (Lindblom, 1977). 
 
With the development of the neo-liberal globalisation agenda, the states traditional 
boundaries have come under attack from the politics of market organisation (White, 
1993) and, as a consequence, politics is increasingly market driven (Leys, 2003). This 
interrelationship of economic and political activity is, more than ever, critical to a 
consideration of social mechanisms and systems. In all accounts of the liberal 
democratic model, it is clear that the notion of separated spheres of economic and 
political activity is, by and large, discounted. The resulting mode of governance, 
characterised by incrementalism, ensures that the interests of the market are protected 
from demands for more transformational forms of change. 
 
In recent years, multi-stakeholder collaboration has emerged as a pragmatic response to 
complex societal problems and, in many spheres of contemporary politics, has 
succeeded in displacing traditional forms of hierarchic governance (Clarence & Painter, 
1998; Kooiman, 1999; Midttun, 1999). An unusual aspect of the discourse related to 
inter-organisational relationships is that it tends to emphasise the functional aspects of 
multi-stakeholder collaboration (Hazen, 1994) and reflects a general preoccupation with 
process, rather than governance, outcomes (Ansell & Gash, 2008). This concentration 
on process overlooks the socio-political dynamics that drive the nature of collaboration 
and its outputs. The significance of underlying power relations (Hardy & Phillips, 
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1998), and an acknowledgement of such factors as leadership (Ozawa, 1993; Huxham & 
Vangen, 2000), are essential to a broader appreciation of collaboration. In political 
terms, multi-stakeholder collaboration is very much a product of the pervasiveness of 
neo-liberal conceptions of the role and limitations of government in modern society. 
Proponents of collaborative ideology see it as providing support and legitimacy for 
consensual processes and relationships that are already an embedded feature of policy 
related activity within, and between, liberal democracies. 
 
The theoretical origins of consensus, as a basis for political action, appear, once again, 
to stem from pragmatic and pluralistic conceptions of the role of the state in mediating a 
plurality of interests in society. Community power debates of the 1950s and 1960s 
between elite theorists (Hunter, 1969; Mills, 1956) and pluralists (Dahl, 1961; Polsby, 
1963) were, ultimately, inconclusive but even ardent pluralists were moved, by the end 
of the 1960s and early 1970s, to concede that certain groups in society could be seen to 
hold disproportionate levels of power (McFarland, 1987).  
 
C. Wright Mills (1956) seminal work, The Power Elite, described how US national 
politics had become dominated by a concentrated power elite and, importantly, stressed 
the degree of elite homogeneity that underpinned coordinated action within the elite 
group. The significance of wealth and social status were emphasised as was the 
importance of socialisation and conformity within elite circles. More recently, Stone 
(1989a) has argued that, out of mutual interest and interdependency, economic and 
political elites form coalitions or regimes. This depiction is distinct from earlier 
power elite contributions in so far as it less concerned with who makes decisions than 
how elites influence political priorities. The emphasis on the shape and tenor of political 
agendas, rather than the detail of specific policies, is a defining feature, therefore, of 
elite interactions.  
 
Theoretically distinct from earlier descriptions of the definition of issues (Blumer, 
1971), their attendant causal stories (Stone, 1989b) and world views (Surel, 2000); the 
formation of consensus between elites is a product of a purposeful and contested 
dialogue. It concerns the social legitimisation of consensual constructs that underpin the 
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very foundations of subsequent public policy discourse. By applying Steve Lukess 
(1974) conception of third dimensional power to a system wide depiction of calls for 
transformational change, one function of elite interactions and consensus formation 
activity becomes clear. It represents a mechanism for unlocking or reinforcing structural 
resistances to more dynamic forms of change. This capacity for transformational change 
in political or societal terms, is only made possible at the structural level. In order to 
unlock this capacity, structural determinants must be reinterpreted, redefined and 
reinforced in order to influence the normative predisposition of policymakers. 
Moreover, these structural articulations must be transmitted throughout society in order 
that policymakers retain essential legitimacy.  
 
1.2 Research context  
 
Since the context for elite consensus formation will likely have a significant bearing 
upon the distinction between processes that are considered to be internal and external to 
the formal policy design process, it is important that the focus of this study provide a 
clear example of elite interactions that are, at once, separate from day-to-day policy 
activities and are, yet, capable of influencing the shape and tenor of widely-held 
assumptions that bear down upon them. It is also important to explain how the dynamics 
of power related to such elite interactions result in the formation of a consensus that has 
wider relevancy and legitimacy.  
 
An obvious example of multi-stakeholder elite interactions, in the contemporary 
political setting, is that provided by informal transnational policy networks. While 
international cooperation and conflict between states has traditionally been the focus of 
studies in international relations, transnational political activity transcends the formal 
boundaries of national sovereignty and incorporates a much wider, and collaborative, 
policy community. Indeed, some have argued that these networks not only represent 
non-state interests, and the needs of capital in particular, but they were created precisely 
for this reason (Van Der Pijl, 1998). Notwithstanding debates related to the purpose of 
elite interactions in the transnational setting, there is little dispute that the members of a 
vast array of interconnected groups, forums and networks represent a transnational 
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policy community whose ranks are drawn from the most senior levels of government, 
finance, business, media, academia, and policy research institutes.  
 
The role played by globalisation, and transnational corporations, in the development of 
this elite transnational network is widely acknowledged but very little data exists to 
support the suggestion of a homogenous international business community or 
transnational class. One obvious exception exists in the analysis of interlocking 
directorates at the national (Useem, 1984; Scott, 1997; Domhoff, 2002; Murray, 2006) 
and international levels (Fennema, 1982; Carroll & Fennema, 2002); but a shortcoming 
of such empirical work is the singular focus on corporate interlocks as evidence of class 
homogeneity (Carroll & Fennema, 2002). The incorporation, in subsequent analysis, of 
informal elite planning groups, has led to the belief that a global corporate elite has, 
indeed, formed and that a few dozen cosmopolitans bind the corporate-policy network 
together (Carroll & Carson, 2003:97). This view of the elite network suggests an 
instrumental depiction of a transnational elite superstructure responsible for 
coordination and communication of prevailing hegemonic culture, namely, economic 
neo-liberalism. A dependence upon quantitative analysis of interlocks, rather than 
evidence related to the qualitative substance of elite interactions, has resulted in a rather 
two dimensional representation of such activity. This is a considerable weakness in the 
current literature.   
 
Likewise, the general paucity of data available on specific transnational groups and 
networks represents a significant scholarly oversight. When one considers the elite 
composition of such groups, and the fact that they are credited with considerable 
geopolitical influence, this omission is astounding. An analysis of mainly archival and 
historical material provides an insight into the most preeminent and influential of such 
networks from the Second World War, and through to the end of the Cold War; but 
there has been no qualitative scholarly assessment of the role of these groups and 
networks in the post-Cold War period.  
 
Equally, there appears to be no empirical material related to the dynamics of power 
within transnational policy networks. Aside from obvious empirical challenges, one 
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explanation might rest with the perception that such contexts lack conflict. As Steven 
Lukes (1974:23) observes, however, the most effective and insidious use of power is to 
prevent such conflict from arising in the first place. In other words, a lack of conflict, 
and the appearance of consensus, does not equal the absence of power relations. Those 
subject to power can be manipulated or socialised into a false appreciation of their real 
interests, and thereby act against them, while, at the same time, believing that they are 
acting according to their preferences (Young, 1978). Exploring the dynamics of power 
within elite transnational interactions can provide a substantial insight into underlying 
processes of consensus formation in such settings. In particular, discrete processes of 
elite communication, socialisation, acculturation and fraternisation are central to any 
understanding of consensus within such arenas.  
 
This study is, therefore, concerned with the dynamics of power within transnational elite 
consensus formation processes during the post-Cold War period.  To this end, it utilises 
Steven Lukess (1974) conception of third dimensional power to more fully 
understand the implications of power dynamics within such settings. Lukess (1974) 
depiction of how desires and beliefs are shaped in given contexts, by discrete 
mechanisms of power, provides a radical conceptual mechanism for exploring the 
question of whether, and how, the preferences of elite participants have been influenced 
without their knowledge. 
 
1.3 Research objectives and question 
 
In simple terms, this research aims to explore the role of discrete third dimensional 
power mechanisms in determining consensual and legitimate policy orientations among 
the transnational policy elite. By focussing on the post-Cold War period, the study 
recognises that traditional alliances in international relations, based primarily on issues 
of security and ideology, have given way to a more fluid period of international 
cooperation during which consensus has emerged as a key requirement of political 
action.  This study considers the veracity of the consensus formation label, the 
meaningful nature of transnational elite collaboration, the purposeful extent of such 
activity and, finally, processes of communication, socialisation, acculturation and 
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fraternisation within such communities. The pivotal focus for the study is the question 
of how discrete power relations have shaped transnational elite thinking related to 
political problems and acceptable public policy responses in the post-Cold War period.  
 
The study is exploratory in nature and aims to provide insights into the significant 
questions of why and how the dynamics of power in elite interactions are central to 
our understanding of consensus within such communities.  
 
1.4 Research methodology 
 
This study explores the accounts of elite participants related to networked interactions in 
the transnational setting. Given the fundamental nature of consensus formation, a social 
constructionist ontological perspective is employed with an interpretivist epistemology. 
A qualitative methodology is considered to be the most appropriate and effective means 
of addressing the objectives of the research. While multiple data collections methods are 
utilised, the principle mechanism is that of elite interviewing. An inductive, thematic, 
discourse analysis is adopted and theory is tentatively developed. 
 
1.5 Findings 
 
There are a number of key findings to the study.  
 
Mirroring constructivist depictions of international relations activity, transnational elite 
interactions represent a contested process for the legitimacy of paradigmatic constructs 
within such settings. An understanding, therefore, of power relations within elite 
transnational networks is critical to any understanding of consensus and legitimacy as a 
basis for action. Importantly, consensus formation is a misleading description of the 
purpose of elite networked interactions although it might broadly be applied to the 
momentum and consequence of such activity. It remains unclear what the overriding 
motivation for elite interactions actually is but this study suggests that self interest is as 
pivotal to an understanding of such activity as any sense of civic mindedness. 
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The evidence of this study also suggests that multi-stakeholder collaboration in elite 
transnational networks is essentially characterised by the relationship of business and 
political elites. Participants who are not explicitly from the fields of business and 
politics exist, for the most part, at the periphery of the network and, it is suggested, do 
not enjoy equal standing within it. The existence of an old boy network, within the 
transnational elite, plays a significant role in the organisation and orientation of certain 
elite networks. This inner-core group is disproportionately powerful within the network 
and has, consciously or otherwise, considerable influence on peripheral and aspirant 
members. Transnational elite networks represent institutionalised arrangements against 
which entrants must successfully navigate the social and personal requirements of group 
membership.  
 
Finally, despite the boundary spanning activity of key interlockers, transnational elite 
networks remain firmly regional, rather than truly global, entities. The discourse of the 
regional network is biased at source and, through the conscious or unconscious activity 
of its members, has the effect of amplifying its biases. The successful application of 
Lukess (1974) third dimensional power finds that elite processes of communication, 
socialisation, acculturation and fraternisation within such settings, play a sizable role in 
the perpetuation of group logic and the development of a peculiar brand of legitimacy. 
This process is largely unconscious and its effects are both highly idiosyncratic and far 
from absolute.  
 
1.6 Contribution 
 
Broadly speaking, there are a number of key contributions to knowledge represented by 
this study.  
 
In terms of theory, the research represents an original contribution to our understanding 
of the purpose and possible implications of elite interactions in the transnational setting. 
It is the first to qualitatively analyse the purpose, and effects, of transnational elite 
interactions in the post-Cold War period and suggests that such interactions are 
significantly more nuanced and idiosyncratic than suggested elsewhere. It extends our 
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understanding of processes of social construction to the largely uncharted territory of 
transnational elite networks and, in so doing, presents a conceptual model of the social 
construction of legitimacy, as a basis for action, in transnational politics. And, crucially, 
it highlights the socio-political dimensions of social construction within such settings.  
 
The study also extends interest of policy elites beyond consideration of local and 
national politics and into the domain of transnational politics. In so doing, it provides an 
original theoretical contribution to consideration of the structural dynamics of pre-
policy formation activity. In challenging essentially reactive portrayals of issue 
definition and policy initiation in the policy sciences literature, the study suggests that 
the structural determinants of policy discourse are not as ethereal as previously 
imagined. Instead, they are within the grasp of a coordinated policy elite.  
 
In methodological terms, the study represents the first application of Lukess (1974) 
theoretical lens within the context of an elite setting and, in so doing, extends our 
understanding of the value of such an approach to an interpretation of complex 
processes of consensus formation and legitimacy building within such environments. It 
should also be noted that the application of a qualitative, and interpretive, methodology 
is, in itself, a contribution to an otherwise quantitative empirical understanding of elite 
interactions and networks in the post-Cold War transnational arena.  
 
Finally, a key contribution to policy practice is the highlighting of influences related to 
normative policy prescriptions embedded in the underlying worldview of policymakers. 
These prescriptions are not the product of institutional influences; rather they are 
constituted through an appreciation of more ethereal forms of common sense. The 
relationship between this common sense and policymaker preference is critical to any 
understanding of choice within policy settings. This study suggests that policymakers 
should consider how their preferences are shaped by such common sense and, as a 
consequence, whether their preferences are ultimately aligned with their interests. 
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1.7 Summary of chapters 
 
The thesis is presented in six chapters. This introductory chapter has provided an 
overview of the rationale and context for the research as well as outlining the objectives, 
methodology, findings and contribution. The following provides a brief summary of the 
remaining chapters.  
 
Chapter 2 presents a review of the literature and is divided into four thematic sections. 
The first, theoretical perspectives on policy initiation and change, reviews contributions 
from the policy sciences field and identifies profound conceptual questions concerning 
the origins of public policy, the boundaries of the policy process and the mechanics of 
transformational change. The second, politics and markets, describes the 
interdependency of business and politics in liberal democracies and considers the 
consequences of this relationship for public policy and governance. The third section, 
the transnational power elite, situates transnational elite networks within a tradition of 
community power debates and against a broader scale depiction of transnational policy 
processes. Finally, power relations reviews power debates and considers the application 
of Steven Lukess (1974) third dimensional power to an understanding of elite 
interactions.  
 
The chapter ends with a discussion of the research opportunity, an outline of its 
objectives and, finally, the research question is introduced.  
 
Chapter 3 presents the ontological and epistemological underpinnings of the research 
and the rationale for a qualitative study of elite interactions. Furthermore, it details the 
data collection and analysis methods adopted for the study. 
 
Chapter 4 describes the findings of the research and presents them in five interrelated 
thematic categories: the structural context of elite interactions in the transnational 
setting; collaboration in the transnational arena; transnational networks and networking; 
consensus formation and the narrowing of differences; and hierarchies of influence.  
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Chapter 5 discusses the findings of the research and presents a conceptual model of the 
social construction of legitimacy as a basis for action in transnational politics. Of 
particular interest are the bi-directional and mutually constitutive arrangements that 
cement the process of social construction within the transnational elite context. The 
complex, and highly dynamic, nature of consensus formation activity within this setting 
reveals a fundamental relationship between structure and articulation with elite contexts. 
 
Chapter 6 presents the contribution to knowledge represented by the study and outlines 
the limitations of the research. Opportunities for future research are described and, 
finally, a short postscript details personal reflections on the PhD process.  
 
1.8 Introduction summary 
 
This chapter has provided an overview of the rationale and contextual setting for the 
study as well as having briefly outlined the research objectives, methodology, findings 
and contribution.  Although it was designed to provide an abridged appreciation of the 
study, the more extensive review of literature presented in Chapter 2 will provide a 
greater understanding of the contextual setting for the research.  
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2.0 REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
In exploring the dynamics and consequences of power relations within elite 
transnational communities, it is essential to recognise the multi-disciplinary nature of 
the subject. It encompasses literature domains as diverse as policy science, political 
sociology, political economy, international relations, public administration, social 
psychology and organisational theory. Moreover, the field is explicitly normative which 
means that philosophical predisposition, personal motivation and values are inextricably 
entwined with the creation and interpretation of knowledge within the domain; to deny 
this would be both futile and misleading. The key challenge, therefore, given the 
breadth of possible contributions and an acknowledgment of the role of such influences, 
is to establish credible boundaries for such a review. 
 
The most obvious difficulty is that the boundaries of the field exist in a contested form 
between a number of literature domains. This means that a straightforward review of 
pre-existing and well defined supportive constructs has not always been possible. In the 
case of the policy process literature, for instance, the review set out to understand 
conceptions of the policy process for the purposes of understanding the role of elite 
interactions within it. It became clear, however, that the role conceived in this study 
existed largely outside the discussion related to formal policy processes; instead, it was 
situated within a broader theoretical debate with significant touch points in the areas of 
policy initiation and transformational change. It is only through an understanding of 
debates within the policy process literature, however, that this discovery, and the 
theoretical foundations of the research, is made possible.  
 
Throughout the development of the study, decisions have had to be made concerning the 
overall scope and direction of the research which has meant that literature within certain 
domains has received more attention than others. These decisions, which are largely 
functional but undeniably subjective, leave the study vulnerable to criticism. In the final 
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analysis, however, the argument outlined in this chapter provides an appropriate and 
substantive platform for consideration of the research question. 
 
2.1.1 Chapter overview 
 
The chapter is divided into four thematic sections: theoretical perspectives on policy 
initiation and change; politics and markets; the transnational power elite; and power 
relations.   
 
Theoretical perspectives on policy initiation and change reviews debates within the 
policy process literature, a substantial multi-disciplinary domain in its own right. Within 
the field, responses to the question of how public policy is initiated have evolved in 
recent years from explanations rooted in notions of objective identification and rational 
decision making to post-positivist explorations of how we define issues for the purposes 
of policy intervention. The latter have been accompanied by a wealth of interest in 
policy agendas and, specifically, the inter-subjective manner in which problems are 
framed prior to the more formal processes of policy formation and change. This interest 
is, in turn, related to notions of power and, more fundamentally, the ongoing academic 
debate concerning structure and agency in political decision making. This summary of 
debates within the field highlights the existence of profound conceptual questions 
concerning the origins of public policy, the boundaries, physical or otherwise, of the 
policy process and the mechanics of transformational change within such systems. 
These questions are of particular relevance since elite consensus formation activity 
might best be viewed as operating between the realms of structural determinism, in 
particular, structured political economic arrangements, and conceptions of initiation in 
the policy process.  
 
Next, Politics and markets presents a review of literature concerned with the structural 
interdependency that exists between politics and markets. The implications of this 
relationship for public policy and governance, especially within the global context, are 
considered. Once again, the role of elites is central to any understanding of such a 
relationship and the development, within liberal democracies, of a culture of 
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collaboration is of particular significance to the research question. The balance of state 
and non-state actors in matters of public policy has altered substantially in recent years - 
underpinning this transition, and providing much of the intellectual legitimacy for it, is 
the development of collaborative ideology. 
 
The next section, The transnational power elite explores traditional community power 
debates of the 1950s and 1960s and considers the emergence of a transnational policy 
elite. It places the development and activities of elite networks and forums within a 
broader scale depiction of transnational policy processes and, in doing so, reflects a 
growing appreciation of the need to break with state centred depictions of international 
relations. A review of contributions from the fields of international political economy 
and global systems theory provides a largely structural and instrumental account of such 
activity. A significant strand within this literature emphasises hegemonic influence 
which offers a compelling, if somewhat deterministic, account of the role of consensual 
forms of power. Such power has been the focus of considerable attention within the 
field and it offers a useful starting point for consideration of elite network interactions. 
A specific, but sparse, literature relating to elite networks and forums is further 
reviewed and provides a useful, albeit partial, account of the function of transnational 
policy communities. It also reveals considerable research opportunities.  
 
Finally, Power relations presents a brief review of power debates within the political 
sociology field and, specifically, considers the application of Steven Lukess (1974) 
third dimensional power to an understanding of elite interactions. It surveys critiques 
levelled at the approach and considers Lukess subsequent amendments to the original 
framework. Despite significant issues related to the application of third dimensional 
power, it is argued that it provides a valuable theoretical mechanism for an 
understanding of power and influence within elite communities.  
 
While these thematic categories reference dominant literature domains, they are 
significantly interconnected which means that some debates are explored or referenced 
in more than one category. In order to facilitate readability and establish a coherent 
interrelated critique of the literature, a narrative is established throughout the review 
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rather than simply placed at the end of it. A summary of this critique is presented at the 
end of the chapter and the research opportunity is defined. The exploratory themes of 
the research are outlined and the specific research question under investigation is 
introduced.  
 
Figure 2.1 Structure of the literature review 
 
2.2
Theoretical
perspectives on policy
initiation and change
2.3
Politics and markets
2.4
The transnational
policy elite
2.5
Power relations in the
political setting
2.2.2
Textbook descriptions of the
policy process
2.2.3
Structural determination
2.2.4
Post-structural accounts
2.2.5
Reconciling structure and
agency in policymakiing
2.2.6
Structural manipulation and
transformational policy
change
2.3.2
Market oriented policymaking
2.3.3
Pragmatism & collaboration
in global governance
2.3.4
The logic of collaboration
2.4.2
Power in the community
2.4.3
Transnational politics and
policy
2.5.2
"Power over" and domination
2.5.3
Three dimensions of power
2.5.4
The challenge of third
dimensional power
2.6  Summary and conceptual model
2.6.1  Research opportunity
2.6.2  Reseach question
 
 
Source: Compiled by the author 
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2.2 Theoretical perspectives on policy initiation and change  
 
2.2.1 Introduction 
 
Policymaking is a highly complex process. This complexity appears to provide a caveat 
for any argument related to part or all of the policy system. Indeed, complex may now 
be the most over used word in the field of political science (Hale, 1988). This 
acknowledgement, and acceptance, of complexity has led to a variety of theoretical 
responses that, to date, have fallen some way short of providing a comprehensive and 
widely agreed upon view of the policy process. Without such a model, however, there is 
no way of understanding how partial theoretical explanations, or aspects of the complex 
system, can be judged relevant (Jones, Sulkin & Larsen, 2003); moreover, no one part 
(of the larger political canvas) can be fully understood, without reference to the way in 
which the whole itself operates (Easton, 1957:383). As a consequence, and depending 
upon ones predisposition, scholarly advances in the field might be characterised as 
insufficiently ambitious in the development of a systematic generalised theory (Hill, 
1997) or, alternatively, as  
 
possessing mountain islands of theoretical structure, intermingled with, and 
occasionally attached together by foothills of shared methods and concepts, and 
empirical work, all of which is surrounded by oceans of descriptive work not 
attached to any mountain of theory. (Schlager, 1997:14) 
 
The descriptive accuracy of early models of the policy process was first called into 
question in the 1980s and, ever since, there has been a strong and persistent call for 
more sophisticated theory building in the field (Nakamura, 1987; Moe, 1990; Sabatier, 
1991; Sabatier, 1999). In recent years, several new and challenging theories of the 
policy process have emerged that still appear to be some distance from providing a full 
explanation of the processes of policy formation and change (Schlager & Blomquist, 
1996). This is partly a result of scope but is also a product of a recent focus in the policy 
sciences arena upon systematic explanation and the observation of ordered patterns. 
Political change that exists beyond such parameters is considered irrelevant or 
unnecessary to a model of political order or, alternatively, too vague to be the subject of 
 20
systematic explanation (Lieberman, 2002). Others argue that the scientific study of 
politics may have improved but it is non-neutral (Danziger, 1995) and frequently 
focused on smaller questions that have had the effect of marginalising it from social 
science to say nothing of public discourse (Petracca, 1990:567). 
 
2.2.2 Textbook descriptions of the policy process 
 
The textbook policy process literature (Nakamura, 1987) presents an overwhelming 
conception of inputs as external stimulants to the policy or political process. Within 
such depictions, policymaking is presented, on the whole, as distinct from the demands 
that are placed upon it. Part of the reason for this may lie with a longstanding theoretical 
distinction between political activity and public administration in the policy sciences 
arena (Goodnow, 1900; White, 1926; Wilson, 1941)1. Another possible explanation 
rests with the apparent longevity of ideas expounded in early decision and system based 
depictions of the policy process. Harold Lasswells decision process2 (Lasswell, 1956; 
Lasswell, 1963), for instance, which has inspired many iterations (Jones, 1970; Mack, 
1971; Anderson, 1975; May & Wildavsky, 1978; Brewer & deLeon, 1983; Howlett & 
Ramesh, 1995; Norton, 2005), presents a lineal, staged and cumulative depiction of 
decision activity which takes, as its starting point, an intelligence gathering phase where 
those involved collect and prepare information pertinent to the decision. Critically, from 
the perspective of understanding how policy proposals enter the process, it provides a 
somewhat limited and value neutral conception depending, as it does, upon the objective 
identification of political problems and issues.  
 
                                                
1 This assumption was significantly challenged by post-war contributions (see Appleby, 1949) and, as a 
consequence, the separate spheres of authority model was effectively discounted (Svara, 1985). 
Interestingly, in later work, Svara (2001) suggests that the persistent view that the politics/administration 
dichotomy represented a meaningful conception during the 1920s and 1930s was a myth. 
2 Lasswells decision process informed various interpretive models including analyses of agency 
decision making (Boyer, 1960) and legislative activity (Polsby, 1969) before receiving its most significant 
adaptation when having its functionally distinct stages expressed in terms of subsystem activities (Jones, 
1970). By focusing attention on the stream of policy rather than on an analysis of institutional 
contributors  the executive, legislative or judiciary  Lasswell provided a conceptual map that 
transcended the limitations or boundaries of formal administrative activities. Furthermore, the framework 
helped to rationalise a problem-oriented perspective which was markedly different from earlier 
conceptions of the process (deLeon, 1999); it enabled a highly complex process to be sub-divided into 
identifiable stages and provided a mechanism that, even ardent critics concede (see Sabatier, 1999), led to 
a considerable amount of high quality research in the 1970s and 1980s.  
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David Eastons (1957) model of input/output exchanges, on the other hand, presents an 
open policy process conceived as an extension of an overall system of influences; 
analytically separated but, fundamentally, exposed to other social systems in which it 
is embedded (Easton, 1966:144). Eastons analytical separation3 of the policy process 
sees neighbouring environmental systems such as ecology, economy, culture, and social 
structure as ultimately responsible for the demands placed upon the political system 
(Easton, 1957). Demands or inputs, in models of this kind, are then subject to the 
mediating effects of system based determinants before being converted into policy 
outputs that are, in turn, passed back to neighbouring environmental systems (Easton, 
1957; Straayer, 1971; Simmons, Davis, Chapman & Sager, 1974). Eastons conception 
of an open system, buttressed by neighbouring social systems, clearly delineates 
endogenous and exogenous system-based determinants but, ultimately, Eastons policy 
system defines permeable boundaries by those actions that are related to the making of 
binding decisions. As such, it is possible to view the policy process as encompassing 
any antecedent, indirect or direct influence on the eventual exchange.  
 
2.2.3 Structural determination 
 
Structural accounts have tended towards causal perspectives of the policy process. A 
process so constrained or, depending upon the viewpoint, enabled by structural context 
and conditioned behaviour, that the very idea of a radical policy departure seems 
practically inconceivable. Funnel of causality descriptions of the policy process, for 
instance, present a political setting in which the scope of policy conversion, and that of 
political actors, is defined, and greatly restricted, by a progression of filtered and 
concurrent contextual pressures. These include historic and geographic conditions, 
socio-economic composition, mass political activity, institutional forces and elite 
                                                
3 Public policy is, therefore, the product of a combination of environmental pressure and internal system 
characteristics. Each system receives its inputs from neighbouring systems and, in turn, passes most of its 
outputs onto them (Susser, 1991). In short, the effect of all environmental conditions is mediated by the 
political system (Boyne, 1985) and policy choice is a collective output created by the push and pull of 
numerous conditions. The system itself, does not exist in any real or essential sense; it is an artificial 
construct with purely heuristic value (Easton, 1965). Despite the value of Eastons contribution, it has 
been noted that ambiguity, and a certain degree of contradiction, are a feature of Eastons protracted 
theory development (Astin, 1972). 
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behaviour (Hofferbert, 1974) as well as socio-economic conditions, power, culture4, 
ideology, institutions and activity within the decision process itself (Simeon, 1976). The 
approaches present a policy domain bounded by a largely inescapable set of system 
parameters and, in so doing, link policymaking to a much broader conception of 
political influences. Moreover, they provide a contextual setting for the policy process; 
a setting that dictates entry terms and subsequent limitations on the design and crafting 
of policy at each and every stage of development. In effect, structure and agency 
become competitive forces at opposite ends of the causality funnel. There is an 
acceptance of overwhelming contextual pressure but, at the same time, a degree of 
autonomy is granted. In both accounts, however, it is difficult to comprehend where, 
and more importantly why, structure ends and agency begins.  
 
The same fundamental issue is at the heart of institutional contributions in the field and, 
in particular, the interplay that exists between institutional arrangements and ideational 
influences. Seen through the institutionalist lens, individual and collective patterns of 
behaviour are viewed as a direct function of a constructed set of institutional constraints 
and policy feedback structures (Skocpol, 1992; Immergut, 1998). Institutional 
arrangements serve to reinforce the development of policy paradigms (Hall, 1992; 
Hall, 1993) or road maps (Goldstein & Keohane, 1993), underlying normative and 
cognitive frameworks that determine action in the policy domain and through which 
policymakers view the world.  These collective ideas are both social and holistic and 
have an inter-subjective quality that transcends individual ideas, belief systems, 
cognition, and psychology. Such ideas are usually embodied in symbols, discourse and 
the institutions themselves (Legro, 2000). Institutional socialisation is seen, therefore, as 
imparting the dominant institutional paradigm and, when subjected to it, individuals 
habitually reproduce prevalent patterns of that social context. In short, social life is 
                                                
4 The importance of dominant or orthodox ideas on levels of social conformity is a factor that has been 
widely considered (Kuran, 1995). Cultural theory, for instance, is premised upon the notion that social 
structures create cultural biases that, in turn, support prevailing social structures. A typology of biases has 
been developed and elaborated in the field: hierarchy; egalitarianism; individualism; fatalism; and 
autonomy (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1983; Thompson, Ellis & Wildavsky, 1990). These biases, it is argued, 
are the source of structural predisposition and, as such, have a significant bearing upon the policy process. 
Despite a guttural appeal, early studies discovered a poor relationship between cultural bias and risk 
perception (Sjoberg, 1996; Sjoberg, 1997; Brenot, Bonnefous & Marris, 1998) and, coupled with 
difficulties related to empirical testing of the theory, modified instruments have failed to provide stronger 
affirmation (Rippl, 2002). 
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viewed as fundamentally structured and, as a consequence, the choices made by 
individuals reflect that structure (Hays, 1994).  The relationship, therefore, between 
institutions and ideas, and the prevalence of dominant ideational structures, is a critical 
one for understanding the nature of the introduction and direction of government policy. 
The development of a new ideational structure must take place if policymakers are to 
craft policies informed by it (Jenkins & Eckert, 2000). Furthermore, the role of elites is 
critical to any understanding of how ideational structures are adapted within such 
environments; after all  
 
governments operate within the bounds of the conventional wisdom of their 
elites(and) cannot operate if policymakers stop to consider first principles. 
(Wallace, 2004:281) 
 
An important question then, given the significance of ideational structures, relates to 
whether the institutional arrangements that shape policy discussions are capable of 
facilitating challenges to the existing ideational structure that might, in turn, lead to 
radical new policy departures. Kiser & Ostroms three worlds of action (1982), 
depicts an institutional policymaking setting with three levels of decision activity in 
which the institutional arrangements, or rules, of one decision making level are 
predetermined by the rule setting activities of the higher level  the highest being that of 
constitutional-choice. Institutional arrangements, in the broadest sense, are formal and 
informal rules  
 
governing the number of decision makers, allowable actions and strategies, 
authorised results, transformations internal to decision situations, and linkages 
among decision situations. (Kiser & Ostrom, 1982:191) 
 
Within this system, bi-directional feedback is seen as responsible for evolutionary 
adaptations to ongoing institutional arrangements. In order to allow for the feedback to 
exist, and change to take place, variances in behaviour are explained by a lack of 
consistency in the way that individuals interpret rules. As with earlier incremental 
characterisations of the policy process (Lindblom, 1959; Braybrooke & Lindblom, 
1963), and subsequent attempts to reconcile explanations of incremental and 
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transformational change (Etzioni, 1967; Schulman, 1975), it remains difficult to 
understand how radical policy departures are possible within such an institutionalised, 
and paradigmatic, setting. After all, the closer the demand for change gets to the hard 
core values of the paradigm, the non-negotiable, inexorable, values that dictate 
strategy, the greater the resistance to such change from the policy system (Capano, 
2003).  
 
2.2.4 Post-structural accounts  
 
Baumgartner and Jones (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993), recognising the characteristic 
resistance to change and an incremental pattern of behaviour that serves to protect the 
status quo of policy subsystems, examined the expansion and contraction of policy 
issues over time to produce the punctuated-equilibrium theory of long-term agenda 
change and policymaking (True, Jones & Baumgartner, 1999). In short, fundamental 
change requires mobilisation, and implies conflict, if entrenched positions are to be 
challenged. Within such a model, major policy changes, set against a backdrop of 
subsystem incrementalism or gradualism, are viewed as policy punctuations5. Jones et 
al (2003), citing Herbert Simons (1996) contention that the output of an efficient 
system should perfectly reflect information flows emanating from its environment, go 
on to demonstrate that, in less-than-perfect human systems, the more friction imposed 
by institutional and social processes in the collective decision-making situation, the 
more punctuated the outcome. The depiction of punctuated equilibrium presented in the 
model is, therefore, one of subsystem stability, prevailing over long periods of time, and 
eventually falling out of step with environmental influences that dictate issue definition 
and, consequently, subsystem arrangements. When existing subsystems are disturbed in 
this way, new subsystems emerge to take their place and a pattern of stability and 
incrementalism is established in the newly defined policy domain. The conception of 
environmental responsiveness and transformation presented in the model highlights the 
boundary spanning composition of subsystems and, importantly, suggests that dynamic 
political change is a product of a collective challenge to the prevailing subsystems 
                                                
5 The punctuated equilibrium metaphor is borrowed from theoretical developments in the field of 
evolutionary biology. 
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definition of issue. A critical question, however, is where the origins of such a challenge 
lie.  
 
Building on the issue-attention work of Downs (1972) and Schattschneiders (1975) 
theory of conflict expansion, Baumgartner & Jones (1993) present political attention, 
created by widespread positive enthusiasm or a heightened negative awareness, as the 
catalyst for the development or dissolution of a subsystem. Existing subsystems are 
vulnerable to criticism of policies and failure. Group mobilisation, media exposure, and 
the activities of policy entrepreneurs are all capable of accelerating the process of 
subsystem disturbance. The enthusiasm, therefore, that challenges existing subsystem 
arrangements, and leads to the creation of new ones, is of particular interest when 
considering the origins of new policy ideas6.  
 
The Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) of Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1988; 1993) 
provides an alternative conception of subsystem politics based upon competition 
between advocacy coalitions. Such coalitions are comprised of stable groups of actors 
from public and private institutions, at every level of government, functioning across 
multiple interacting policy cycles. Coalition membership is seen as stable over long 
periods of time since members are bound together by core beliefs (Sabatier, 1988). They 
are ascribed a learning function, primarily concerned with environmental effects and 
intergovernmental interventions, in order that they can fulfil their goals over time. The 
specific nature of the policy subsystem is critical to the notion of policy change as 
coalition members mediate the exchange of interests and ideas in public policymaking 
(Howlett & Ramesh, 1998:469). Policy change is seen as a function of three variables: 
the interaction of competing advocacy coalitions within a subsystem; changes 
exogenous to the subsystem in socio-economic factors, system-wide coalitions, and 
activity in other policy subsystems; and, finally, the effects of stable system parameters 
on the constraints and resources of policy actors. A fundamental change in public policy 
is seen as taking place when one dominant coalition is replaced by another, or more 
indirectly, when one set of core beliefs succeeds in displacing another as the dominant 
                                                
6 Baumgartner and Joness (1993) contribution owes a considerable amount to the earlier work of 
Kingdon (1984) in which the activities of policy entrepreneurs and the significance of temporal 
opportunities are highlighted.  
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referential in the subsystem. Such a transition results primarily from changes that occur 
outside of the subsystem; for instance, when there are disturbances in macroeconomic 
conditions or system-wide governing coalitions.   
 
Both punctuated-equilibrium and advocacy coalition framework approaches to 
subsystem behaviour present a significantly different conception of group cohesiveness 
than that suggested by earlier models concerned with interests, iron triangles (Cater, 
1964), issue networks (Heclo & Wildavsky, 1974; Heclo, 1978), sub-governments 
(Richardson & Jordan, 1979), and policy networks (Knoke, 1990; Marsh & Rhodes, 
1992; Smith, 1993). The elegant integration of endogenous and exogenous system 
components into a wider conception of the political whole provides a more holistic 
depiction of political processes than scholars have traditionally posited. Sabatiers 
(1993) acknowledgement of Hofferbert (1974), and the incorporation of stable system 
parameters providing constraints in the form of social, legal, and resource features, links 
subsystem activity to a broader political and societal context. This, by implication, 
suggests that structural determinants, such as socio-cultural values and basic social 
structure, provide, at the very least, a basic contextual setting for the scope of competing 
belief systems upon which the framework is based. This explains the fundamental 
obstacle within the framework to system generated transformational change as the scope 
of the broader system overwhelmingly discourages actors from making them the object 
of strategising behaviour (1993:20); such change isnt impossible but, given that it 
would take decades to produce, is seen as far more likely to come from external events.  
 
2.2.5 Reconciling structure and agency in policymaking 
 
As with earlier depictions of political decision making7, notions of rational-choice and 
concepts such as utility have played an important and deterministic role in behavioural 
                                                
7 Herbert Simons (1948) vision of administrative decision making, in which goals were a given and decision making 
was, effectively, the process of implementation required to fulfill those objectives, had provided the dominant 
reference point for scholars. The limitations of such rational decision making models in explaining the legislative 
process were called into question, however, because of the complexity and ambiguity of political processes (Wahlke, 
Eulau, Buchanan & Ferguson, 1962) with some arguing that the application of social-psychological models should 
vary from context to context (Eulau, 1976). Lindblom responded to the rational-comprehensive view of 
policymaking, which posited that a policymaker should have a synoptic view of the problem before making policy 
decisions, with the notion of successive limited comparisons. Not only did Lindblom suggest that the limits of 
knowledge within which policymakers operated fell well short of this ideal but, by limiting the focus of policymaking 
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theories of the policy process. Moe (1990), for instance, highlights the significance of 
economic rationality in institutionalist contributions and argues that such approaches 
need to be complemented by a political theory that treats institutional adjustment as the 
product of political processes involving conflicts over power. In positing this political 
theory of public organisation, he suggests that the political decision becomes two-tiered: 
one part concerned with the internal hierarchy of the agency; and the other dealing with 
the political control structure linking it to politicians and groups (1990:122). 
Similarly, in the organisational theory literature, the heuristic value of economic 
rationality has been the subject of considerable debate since the 1970s. It has been 
forcefully argued that behaviour and institutions are so constrained by ongoing social 
relations that viewing them as independent of one another is a grievous 
misunderstanding (Granovetter, 1985). Structural embeddedness, the social context 
surrounding economic exchange, is critical to an understanding of the nature of the 
relationship and an ongoing refinement of the transaction cost model (Jones, Hesterly & 
Borgatti, 1997).  
 
Early institutional theory contributions tend to emphasise the significance of rules, 
myths and beliefs, and, specifically, the shared reality that they represent for those 
within the institutional setting (Selznick, 1957; Berger & Luckmann, 1966). The formal 
structures of many organisations were seen to dramatically reflect the myths of the 
institution rather than the demands of the economic setting. By incorporating these 
rules, myths and beliefs over time, organisations gained legitimacy, attracted resources, 
engendered stability and enhanced survival prospects (Meyer & Rowan, 1977:340). 
                                                                                                                                          
efforts to small adjustments in pursuit of marginally redefined policy goals, the goals of short term implementation 
took precedence over long-term objectives (Schulman, 1975). Within such a system, policy is not made once and for 
all; it is made and remade endlessly; the whole notion of political ends is called into question as policymaking 
becomes a process of successive approximation to some desired objectives in which what is desired itself continues 
to change under reconsideration (Lindblom, 1959:86). It has been argued by others that Lindblom is describing an 
administrative realm in which rational-comprehensive decision-making still remains the goal of administrators. 
Successive limited comparisons may explain the limitations of such rationality but, ultimately, it still depicts a 
policy administrator whose only constraints are intellectual; the administrator within such a model is relatively 
immune to politics (Hale, 1988). Lindblom subsequently acknowledged limitations of the approach and a number of 
decision situations, specifically large ones, in which it did not apply (Braybrooke & Lindblom, 1963); but he 
continued to defend incrementalism against critics (Lindblom, 1979) who sought to discredit the approach on the 
grounds of its dysfunctional justification for the malaise in policymaking or as providing theoretical-ideological 
support for an actual situation which, in fact, stems from inertia and a priori bias (Dror, 1964). Despite the debate 
concerning innovation and justification, the descriptive value of incrementalism has been extremely influential. 
Scholars have sought to modify the approach in order to resolve its limitations by distinguishing between incremental 
decisions and fundamental decisions or mixed scanning (Etzioni, 1967); while others have used the dominant 
paradigm to emphasise important alternative exceptions or non-incremental, indivisible policies (Schulman, 1975).  
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The emphasis on legitimisation as a sustained and driving force among organisational 
actors is a cornerstone of the institutionalist movement in organisation theory (Selznick, 
1996) and the greater the degree of social legitimacy perceived to be attainable from 
conformity to institutional pressures, the lower the likelihood of organisational 
resistance (Oliver, 1991). The notion of legitimacy seeking behaviour, as a principal 
motivator of action, provides a useful, if ultimately partial, explanation of individual 
behaviour; in the political context, it echoes earlier incrementalist contributions 
(Lindblom, 1959) and raises practically the same questions concerning explanations of 
transformational change.  
 
The omission of individual agency from earlier and more positivistic contributions, 
while not unusual at the time, is curious since the structures within which individuals 
are assumed to be constrained were created by human beings and could not continue to 
exist without their willing or unwilling and conscious or unconscious participation 
(Hays, 1994). Furthermore, without ascribing a meaningful or realistic depiction of the 
role of individuals within the policy process, it is difficult to explain the presence of 
ideas or innovation. Interestingly, this highlights a fundamental contradiction within 
such theories, after all, individuals ultimately provide the raw material upon which 
institutional theories are based. Lieberman (2002:697) describes this raw material as 
 
the goals and desires that people bring to the political world and, hence, the 
ways they define and express their interests: the meanings, interpretations, and 
judgments they attach to events and conditions; and their beliefs about cause 
and effect relationships in the political world and, hence, their expectations 
about how others will respond to their own behaviour.  
 
Acknowledging the ability of individuals to engage in deliberate and creative 
transposition is one way to inject agency into structural explanations and develop a 
more refined and dynamic theory of action (Campbell, 1998:383); after all, the 
capacity for desiring, for forming intentions, and for acting creatively  is inherent in all 
humans. (Sewell Jr., 1992:20) 
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In contrast to earlier depictions of the policy process, post-positivist approaches have 
been primarily concerned with the way in which situations are defined by human 
actions and are, therefore, made amenable to human intervention (Stone, 1989b). They 
are concerned with the way in which public policy is constructed by language in the 
sphere of public and private deliberation and discourse (Hawkesworth, 1988; Roe, 
1994; Danziger, 1995) and reflect the context-specific rhetoric character of analytical 
practices which includes the nature of language symbolism, consideration of audience, 
and the nature of problem construction and definition (Fischer & Forester, 1993:7). This 
view contrasts with the idea that societal problems are objective and identifiable and 
suggests that social problems exist in terms of how they are defined and conceived in 
society, where collective definition takes place (Blumer, 1971; Hilgartner & Bosk, 
1988). The consequences of such an approach for theories related to agenda setting and 
pre-agenda definitional activity are, therefore, profound  a theme that is considered in 
more detail in section 2.5.3 The three dimensions of power. Such issues are at the very 
heart of governmental processes, regardless of issue, level, or institutional arena, and are 
critical to any understanding of policy change (Rochefort & Cobb, 1993). In short, 
general laws of society are elusive, the objectives of policy rarely represent a clear and 
uncontested specifiable group, and, at any point, the intentional actions of individuals 
can subvert causal predictions of behaviour (Dryzek, 1993).  
 
The complex role played by language and metaphor has been slow to challenge more 
orthodox conceptions of the policy process8 but it has influenced some theory 
development within the field. The role of the individual in the Advocacy Coalition 
Framework, for instance, is especially interesting. Within the framework, goals are 
viewed as complex and the role of individual cognitive biases is central to the 
consideration of actions. As Sabatier himself claims (1999:130), the frameworks 
instrumentally rational actor owes more to social psychology than economic dictates. 
Reconciling the tensions, therefore, that exist between structural determination and 
individual agency, where both are the medium and the outcome of the practices which 
constitute social systems (Giddens, 1981:27), has become key to making sense of the 
nature of complexity that exists within the policy process. Seen through Giddenss lens 
                                                
8 It has been noted that a critical component of the characteristic hegemony of orthodox theory lies in the 
discursive substructure of policy studies in general and public administration in particular (Kochis, 2005) 
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of structuration (1981), structures shape human practices but, at the same time, human 
agents discursively and recursively create rules, practices, and routines that, over time 
and space, constitute and reproduce structure. The interplay that exists between the 
inter-subjective knowledge that defines actions and the interpretive significance of 
individuals is central to the process of adaptation and change; individual actions are 
defined by an inter-subjective understanding of structure but the meaning that 
individuals interpret from that structure can, itself, be the catalyst for change. 
 
2.2.6 Structural manipulation and transformational policy change 
 
A major problem with structural accounts of policy design is that they appear to deal in 
absolutes when most post-structural depictions of policy activity over the past thirty 
years have demonstrated the enormous vagaries of a process that is highly complex and 
multi-dimensional. Within this quagmire of policy related activity, overarching 
descriptions of political determination have become somewhat outmoded and 
unfashionable; in their place, rich descriptions of policy activity have demonstrated how 
political power has played out differently in different domains contingent, as it is, upon 
many factors. Not least of these are those that depict post-structural accounts of 
individual power and the often overlooked significance of a temporal dimension (see 
Kingdon, 1984). Recent interest in the macro determinants of comparative political 
economy, specifically, the institutional and ideational arrangements that result in 
varieties of capitalism with divergent national economic structures and regimes (Hall & 
Soskice, 2001; Hay, 2006a), has further highlighted the dangers of viewing structural 
influence as reliably deterministic in terms of outcome. Hay (2006a), for instance, 
demonstrates how countries with common reform trajectories can develop divergent 
policy paths; in the case of welfare systems, providing evidence of de-globalisation 
rather than globalisation.  
 
While such contributions are extremely valuable, they have tended to be more 
concerned with the reasons for comparative advantage and divergence rather than the 
nature, purpose, and essence of the structural prompt. There are, nonetheless, parallels 
that can be drawn between the conception of institutional influence that Hall and 
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Soskice (2001:13) advocate, in which the role of informal rules and shared 
understandings is critical to the securing of equilibrium in the strategic interactions of 
the political economy, and the exogenous function of shared understanding that can be 
seen to underpin the global structural context. They suggest that 
 
institutions central to the operation of the political economy should not be seen 
as entities that are created at one point in time and can then be assumed to 
operate effectively afterwards. To remain viable, the shared understandings 
associated with them must be reinforced periodically by appropriate historical 
experience. (2001:13-14) 
 
In this depiction, of course, the common knowledge that leads participants to 
coordinate on one outcome, rather than another (2001:13) is based upon elemental 
shared understandings. Changes to the assumptions that underpin these shared 
understandings result in the capacity for institutional change and, in so doing, enable the 
institution to adapt to revised environmental demands. This process is conceived as 
historical and based upon collective experience, and it is largely consistent with 
Baumgartner & Joness (1993) description of punctuated equilibrium brought about 
by the failure of the policy subsystem to efficiently mirror environmental influences that 
dictate issue definition and, consequently, subsystem arrangements.  
 
A stated previously, the enthusiasm that challenges existing subsystem arrangements, 
and leads to the creation of new ones, is of particular interest when considering where 
new policy ideas come from.  For, as much as the punctuated-equilibrium theory 
describes the interrelationship between gradual and transformational change, its 
dependence upon events, circumstance, and timing as causal stimulants for political 
attention, and conflict between issue definitions, suggests that the definitions are, 
themselves responses, rather than pre-existing stimulants, to contextual prompts. As 
such, it overlooks the possibility that pre-definition advocacy might have already 
defined what constitutes an event, circumstance, or temporally significant occurrence. 
 
Likewise, the Advocacy Coalition Framework of Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1988; 
1993), which views fundamental transitions in public policy as taking place when one 
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set of core beliefs succeeds in displacing another as the dominant referential in the 
subsystem, fails to acknowledge the role of elites, possibly at the fringes of its own 
networked coalitions, in creating the kind of exogenous disturbance to macro 
environmental conditions that might facilitate transformational change at the subsystem 
level. As currently constituted, the linking of wider structural determinants to subsystem 
activity within the framework might explain the fundamental obstacle to system 
generated transformational change, as actors are effectively discouraged from 
attempting such activity, but in viewing wider structural determinants as largely beyond 
the control of individuals, transformational change becomes an almost accidental 
consequence of competing coalition activity in space and over time. And while this 
might be an appropriate characterisation for much of what passes for activity at the 
policy domain level, the contention that transformational change would take decades to 
produce severely underestimates the ability of coordinated elite activity to manipulate 
the structural tolerances of change in the contemporary political setting.  
 
2.2.7 Conclusion 
 
The various contrasting views of the policy process provide, collectively, a sense of the 
complex issues that have divided and tormented policy process scholars over recent 
years. Assertions related to the existence and proximity of system boundaries have, in 
anything other than textbook devices, given way to a broader and more interrelated 
sense of the system and environmental whole. As with system theory developments in 
other fields, the role of the environment is seen as central to an understanding of 
adaptation (Emery & Trist, 1965) and systems are seen as largely incapable of self-
generated transformational change. Ultimately, the extent of adaptability to 
environmental turbulence is viewed as a function of ability to learn and to perform in 
line with changing exogenous contingencies (Terreberry, 1968).  
 
Theories concerning the initiation of policy have evolved from straightforward 
descriptions centred upon an objective consensus concerning problems and issues into a 
more complex debate regarding the inter-subjective nature in which issues are defined, 
framed, and, subsequently, managed within the policy process, a theme that is returned 
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to, in more detail, later in the review  see 2.5.3 The three dimensions of power. Staged 
depictions of the policy process, with inputs entering at one end and leaving at the other 
as policy outputs, have been superseded by a multi-dimensional depiction in which 
inputs can enter the process anywhere and at any time. The only bar is the extent to 
which the input can be sufficiently well purposed for the stated scope and objectives of 
the policy domain. Likewise, the only meaningful obstacle to the promotion of inputs 
onto the wider political agenda is not an intractable sense of what needs to be done but, 
instead, an ever shifting attempt to define political inputs in terms of structural and 
normative requirements that are, themselves, the subject of interpretation, definition, 
and articulation. The demand for more radical, system-wide, transformational change, 
given the enormous structural, institutional, and normative resistance it is likely to 
encounter, requires a type of political activity capable of subtly redefining the very 
substance of these pre-agenda structural and normative patterns  a theme that is 
returned to in section 2.5.3.1 Shared understanding and transformational change. 
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2.3 Politics and markets 
 
2.3.1 Introduction 
 
The structural interdependency of politics and markets in liberal democratic societies 
has been the subject of renewed, and intense, theoretical debate in recent years. Much of 
this is related to the seemingly irresistible forces of neo-liberalism and the globalisation 
project which have had the effect of significantly blurring traditional definitions of 
public and private. As early observers noted, it has become increasingly difficult to 
know where public government ends and private business begins (Nigro & Nigro, 
1973); the increasing incoherence of modern governments (Sharkansky, 1979) raises 
important questions concerning the public nature of public policy activity. This 
section of the literature review seeks to explore the nature of this relationship in the 
contemporary political setting and, specifically, the development of a legitimising 
collaborative ideology.  
 
2.3.1.1 The role of elite shared understanding 
 
The importance of the politics/market interdependency to theories of political change 
should not be underestimated and, neither therefore, should the role of business and 
political elites in defining the nature of such a relationship. It is argued that the shared 
understandings of political and economic elites reinforce and lend purpose to existing 
structural norms and may, where necessary, represent a deliberate attempt to redefine 
structural tolerances for the purposes of facilitating more dynamic political change. 
 
The requirement for dynamic change stems from a paradoxical market driven 
imperative that is enshrined in liberal democracies, namely, that they should provide 
political and economic stability. Such systems, frequently characterised as being in a 
state of equilibrium, manifest an inherent resistance to change and a policy process 
bound by incrementalism, checks and balances, and a myriad of countervailing 
processes and relationships that defy satisfactory explanation. Against the backdrop of 
such a deep-rooted model of intransigence, the market functions within a largely 
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predictable, and satisfactory, regulatory framework, content, where able, to influence 
the direction and detail of government policy. The extent of this ability, however, is 
governed by factors that serve to protect the overall stability of existing structured 
socio-economic arrangements. In order to facilitate change that calls into question these 
existing modes of governance, a new shared understanding of political objectives must 
firstly be created and structural norms must be re-interpreted and defined for the 
purposes of supporting a revised political and economic agenda.  
 
This theoretical perspective challenges a prevailingly reactive theme in the policy 
sciences literature concerning political inputs and the identification of problems. It 
suggests that political agenda setting, far from representing the beginning of the formal 
policy process, is a function of prior political processes embedded in the articulation, 
and not just interpretation, of structural and normative conditions. In doing so, it calls 
into question the notion of structural determination as a largely pre-defined contextual 
arrangement and seeks, instead, to emphasise the role of elite networks in lending 
purpose to its form and, thereby, manipulating the discursive and deliberative 
parameters that serve to determine action at the domain level of the policy process. 
Within such a depiction, structural context is a pliable phenomenon given tangible and 
immediate form through the creation of shared elite understanding.  
 
2.3.2 Market oriented policymaking 
 
In Charles Lindbloms seminal work Politics and Markets (1977), the common origins 
of polyarchy and market, as systems of popular control, are cited as a chief reason for 
the two to be linked together:  
 
the association between liberal constitutional polyarchy and market is clearly 
no historical accident. Polyarchies were established to win and protect certain 
liberties: private property, free enterprise, free contract, and occupational 
choice. Polyarchy also served the more diffuse aspirations of those elites that 
established it. For both the specific liberties, and for the exercise of self-help, 
markets in which the options can be exercised are required. (1977:164) 
 
 36
Historically, polyarchal societies have been characterised by favourable measures of 
economic and social development and provide the setting for the conception of the 
modern dynamic pluralist state (Dahl, 1989). Furthermore, and fundamentally entwined 
with our understanding of such development, markets are part of the very fabric of the 
constitution of the modern capitalist nation-state and contemporary world order (Cerny, 
1990). Against a backdrop of international capital flows, and the setting of the price of 
money across borders, the allocation of all goods in society is subject to the disciplines 
of the global financial marketplace; in short, this financial system represents the 
infrastructure of the infrastructure (Cerny, 1994).  
 
The development of globalisation has brought with it an intense pressure to reconcile 
political and economic tensions related to domestic and international policy; this has led 
to a rescaling of traditional governance systems (Brenner, 1998), the increasing 
dominance of private authority in areas such as international finance (Pauly, 2002) and 
the proactive participation of neo-liberal institutions shaping relations between state and 
market in the contemporary era (O' Riain, 2000). In brief, the states traditional 
boundaries have been under attack from the politics of market organisation (White, 
1993) and politics, everywhere, is now market driven (Leys, 2003). The 
interrelationship of economic and political activity is, more than ever, critical to a 
consideration of social mechanisms and systems; in the words of Lindblom (1997:8), 
much of politics is economics and most of economics is politics. 
 
Despite strong pluralist convictions, Lindblom (1988) was keen to highlight the role 
played by advantaged segments of society in narrowing diversity of opinion and 
discussion in order to protect their advantages from slow erosion. These concerns for 
the discursive foundations of democracy, despite the obvious absence of a class 
dimension, hint at a process similar to that of Gramscis cultural hegemony (1971); 
where the scope for ideological political conflict is, in effect, limited at source. The 
presence of the market control paradigm, for instance, hardwired into the structural and 
ideological consciousness of polyarchal systems of governance, ensures that the scope 
of political discursiveness is guided by the dictates of certain inalienable constructs. The 
extent of the pervasiveness of these constructs is evidenced not only in terms of limited 
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political debate and decisional incrementalism (Lindblom, 1959; Braybrooke & 
Lindblom, 1963) but also in the many philosophical justifications that have 
characterised political commentary during the latter half of the twentieth century. 
Drucker (1962), for instance, in a contribution that prefaces many later debates on 
regulation and voluntarism, notes that if we accept that public policy and economic 
performance are not separate9, and do not have their own distinct logic, we must also 
accept that the business enterprise, as an institution for economic performance, will, out 
of necessity, have public policy powers and responsibilities. The subtlety and 
seductiveness of this argument is, undeniably, compelling and it succeeds in disguising 
some fundamental questions related to formal legitimacy. Indeed, for Drucker (1962) 
and many pragmatists like him, such legitimacy is practically self-evident. It is for this 
reason that the subsequent development of a meta-narrative of neo-liberal micro-
economics, the silent grand theory that governs contemporary reason (Van Der Pijl, 
2005), has such profound implications for the bounds of political discourse in liberal 
democracies. 
 
In all accounts of the liberal democratic model, it is clear that the notion of separated 
spheres of economic and political activity is, by and large, discounted. The various 
interpretations of the relationship between politics and markets reflect a substantial 
agreement over the structurally advantaged position of business. Even if the relationship 
is far from static and stable (Vogel, 1983), and the role of the state, and state actors, has 
been significantly underestimated (Nordlinger, 1983; Mann, 1984; Weir & Skocpol, 
1985; Skocpol, 1985), we are still some way from the pluralist depiction of community 
power in which political and economic processes are considered to have a high degree 
of autonomy  see section 2.4.2 Power in the community. Furthermore, it is difficult to 
                                                
9 An obvious example of the consequences of this relationship can be found in the accountability of 
public officials for economic performance  an area where they have little control over certain key 
determinants of market activity i.e. private investment. There is evidence to suggest that a poorly 
performing economy, and deflated business confidence, are bad for prospects of political reelection 
(Tufte, 1979). In a similar vein, evidence has suggested that governments attempt to manipulate economic 
performance prior to elections in order to secure favourable outcomes (Schultz, 1995). Moreover, the 
strength of business/government relations continues to grow as global economic pressures increasingly 
lead to a situation where governments are acting as representatives of their national business communities 
(Baumgartner & Leech, 1998; Sell, 2003). 
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escape the conclusion that control of resources lies at the heart of conceptions of the 
state and notions of coercion and power in the policy making process.  
 
Resource dependency theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), a contribution from the 
organisational theory field, suggests that organisations are comprised of internal and 
external coalitions that emerge from social exchanges for the purpose of influencing and 
controlling behaviour (Ulrich & Barney, 1984); external organisational links are 
essentially power relationships based upon exchange resources. Demands are constantly 
placed on the organisation but it responds most acutely to those upon which it is most 
dependent for resources and survival. Where organisations are dependent for stability 
upon one another, mutual interdependencies can lead to increased coordination and 
mutual control over each others resources. Policy network contributors have utilised 
resource dependency, and the explanatory driver of exchange relationships, to provide 
support for descriptions of intergovernmental relations (Rhodes, 1979) while, 
elsewhere, it has been suggested that, as a consequence of mutual resource 
interdependency, economic and political elites form coalitions or regimes. The broad 
direction setting nature of such activity distinguishing it from the retail politics of 
lobbying and policy networks10 (Stone, 2005).  
 
In a system where boundaries are vague, where the distinction between governmental 
and quasi-governmental activity is blurred, where a structural relationship between 
economy and state is hardwired into the system of governance, and where non-state 
actors play a significant role in providing information, expertise, and support to those in 
positions of political power, a huge array of political resource interdependencies have, 
no doubt, been established. The resulting networks ensure that relationships develop a 
                                                
10 By the mid-1990s in the UK, policy network theory had influenced three Economic and Research 
Council programmes, the Intergovernmental Relations Initiative, the Relations Between Government and 
Industry initiative and much of the local governance programme (John, 2004). The Private Finance 
Initiative (PFI) introduced by the Conservative government in the early 1990s was later embraced by the 
Labour government which has subsequently introduced numerous examples of state/private sector 
collaboration or public-private partnership (PPP). There is considerable concern about the intrusion of 
private interest into areas of public policy such as education and health. The unprecedented, and largely 
seamless, erosion of previously protected state provision has raised questions about the nature of such 
collaboration in Britain.  
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routine and predictable quality; the most resistant to change being those networks with a 
dominant economic or professional bias (Marsh & Rhodes, 1992).  
 
The extent of economic determinism is, of course, a fundamental question and, its 
relevance is more acute given the advent of globalisation and the lack of a coherent 
global regulatory framework. The polyarchal nation-state, structurally dependent upon 
its domestic business interests, now finds itself subsumed within a global and 
structurally interconnected neo-liberal market paradigm. Within such a paradigm, the 
alternative to adherence is politically unthinkable; and the processes that are shaping the 
development of the new world order will, almost certainly, only accelerate. The 
demands placed upon government are, therefore, increasingly influenced by 
international considerations and market demands have assumed greater, and more 
urgent, primacy. Fundamental and rapid change cannot be brought about, however, 
without the ongoing and willing participation of the sovereign state; a participation that 
cannot be provided unless governments maintain their legitimacy in the face of 
structural and normative resistance to change. While Mitchells calculated heroism 
(1997:219) goes some way to explaining policymaker resistance to business influence 
along these lines, the manipulation of public preferences can, and does, play a critical 
role in securing downstream legitimacy in the policy debate  see section 2.5.3 The 
three dimensions of power. Indeed, where business is unified, its most effective form of 
influence is not through a direct approach to policymakers but, rather, through the more 
indirect influence of public opinion (Smith, 2000). In this sense, the ideological and 
structural strands of Lindbloms (1977) view of the privileged position of business in 
policymaking become inextricably intertwined.  
 
2.3.3 Pragmatism and collaboration in global governance 
 
It almost goes without saying that the pervasiveness of the Washington Consensus in 
recent years, coupled with the absence of a global regulatory framework, has ushered in 
a period of unprecedented market expansion and global trade liberalisation. The support 
given to such a cause by certain governments, notably that of the United States, and 
global financial institutions in pursuit of unfettered and open markets, with seemingly 
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little interest in the societal or environmental impact of such demands, has sparked a 
significant political response and the emergence of corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
networks desperately seeking to fill the regulatory vacuum (Hirschland, 2006). Such 
networks, which take a variety of forms but, in essence, conform to multi-stakeholder 
collaborative or partnered governance11 depictions, have sought to redress the perceived 
imbalance of transnational corporation power and the lack of regulatory constraint by 
ensuring that social and environmental considerations become an embedded feature in 
the ongoing and informal development of global economic standards and soft 
regulation. 
 
While few, with the obvious exception of ardent advocates of free markets, would argue 
with the necessity for such activity, the motivation, composition, and conduct of such 
networks is largely overlooked. In its place is to be found a widespread 
acknowledgement of the failure of government and collective action initiatives at the 
intergovernmental level and a pragmatic realisation that complex and unbounded global 
problems require an immediate and collaborative response. Questions related to 
accountability and legitimacy are increasingly addressed by a subtle reframing of the 
problem rather than a genuine attempt to grapple with the conceptual difficulties 
presented by an underlying deficit in both areas. As a consequence, such questions are 
ignored, as naively idealistic, in the clamour to achieve what are, essentially, 
consensual, non-binding, accords between public and private actors. Such pragmatism 
may be a realistic response to the complex problems of global governance but it comes 
at a price and that price is a loss of clarity related to core principles and the downstream 
ambiguities that will, no doubt, accompany it.  
 
 
 
                                                
11 Collaborative governance, despite some subtle definitional differences, usually depicts a scenario in 
which public and private actors are brought together with public agencies for the purposes of reaching 
consensus-based decisions. Partnered governance refers to the mix of legal regulatory and soft 
governance accords that have the combined effect of regulating action; the term is increasingly used to 
describe the type of governance applied in the transnational setting to business corporations. Such 
corporations find themselves subject to domestic regulation at the nation state level but, in the 
transnational arena, where such regulation is largely unenforceable, are constrained only by a raft of 
multi-stakeholder agreements and accords. 
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2.3.4 The logic of collaboration 
 
Collaboration has long been seen as a solution to problems associated with complexity 
in the contemporary political setting; in particular, where such problems are viewed as 
beyond resolution by a single organisation. In order to satisfactorily address such 
problems, organisations must come together and  
 
collaborate at the domain level of common concern (they must) share an 
appreciation for the problem, identify their areas of shared concern, determine the 
direction of their actions, establish the boundaries of collaboration, and develop an 
inter-organisational structure that accommodates both shared and conflicting interests. 
(Trist, 1983) 
 
In the past thirty years, collaboration has supplanted traditional forms of hierarchic 
governance as the most appropriate means of dealing with complex political and 
societal issues (Clarence & Painter, 1998; Kooiman, 1999; Midttun, 1999). In doing so, 
it has become this eras source of imagined hope(and) underpins todays utopian 
visions of social organisation (Zadek, 2005). Furthermore, collaboration has become a 
principle mechanism for tackling complex problems related to the issue of public goods 
in areas as diverse as economic development, regulation and administration, 
globalisation, the environment, poverty, education and health. And at practically all 
levels of administrative activity, from local partnerships through to transnational forums 
and networks, examples of collaborative governance are to be found12. The types of 
activity vary substantially and reflect different challenges as well as differing regulatory 
contexts but the engagement of non-state actors, most especially in the transnational 
arena, reflects the reality that a large percentage of world population lives in areas of 
weak state control, that there has been a significant loss of confidence in state-centred 
governance, and that collective tasks in a complex, interconnected, information dense 
world  knit together and energised by powerful market forces  simply cannot be 
accomplished (well, or at all) by government acting alone. (Donahue, 2004:1) 
                                                
12 In their forthcoming paper, Ansell & Gash (2008) review evidence from 137 cases of collaborative 
governance across a range of policy sectors 
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A peculiar aspect of the discourse surrounding inter-organisational relationships is that 
it tends to emphasise the functional aspects of collaboration (Hazen, 1994). By bringing 
together stakeholders from different organisations, public and private, proponents argue 
that stakeholders are able to create an inclusive form of transparency and understanding 
and, thereby, improve the potential for problem-solving. This rather managerial 
depiction of the role of collaboration, however, misses a crucial point:  
 
collaboration between organisations is not necessarily good, conflict is not 
necessarily bad, and surface dynamics are not necessarily an accurate representation 
of what is going on beneath. (Hardy & Phillips, 1998)  
 
It emphasises a preoccupation with process outcomes, rather than governance outcomes 
(Ansell & Gash, 2008) and, therefore, threatens to distort our understanding of its value. 
In short, the concentration on process, and more functional aspects of collaboration, has 
tended to overlook the socio-political context that frames the emergence of such 
activity, determines its purpose, structures its agenda, shapes its parameters of 
acceptable discourse, selects participants, and fundamentally drives its output, tangible 
or otherwise. The significance of underlying power relations (Hardy & Phillips, 1998), 
and an acknowledgement of such factors as leadership (Ozawa, 1993; Huxham & 
Vangen, 2000), are essential to a broader appreciation of the collaborative exercise; 
moreover, without understanding the motivation for collaboration among individual 
participants, and the direct and indirect consequences of such activity for those parties, 
we are left with an instrumental and, somewhat, romantic depiction of its purpose.  
 
Despite these observations, there can be little doubt that the balance between state and 
non-state actors in the political activities of advanced industrialised communities has 
shifted considerably in recent decades and is likely to shift still further (Florini, 2000; 
Josselin & Wallace, 2001). What should not be overlooked, however, is the emergence 
of a collaborative ideology that has provided much of the intellectual legitimacy for 
this transition.  In the case of global business regulation, for instance, we have 
witnessed the development of an era of global civil regulation (Hirschland, 2006) in 
response to an earlier, and concurrent, period of de-regulation based upon the demands 
of market efficiency (Eisner, 2000). Significantly, this emergent form of soft 
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governance, which has frequently taken the form of direct partnerships between NGOs, 
the self-appointed representatives of civil society in the transnational setting, and 
transnational corporations, has spawned its own legitimising and guiding discourse: that 
of corporate responsibility. The failure of the OECDs Multilateral Investment 
Agreement (MAI) in 1998, cited by some as the turning point in the shifting balance 
between capital and citizen interest at the global level (Smythe, 2000; Walter, 2001), 
may have led governments to  
 
rethink their whole approach to negotiating international liberalisation agreements. Re-
branding and re-legitimising their liberalisation process (was) likely to involve opening 
it up to much greater NGO participation, both at the domestic and international levels 
(Walter, 2001:150),  
 
but how much of a backlash13 to government and pro-trade business collusion over 
global market liberalisation, and its impacts, the subsequent corporate responsibility 
project represents is highly debatable14.  
 
Corporate social responsibility networks in the transnational setting do, of course, 
provide just one example of how the logic of collaboration has permeated the 
underlying basis of rationality in policymaking. They are of particular interest, however, 
because the governance vacuum they are designed to fill is, in a sense, maintained by 
the logic of such an approach.  
 
                                                
13 When the Global Compact was proposed to the World Economic Forum in January 1999, UN Secretary 
General Kofi Annan warned delegates that global unease about poverty, social inequality and 
marginalisation was reaching  a critical mass: I was concerned that unless global markets were 
embedded in shared values and responsible practices, the global economy would be fragile, and 
vulnerable to backlash (2004:1). OECD members were, themselves, concerned at the prospect of a 
political backlash to the globalisation project during the MAI negotiations in 1998 (Smythe, 2000); and 
this concern has continued to date. Commenting on the annual OECD Employment Outlook in June 2007, 
Angel Gurria, the OECDs Secretary General, stated that millions are benefiting from globalisation but 
at the same time there's a feeling something's wrong with the process (see 
http://www.stwr.net/content/view/1995/36/). 
14 It has not curtailed further attempts to reach agreement on the subject of global investment regimes; 
even if the tone of such debate has softened to emphasise the importance of educating opponents as part 
of the globalisation agenda (Smythe, 2003) 
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2.3.5 Conclusion 
 
The structural interdependency of politics and markets is critical to any understanding 
of political, or societal, change; and the relationship between political and economic 
elites represents a key mechanism of structural readjustment. For the most part, the 
overall integrity of existing socio-economic arrangements is preserved by such 
interdependency but, when demands for more dynamic forms of change are required, 
the shared understandings of political and economic elites are pivotal to establishing the 
cognitive latitude likely to facilitate such change  this theme is returned to in section 
2.5.3.1 Shared understanding and transformational change. 
 
The emergence of collaboration, a pragmatic response to the challenges of complexity 
in the contemporary era has, in many ways, avoided many serious questions related to 
the legitimacy or efficacy of the approach. A normative preoccupation with process 
rather than outcomes has tended to reinforce functional philosophical arguments and 
such a seemingly sensible and moderate doctrine has had the effect of making 
extremists of its critics. Ultimately, however, multi-stakeholder collaboration might best 
be viewed as a product of the pervasiveness of neo-liberal conceptions of the role and 
limitations of government. Collaborative ideology provides a supporting narrative, 
and considerable legitimacy, for processes and relationships that are already an 
embedded feature and reality of political activity within, and between, liberal 
democracies.  
 
2.4 The transnational power elite 
 
2.4.1 Introduction 
 
It is not possible to discuss the existence, or otherwise, of a transnational power elite 
without reference to earlier community power debates of the 1950s and 1960s and, 
specifically, C. Wright Millss (1956) seminal contribution The power elite. These 
debates, with their central concern for the distribution of power in society, have 
provided a contested backdrop to many subsequent lines of theoretical and empirical 
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inquiry. And, further, they are of considerable relevance to the consideration of 
collaboration in matters of global governance.   
 
Formal and informal elite interactions in the transnational setting form part of a much 
broader and complex depiction of political and economic processes than that posited by 
traditional, state-centred, theories of international relations. In the post-Cold War 
period, these processes have moved beyond earlier ideological and political constraints 
and reflect a much greater concern for consensus and legitimacy. The interplay between 
economic and political forces within such a context is of particular interest when 
considering the nature of a transnational power elite.  
 
2.4.2 Power in the community 
 
2.4.2.1 Elite theories 
 
The community power debate of the 1950s and 1960s really began with Floyd 
Hunters 1953 study of elite power in Atlanta (1969). It was the first of many studies to 
identify the existence of a cohesive social group that appeared to have disproportionate 
amounts of power and influence in society. According to Hunter (1969:113), 
 
the top group of the power hierarchy has been isolated and defined as 
comprised of policy makers. These men are drawn largely from the 
businessmens class in Atlanta. They form cliques, or crowds, as the term is 
more often used in the community, which formulate policy. 
 
Hunter (1969) suggested that this group were comprised of corporation owners, senior 
executives and corporate lawyers of the largest banks and other businesses in the city. 
They lived in the same neighbourhoods, belonged to the same clubs, and were on 
interlocking boards of directors. Importantly, they played a crucial role in initiating 
policy through these informal networks. This depiction of a businessman class 
formulating policy through informal discussions and networks was subsequently 
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replicated in Atlanta15 and mirrored in a number of other US cities. For instance, Scott 
Cummings and Edmond Sniders (Cummings & Snider, 1988) case study of Dallas, 
demonstrates how local development and real estate interests, in cooperation with city 
officials, orchestrated a revitalisation and redevelopment plan for the city. This alliance, 
between factions of the local business elite and City Hall led to a potent political force 
that crushed opposition voices. Similarly, Joe Feagins (1988) case study of urban 
development policy in Houston showed how a dogma of free enterprise caused 
development chaos in the city and seriously compromised quality of life. He concluded 
that Houstons business elite appeared to have an unrestrained capacity to formulate 
development policy in the city (Feagin, 1988). In short, elites were using public 
authority and private power as a means of stimulating economic development and 
enhancing their own interests (Cummings, 1988). 
 
More recently, it has been argued that, out of mutual interest and interdependency, 
economic and political elites form coalitions or regimes. Clarence Stones study of 
Atlanta (1989a) provides an urban regime approach that is distinct from earlier elite 
contributions because of its focus on who influences priorities rather than who makes 
decisions. But regime analysis emphasises the role that social stratification plays in 
underpinning social and economic parity; politics is primarily accessible to those who 
meet substantial threshold tests (Stone, 2005). Stones study of Atlanta (1989:219) 
provides evidence of how business interests were able to shape a citys policy agenda 
by becoming an integral part of a system of civic co-operation16. An agreement on 
fundamental values ensures longevity and sustains the regime through periods of 
changing personnel and leadership (Dowding, Dunleavy et al, 1999).  
 
Elite theories of power were given their most significant articulation with the 
publication of C. Wright Millss The power elite (1956). In it, Mills (1956) described 
                                                
15 William Domhoff (2005a) highlights a study produced by pluralist scholar M. Kent Jennings (1964) 
that he claims completely vindicates the work of Hunter and, specifically, his highly criticised 
"reputational method. Domhoff concludes that the fact that this simple truth has never been 
acknowledged is a commentary on the power of pluralism within the political science fraternity.  
16 A more recent study of regimes in London (Dowding et al., 1999) suggests an eight point 
characterisation for identifying their existence. These include the observation that a regime has a distinct 
policy agenda, it operates beyond formal structures, it creates public-private modes of interaction and it 
mobilises external resources. 
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how national power in the US resided in the economic, political and military domains. 
He suggested that nobody could have power unless they had access to the command of 
major institutions, 
 
The power elite is composed of men whose positions enable them to transcend 
the ordinary environments of ordinary men and women; they are in positions to 
make decisions having major consequences. Whether they do or do not make 
such decisions is less important than the fact that they do occupy such pivotal 
positions: their failure to act, their failure to make decisions, is itself an act that 
is often of greater consequence than the decisions they do make. For they are in 
command of the major hierarchies and organisations of modern society. They 
rule the big corporations. They run the machinery of the state and claim its 
prerogatives. They direct the military establishment. They occupy the strategic 
command posts of the social structure, in which are now centred the effective 
means of the power and the wealth and the celebrity which they enjoy.(Mills, 
1956:3-4) 
Millss (1956) characterisation of US national politics as being dominated by a 
concentrated power elite suggested a form of group coherence that was not entirely in 
line with the earlier findings of Floyd Hunter (1969) although the central emphasis was 
the same. Millss (1956) contribution went considerably further, however, in explaining 
the origins of, and access to, elite membership. The significance of wealth and social 
status are emphasised as is the significance of socialisation and conformity within elite 
circles. These themes are further highlighted by William Domhoff (2002) who has 
forcefully demonstrated the significance of wealth in supposedly democratic states. He 
summarises his position in the following way (Domhoff, 2005b), 
The rich coalesce into a social upper class that has developed institutions by 
which the children of its members are socialised into an upper-class worldview, 
and newly wealthy people are assimilated. Members of this upper class control 
corporations, which have been the primary mechanisms for generating and 
holding wealth in the United States for upwards of 150 years now. [And] there 
exists a network of non-profit organisations through which members of the 
upper class, and hired corporate leaders not yet in the upper class, shape policy 
debates in the United States. 
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It is important to note that Domhoff attempts to espouse a theory of elite rule that is 
distinct from Marxist conceptions of institutions and class but the task is bedevilled by 
terminological difficulty and complex problems related to conceptions of economic 
and non-economic organisation (Bendix, 1991:90). And, while Robert Michels (1962) 
iron law of oligarchy goes some way to explaining oligarchic rule in non-economic 
terms, or at least quasi-economic terms, it presents considerable difficulties for those 
elite theorists, such as Domhoff, who have emphasised class stratification and 
domination (Bendix, 1991:90).   
2.4.2.2 The pluralistic conception of power dispersal 
The classic pluralist perspective views power as dispersed throughout society into many 
different and competing groups; political decisions are the product of government 
mediating between these competing forces. For pluralists, groups are essential to the 
political process; they are the means of representation for the interests of various sectors 
of society (Smith, 1993). The role of government, therefore, becomes that of arbitrating 
and bartering between the multitude of competitive forces that exist within society. 
Indeed, the form of government is dynamic and reflects the nature of its response to 
these forces; in the words of Truman (1951:508), 
 the total pattern of government over a period of time thus presents a protean 
complex of criss-crossing relationships that change in strength and direction 
with alterations in the power and standing of interests, organised and 
unorganised. 
For Truman (1951), therefore, the overall direction of state policy is a function of the 
various countervailing influences that government is exposed to and out of this barrage 
of requirements, state policy develops. Trumans description of the complex texture of 
decentralised bargaining was readily assimilated into Robert Dahls pluralist view of 
power (McFarland, 1987). Dahl (1961) argued that democratic rights would be 
protected within such a system primarily because of the huge diversity of interest that 
exists within society. In stark contrast to Floyd Hunters research (1969), his study of 
New Haven city politics observed that power was disaggregated and non-cumulative 
and, although he found evidence of political resource inequality, he described the 
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political system of New Haven as one of dispersed inequalities (1961: 89). In short, 
Dahl (1961) concluded that in less than a century, a political system dominated by a 
patrician based elite had disappeared and been replaced by a system of many different 
sets of leaders, each with access to a different combination of resources.  
 
For Dahl (1961), and other pluralist theorists, influence was best conceived of as 
specialised, that is, that those with influence in one domain are unlikely to be influential 
in another. Despite considerable criticism of this stance, there has been more recent 
empirical support for the claim. For instance, in their study of Washington 
Representatives, Heinz et al (1990) looked to establish whether evidence of an inner 
circle of private interest representatives could be established. Their findings indicated 
that the acquaintance network structures of Washington Representatives do not have 
central cores or authoritative mediators; in other words, they could find no evidence 
of an identifiable group of core actors. They concluded that the acquaintance 
networks of Washington Representatives might be viewed as resembling a sphere with a 
hollow core (Heinz, Laumann et al, 1990). 
 
It is important to note, however, that such findings do not preclude the existence of 
elites within specific domains. Pluralists do accept that some inequalities exist within, 
and between, groups but do not believe that power is accumulated. In a similar vein, 
resource inequality is seen as no guarantee of power within the domain. Business 
interests, for instance, while well resourced, were initially viewed as primarily 
concerned with direct business legislation and, therefore, only marginally affecting 
other policy domains. Finers (1958) study of the types, strategies, and tactics of lobby 
groups in Britain, for example, presented a classic pluralist perspective in which the 
wealth of certain groups was not seen to deliver any special resources over those of less 
resourced groups because of the myriad of ways available to poorer associations to 
influence government policy. The influence of all groups, therefore, is primarily the 
product of resource availability. Wealth is just one resource that can affect a groups 
ability to influence state policy 
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There has been substantial criticism of the pluralist perspective of power dispersal in 
contemporary politics. For instance, policy network activity has provided significant 
evidence of elite representation; in short, 
 
the policy network metaphor does suggest that policy in Britain is the product 
of an elitist power structure, albeit one fragmented between functional areas. 
(Marsh & Rhodes, 2002:101) 
 
Commenting on a number of British case studies, Marsh & Rhodes (2002:101) note 
that,  
 
in each area, a limited number of groups enjoyed privileged access to policy 
making, shaping both the policy agenda and policy outcomes. There is little 
evidence that a plurality of groups is involved in policy making. 
 
Similarly, Browne (1990) observed how agricultural issue representation was 
increasingly organised around the accommodation of more and more players; evidence, 
he suggests, of a fragmented elite dominance among the interest groups of the policy 
domain. Contrary to the pluralist ideal of competing interests within policy domains, 
and given the discrete forms of influence that are employed by certain groups, the 
reality is that a huge amount of policy activity goes uncontested (Baumgartner & Leech, 
2001). The issue of discrete practices is inextricably entwined with a broader debate 
related to pluralist and elitist conceptions of power, a theme that is returned to in section 
2.5.3 The three dimensions of power. 
 
Perhaps the most vociferous of all critics of pluralism is Theodore Lowi (1969). In 
particular, of its faith in a system built primarily upon groups and bargaining as self-
corrective devices. Lowi (1969) draws a parallel between equilibrium in market theory 
and political theory and suggests that, 
 
pure pluralist competition, similarly, might produce political equilibrium, but 
the experience of recent years shows that it occurs at something far below an 
 51
acceptable level of legitimacy, or access, or equality, or innovation, or any other 
valued political commodity. (Lowi, 1969:57-58) 
 
2.4.2.3 The inconclusive state of the power debate 
 
Although the debate between pluralists and elite theorists continued throughout the 
1960s, the credibility of the pluralist argument was ultimately called into question by 
common experiences of politics in the late 1960s and early 1970s (McFarland, 1987). 
Although, it should be stated, that the empirical debate between the two groups was, 
ultimately, rather inconclusive. Whether the elite is a concentrated class or a rotating 
populace is a quantitative issue; it might be both, but no metric of the degree of 
concentration has been applied to make any statement rigorous (Bauer, Pool & Dexter, 
1972).   
 
The issue of power distribution, therefore, is clearly unresolved although the differences 
between the two poles are, for some, not as great as they might first appear. Some have 
argued that a middle ground, flawed pluralism or biased participation (Greenwald, 
1977), is a more likely description of actual power distribution; while others have 
argued that it is possible for multiple models to exist in the same political system 
(Kennedy, 2005). There is, however, no definitive or widely accepted description of the 
distribution of power or, for that matter, any agreement on the nature of power itself. 
This underlying deficit, a theme that will be returned to in section 2.5.1 Power relations 
in the political setting/Introduction, is something that is unlikely to be satisfactorily 
reconciled. 
 
2.4.3 Transnational politics and policy 
 
2.4.3.1 Defining transnational processes 
 
Before considering the role and impact of transnational politics it is important to define 
the meaning of three core terms: international, transnational and global. These terms are 
often used interchangeably but their meanings, within the contexts of international 
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political economy and global system theory17, are quite different. Leslie Sklair (2001) 
provides a useful working distinction that will serve as the basis for my own analysis: 
international relates to forces, processes, and institutions based on the pre-existing 
(even if changing) system of nation states (2001:2); transnational refers to forces, 
processes, and institutions that cross borders but do not derive their power and authority 
from the state (2001:2); and global has a more narrow definition as the goals to which 
processes of globalisation are leading(namely) the establishment of a borderless 
global economy, the complete denationalisation of all corporate procedures and 
activities, and the eradication of economic nationalism(2001:3).  
 
2.4.3.2 Transnational politics and the transnational policy elite 
 
While international cooperation and negotiation between states has traditionally been 
the focus of international relations and foreign affairs studies, transnational political 
activity transcends the formal boundaries of state sovereignty and interaction and draw 
in participants from outside of the formal political sphere. Indeed, in the case of 
transnational forums and networks, it has been argued they are initiated by non-state 
interests and, specifically, the interests of transnational capital. Neo-Marxist scholars 
have, for some time, suggested that these networks are evidence of the development of a 
transnational phase of capitalism and, critically, the formation of a transnational 
capitalist class (Van Der Pijl, 1998; Robinson & Harris, 2000; Sklair, 2001).  
 
Drawing upon Robert Coxs earlier work on social forces and world orders (Cox, 1987), 
and lending additional support to the then contentious view that Americas hegemonic 
power was expanding rather than receding (Strange, 1987), Stephen Gill (Gill & Law, 
1989; Gill, 1990) cites the transition of global capital from national to transnational 
form as an explanation of the United States sustained hegemonic presence in 
international affairs. This, he contends, has resulted in the development of an 
                                                
17 Global system theory is premised on the existence of transnational practices; practices that cross 
boundaries but do not originate with state actors or agencies. Sklair (1999; 2001) views the global system 
whole as comprised of transnational practices within three spheres: economic, political and cultural-
ideological. He contends that the global system, at the end of the twentieth century, is not synonymous 
with global capitalism, but the dominant forces of global capitalism are the dominant forces in the global 
system (Sklair, 1999:436). 
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international elite, whose members are drawn from leading industrial nations and whose 
existence represents the formation of an historic bloc18 of social forces centred in the 
United States. Elsewhere, links between the United States multinational bloc19 
(Ferguson, 1984) and their European counterparts, is seen as having led to the 
strengthening of a transatlantic community in the post-war period. The congruence of 
forces that led to, and sustained, the emergence of a transatlantic class represents, it is 
argued, a coherent international historic bloc (Van der Pijl, 1985; Gill & Law, 1989; 
Robinson & Harris, 2000).  
 
There exists a widespread appreciation of the role played by globalisation in the 
development of this emergent transnational class and, critically, an almost universal 
appreciation of the central role of transnational corporations in the wider globalisation 
project. Sklair (2001) views the transnational class as comprised of four groups: 
corporate executives, globalising bureaucrats and politicians, globalising professionals 
and consumerist elites. While Robinson and Harris (2000:40) suggest that the 
transnational capitalist class is, 
 
comprised of the owners and managers of the transnational corporations and 
other capitalists around the world who manage transnational capital. The bloc 
also includes the cadre, bureaucratic managers and technicians who administer 
the agencies of the TNS [transnational state], such as the IMF, the World Bank, 
and the WTO, the States of the North and South, and other transnational 
forums. And membership in the hegemonic bloc also includes politicians and 
charismatic figures, along with selected organic intellectuals, who provide 
ideological legitimacy and technical solutions. 
 
                                                
18 See Gramsci (1971) 
19 Ferguson charts the development and composition of the emergent multinational bloc in the first half 
of the twentieth century and identifies the source of its advantage vis-à-vis other blocs. He states The 
multinational bloc included many of the largest, most rapidly growing corporations in the economy. 
Recognised industry leaders with the most sophisticated managements, they embodied the norms of 
professionalism and scientific advance that in this period fired the imagination of large parts of American 
society. The largest of them also dominated major American foundations, which were coming to exercise 
major influence not only on the climate of opinion but the specific content of American public policy 
(Ferguson, 1984:68). 
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Given the role accorded to transnational corporations by such analyses, surprisingly 
little empirical data appears to exist that identifies the existence, or otherwise, of such a 
homogenous business community or transnational class. One exception to this occurs 
with the, now established, analysis of interlocking directorates at the national (Useem, 
1984; Scott, 1997; Domhoff, 2002; Murray, 2006) and transnational levels (Fennema, 
1982; Carroll & Fennema, 2002).  
 
In an attempt to better understand the existence, or otherwise, of a transnational class 
Carroll and Fennemas (2002) work on interlocking directorates provides a unique 
insight into patterns of ownership and transnational board interlocks. Mirroring 
Fennemas (1982) earlier study of 176 leading international corporations (135 industrial 
corporations and 41 banks), this second study delivered firm evidence of a transnational 
network albeit one that resembled a superstructure that rests upon rather resilient 
national bases (2002:414). This network, which had consolidated during the period 
between the two studies, drew in large corporations and was comprised mainly of thin, 
secondary interlocks and outside corporate directors (2002:415). Furthermore, there 
was strong evidence in support of the Atlantic network thesis (Van der Pijl, 1985) with a 
clear concentration of ties within and between the United States and Europe.  
 
Preliminary results from follow-up research on the Global 50020, looking at the period 
1996-2004 (Carroll, 2007), suggest a further concentration of asset accumulation in the 
United States and Europe and points to a significant expansion of transnational 
interlocking. While national interlocks had declined in the period, transnational 
interlocking had increased significantly with almost half of the Global 500 having at 
least one transnational interlocker on their board. The largest increases were in the area 
of intra-regional interlocks; with Europe, in particular, witnessing a significant 
expansion of activity along these lines.  This contrasted with more modest growth in the 
United States and elsewhere. More recent work on European integration suggests that, 
as German capital has become increasingly pivotal within the continental European 
network, the composition of the Atlantic network has altered to reflect a greater number 
of links by German firms into the United States network. To the East, it has created 
                                                
20 See Fortune magazines Global 500  
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stronger ties with Russian firms and, in particular, those in the energy sector (Van Der 
Pijl & Raviv, 2007).  
 
One of the shortcomings of early studies on interlocking directorates, itself 
acknowledged by Carroll and Fennema (2002), is the singular focus on formal corporate 
interlocks as vehicles of transnational class formation; a fault partially addressed by the 
inclusion, in subsequent analysis, of formal and informal elite policy planning groups 
(Carroll & Carson, 2003). By situating five such planning groups, perceived to be 
engaged in elite consensus building  the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), 
the Bilderberg Group, The Trilateral Commission, The World Economic Forum (WEF) 
and the World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD)  within the 
context of a broader structure of transnational interlocking corporate power, the authors 
attempt to provide evidence of the role such organisations play in the formation of a 
transnational class and, importantly, their role in the creation and diffusion of a 
transnational neo-liberal hegemonic culture. With the exception of the ICC, which is 
viewed as performing an integrative role between the centre and its fringes, the groups 
are seen as, 
 
deeply enmeshed within the global corporate elite. They are substantially 
interlocked with each other as well as with common corporate boards, a small 
number of which account for two-fifths of all the corporate policy links 
(Carroll & Carson, 2003:97-98).  
 
The research supports the contention that a global corporate elite has, indeed, formed 
and that a few dozen cosmopolitans (Carroll & Carson, 2003:97), mainly from the 
United States and Europe, bind the corporate-policy network together21. 
 
These contributions, from the fields of international political economy and global 
systems theory, present a view of transnational forums and networks as essentially the 
                                                
21 The research on policy-group affiliations demonstrates how a nucleus of six transnational linkers, and 
seventeen corporate directors in total, create a plethora of relations among the policy groups. The 
authors claim that the network is highly centralised in terms of the individuals and organisations that 
participate in it. Yet, from its core it extends unevenly to corporations and individuals positioned on the 
fringes of the transnational network (2003:97). 
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coordinative and communications infrastructure of a transnational elite; an elite, if not 
dominating in any clear sense, then certainly responsible for the creation, perpetuation, 
and projection of a prevailing hegemonic culture, that of economic neo-liberalism.  
 
Whether the historical development of such networks and forums has been as deliberate 
or purposeful as some of the descriptions suggest is the subject of some debate and, 
furthermore, the question whether such an elite really represents a transnational 
capitalist class is, in the words of Carroll and Carson (2003: 67), a matter partly of 
semantics and partly of substance.  
 
2.4.3.3 Transnational forums and networks 
 
While there is a considerable literature related to the activities of formal inter-
governmental and quasi-governmental groups in the transnational setting such as the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO), World Bank and International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), the general paucity of material available on informal transnational groups and 
networks is striking. A free-text search of academic databases22 on groups such as the 
Bilderberg Group and the Trilateral Commission demonstrates how such groups have 
largely escaped the attention of scholars over the past fifty years (see Appendix A. 
Informal transnational groups/free text search). When one considers the elite 
composition of such groups, and the fact that they are credited in some quarters with 
considerable influence, this is an astounding scholarly omission. Such an omission is 
almost certainly the product of a broader reluctance on the part of social scientists to 
engage in research related to elite groups or dominant classes. As Leslie Sklair (2001: 
ix-x) notes,  
 
It is somewhat surprising to discover that of all the social classes, however 
defined and categorised, the group that has attracted the least serious research is 
the class at the very top of the pile.  Terms like elite, ruling class, and capitalist 
class have been out of favour in the social sciences for some time and the idea 
of a global ruling class appears, frankly, ridiculous to many capable scholars.  
 
                                                
22 JSTOR, EBSCO, Proquest, CSA, Social Science Citation database 
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Notwithstanding this general scholarly reluctance, there has been a recent surge of 
popular interest in the notion of a global power elite and journalistic contributions such 
as Rothkopfs Superclass23 (2008) have spawned considerable media interest in the 
subject.  
 
In academia, it has also been noted that the growth of interest concerning intellectual 
input into the foreign policy activity of the US administration had led to a sudden 
increase in the number of books concerned with the activities of one elite policy forum - 
the Council on Foreign Relations (Parmar, 2001). The Council on Foreign Relations 
(CFR), along with the Royal Institute of International Affairs (now Chatham House), is 
one of a small number of groups, including the Bilderberg group and the Trilateral 
Commission, that are seen by many as forming an ultra-elite policy community in the 
transnational setting. They are seen to represent the pinnacle of an elite business and 
political network that is interconnected with various prestigious policy institutes and 
numerous regional and bi-lateral elite networks. For the more conspiracy oriented, this 
small group of interconnected elite networks represents a sinister cadre leading, a 
largely ignorant, global citizenry irreversibly in the direction of a new world order (see, 
for example, Villemarest, Villemarest & Wolf, 2004; Estulin, 2007). 
 
Such charges have done little to increase the serious scholarly appeal of the subject but 
there are a small number of contributions, mainly historical and archival, that shed some 
light on the nature of the development and activities of such groups. Valerie Aubourgs 
(2003) excellent paper, for instance, on the post-war development of the Atlantic 
community and, specifically, the formation of the Bilderberg group and the Atlantic 
Institute, provides a fascinating insight into the convergence of events and personalities 
that led to the creation and preservation of such groups during a period of heightened 
Cold War tension.  As well as casting some doubt on a number of well trodden 
                                                
23 David Rothkopfs Superclass defines a global power elite comprised of approximately 6000 
individuals from all walks of life. He claims that this elite as a group, because of their influence, play a 
big part in defining the tenor of our times, determining which views are accepted and which are not, and 
what our priorities are. The influence of this transnational superclass is often amplified as the members 
act in clusters knit together by business deals, corporate boards, investment flows, old school ties, club 
memberships, and countless other strands that transform them if not into the conspiring committees of 
legend then at least into groups that are proven masters at advancing their own aligned self interests 
(2008: xvii). 
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conspiracy theories related to the funding and control of such networks, Aubourg (2003) 
demonstrates how the main thrust of both groups shifted subtly from solidarity against 
Soviet ideological propaganda to a more immediate concern with European anti-
Americanism. Furthermore, the importance of the Netherlands and Belgium to the spirit 
of the Atlantic community is emphasised as a means of preserving a liberal democratic 
tradition not sufficiently rooted in Germany, Italy or France (2003:103). The 
promotion of an Atlantic consensus is seen, therefore, as mirroring the efforts of other 
groups such as The Congress for Cultural Freedom, an institute that fostered an 
international anti-Soviet consensus between intellectuals that was linked, in turn, to the 
notion of end of ideology discourse (Scott-Smith, 2002), and demonstrated a blurring 
of public/private boundaries at the transnational level. As Aubourg observes,  
 
the Atlantic Institute and the Bilderberg group show a complex combination of 
private initiatives and official encouragement through which a shared 
experience in the war or the immediate after-war years was more important than 
distinctions between State and private groups. (Aubourg 2003:103) 
 
Using this shared experience, and the complex interrelationship of participants, as a 
starting point, Hugh Wilford (2003) explores the early years of the Bilderberg group 
with a view to addressing the question of which of the chief conspiracy theory claims it 
most closely represented: a CIA plot; a socialist conspiracy; or an attempt to develop a 
new world order. Pushing the conspiracy theories to one side, for the purposes of the 
study, he explores archival evidence, primarily from the C.D. Jackson and Hugh 
Gaitskell papers24, to provide a narrative of the formative years of the group. Providing 
some hitherto unpublished information, the paper explores the relationship between the 
United States and European representatives and considers the role played by each. Like 
Aubourg (2003), Wilford concludes that claims relating to ongoing CIA involvement 
and control have been overstated and overlook the interplay that existed between 
various key players at that time. Equally, and acknowledging the enthusiastic and 
intelligent participation of revisionist Labour Party representatives such as Hugh 
                                                
24 C.D. Jacksons papers are held at the Eisenhower Library in Abilene, Kansas; the Gaitskell papers are 
held by University College, London 
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Gaitskell and Denis Healey25, he concludes that latent American power and revisionist 
empathy with the American position make the socialist conspiracy thesis an improbable 
account. And, finally, he suggests, in an extremely qualified fashion, that of all the 
conspiracy claims, the new world order theory is the closest depiction of actual 
outcomes. Citing Kees Van Der Pijls (1998) conclusion that in order to emphasise 
transnational societal development, we must first move beyond the traditional, state-
centred conception of politics, Wilford, finding a parallel between the formation of the 
group and its chief architect, provides the following description of how best to 
conceive of the Bilderberg group,  
 
[it is] neither an entirely European nor American invention, but rather the 
result of a highly complex process of Atlantic interaction. For that matter, it is 
equally difficult to tell whether Bilderberg was the creation of state agencies, 
specifically the Western intelligence services, or non-government actors. In the 
curious person of its principal founder, the wandering scholar Joseph Retinger, 
the distinction between the private and official realms, civil society and the 
state, seems to collapse altogether, as indeed does the very concept of 
nationality. (2003:79-80) 
 
The desire for the creation of a new world order needs, of course, to be set against the 
context of the loss of enormous human life during the Second World War and the ever 
increasing tensions of the Cold War. A peculiar aspect, for instance, of the British 
contingent at Bilderberg was the ever-increasing presence of internationalist, revisionist, 
Labour Party politicians which, for some, represented a strain in Labours anatomy 
(which) mistrusted the people and countenanced an elitist, expert approach (Black, 
2001:55). By the time of Harold Wilsons electoral victory in 1964, he had been 
sufficiently persuaded, by revisionists within the party, of the importance and 
significance of the Bilderberg group to call for, or support the call for,26 a 
Commonwealth Bilderberg scheme (Murphy, 2005). This, despite the fact that he was, 
                                                
25 For a fuller account of revisionist activity during this period see Lawrence Blacks The bitterest 
enemies of Communism(Black, 2001).  
26 Murphy (2005) details the rather sketchy account of how the initiative was first brought about. A set of 
proposals, drafted jointly by Lord Mountbatten and Prince Philip, provide the first official documentary 
support for the proposal although it is suggested that the actual initiative came from Wilson and, his then 
secretary of State for Defence, Denis Healey. 
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by no means, aligned with the Gaitskellite faction of the Labour Party and that he was 
likely to encounter internal party opposition should the requisite royal involvement have 
become public. In the event, the proposal was eventually dropped in the wake of 
political events elsewhere in the world but it, nevertheless, provides a useful insight into 
the perceived international value of such networks and forums among national elites of 
the time. 
 
Adding weight to this assessment, Thomas Gijswijt (2007; 2008) has also highlighted 
the historic geopolitical significance of Bilderberg, notably in relation to debates 
concerning the inception of the European Union and concerning its influence in 
establishing, and maintaining, transatlantic relationships. He notes that, 
 
the Bilderberg group has contributed both to the cohesion and longevity of the 
Atlantic Alliance and to the vast increase in commerce and investment across 
the Atlantic in the post-war period. The group has done so in part through the 
informal exchange of information, the establishment of relationships of trust 
among members of the transatlantic elite, and the strengthening of common 
values and beliefs [] the transatlantic proliferation of ideas, contacts, 
information and trade stimulated by the Bilderberg meetings has had a 
cumulative impact that any serious student of transatlantic relations should at 
least be aware of. (Gijswijt, 2008) 
 
The distinctive North Atlantic bias to transnational network membership during the 
1960s and early 1970s did, however, lead to considerable resentment in certain quarters, 
most obviously among the Japanese and Chinese, and reflected a more general 
acknowledgement of changing geopolitical realities and priorities. Calls for a broader 
representation of Japanese attendees at Bilderberg were led by David Rockefeller and 
met with some resistance. They coincided with, what Stephen Gill (1990:55) calls, a 
crisis of hegemony [and] the unravelling of post-war political settlements within and 
between the advanced capitalist states driven by the forces of internationally mobile 
capital. In particular, it represented a rejection, in Western and Japanese policy circles, 
of the Nixon-Kissinger world-view which was considered to be outmoded and 
therefore dangerous for the evolving liberal international economic order (1990:133). 
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In response, and with the support of a number of prominent Bilderberg members, the 
Trilateral Commission was formed with David Rockefeller very much the driving force 
behind the group. As Gill states (1990:140), 
 
[his] unique international influence was mentioned in most of the interviews I 
conducted with Commissioners, and he was always cited as the key figure. 
Indeed, at least initially, Rockefeller recruited virtually each member 
personally. 
 
Gills (1990) research involved interviews with one hundred Trilateral Commission 
members and was endorsed by the then Director of the Commission, Charles Heck. It 
provides a graphical, historical, account of the development and activities of the group 
between its inception in 1973 and the late 1980s. More specifically, Gill (1990) 
contends that it provides evidence of the need to move beyond traditional conceptions 
of waning American political hegemony in the late twentieth century and consider the 
consequences of a more profound, less observable, hegemonic economic influence in 
world affairs. His argument is well made and supported with considerable amounts of 
supportive data; much of it clearly emanating from interviews with Commission 
members. However, the research has been criticised for its failure to support its 
contention of consensual hegemonic power (Reich, 1991) and also failing to adequately 
explain how the activities of the Commission have influenced government policy (Watt, 
1991). It is also is notable for its absence of published interview material and while this 
possibly reveals something of the terms of access for the research, it also suggests that 
the interview data was sought, less for the insight it might provide concerning individual 
attendees, and more for the purpose of hypothesis testing Gills stated belief in a 
Gramscian form of hegemonic American influence. This is, nevertheless, a personal 
frustration with the book and does not detract from the, otherwise, powerful case that is 
presented for the role of such policy councils in the shaping of world affairs. As Gill 
(1990:122) states,  
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private councils are part of a much wider international process of elite 
familiarisation and fraternisation, mutual education and, broadly speaking, 
networking. This process involves both consciousness-raising and social 
intercourse. It is relatively indirect with respect to the precise contours of policy 
but it is nonetheless significant. Private councils provide forums for developing 
or reinforcing concepts of international relations and foreign policy which may 
diffuse within the nations represented. 
 
As stated previously, recent academic interest in the Council on Foreign Relations 
(CFR) has highlighted the involvement of the group members in matters of US foreign 
policy. This emphasizes the, at times, quasi-governmental relationship that existed 
between the organisation and foreign policy mandarins within the US administration. 
Most accounts of the group are historical and hark back to a heyday of CFR influence 
during the Second World War and, in some instances, through to the breakdown of 
foreign policy consensus over the Vietnam conflict.  
 
Despite the organisations repeated insistence that it is non-partisan, Schulzinger (1984) 
demonstrates that the early years of the CFR were typified by a kind of Wilsonian 
internationalist diplomacy and Wala (1994) also observes that internationalist opinion 
was, and remains, a strong vein within the membership of the group. Two insider 
studies, published by the Council itself (see Bundy, 1994; Grose, 1996), highlight the 
pluralistic, meritocratic and idiosyncratic nature of group composition in spite of 
overwhelming evidence to the contrary. These contributions, it is argued by Parmar 
(2001), are more than self-congratulatory commemorative publications27; they also 
constitute a call for a renewal of faith in liberal internationalism, in the face of emerging 
neo-isolationism in the US, and a statement concerning the ongoing relevance of the 
group to world affairs. 
 
The role of the group in state activities has been the subject of some speculation and 
Parmar (2001) compares and contrasts the various perspectives in order to introduce his 
own conception of the nature of the relationship. He argues that Domhoffs (1990) 
depiction of CFR activity is consistent with the suggestion of a weak state with few 
                                                
27 Formed in 1921, 1996 represented the 75th anniversary of the group 
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interests or goals of its own. Domhoffs rather instrumental account of how the Council 
influenced government decisions concerning post-War reconstruction, and specifically 
the formation of the Bretton Woods institutions, is cited by Parmar (2001) as evidence 
of this inclination. Similarly, Santoros more ambiguous account of Council/State 
relations (1992) also suggests a weak state although the function of the Council is 
tempered and viewed as that of intellectual advisor. Citing developments during the 
period 1939-45, Santoros depiction is, according to Parmar (2001), more akin to a neo-
Gramscian model with its focus on the creation and development of ideology. Finally, 
Parmar (2001) compares the corporatist approach of Wala (1994), where the role of 
the Council is presented very much as a respected advisor to the State, with outright 
statist approaches (Parmar, 1995), where the state is seen as having special 
advantages that maintain its dominance in the relationship. He concludes that both are 
inadequate as explanations of the nature of CFR influence; instead it is more useful to 
think in terms of a power shared by forces that transcend the public-private divide 
(2001:37).  Drawing on the earlier work of Eisenach (1994), Parmar (2004) introduces, 
therefore, the concept of parastate organisations to describe the nature of the 
relationship that the Council on Foreign Relations and Chatham House hold with 
respect to their own governments.  
 
2.4.4 Conclusion 
 
Elite and pluralist theories of power dispersal are of continuing relevance to our 
understanding of elite interactions in the transnational setting. The parallels that can be 
drawn between early depictions of elite activity within the policy domains of the state 
and national politics in the United States and the activities of the policy elite in the 
transnational setting are striking. The same issues of accountability and legitimacy are 
at play as are questions related to the precise nature and contours of the plurality of 
interests in the setting. What is missing, of course, is the sense of a formal policymaking 
or legislative arena.  
 
Contributions from the fields of international political economy and global systems 
theory have presented a rather instrumental account of the purpose of elite networks. 
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They are, in essence, viewed as a communications infrastructure, for the mobility of 
capital interests, and the development of a transnational network is seen as evidence of 
the shift towards a transnational phase of capitalism. Studies of interlocking boards and 
elite group membership demonstrate a complex interweaving of membership and 
interests held together by key organisational hubs and members within the network.  
 
Academic literature on the transnational policy elite is sparse and largely concerned 
with the historical role and development of certain elite groups. Much of this literature 
concerns the activity of such groups in the Second World War and through to the end of 
the Cold War. The influence of elite groups is, in the main, inferred rather than proven 
and the mechanisms of power and influence, in particular more consensual mechanisms, 
have not been satisfactorily demonstrated.  
 
2.5 Power relations in the political setting 
 
2.5.1 Introduction 
 
In any discussion of power, Steve Lukess (1974:9) frequently cited observation that it 
is an essentially contested concept, must be highlighted. There is, after all, little 
denying the enormous debate that exists over the form that it can take. Haugaard (2006) 
argues that much of the difficulty stems from the fact that power is a multi-scalar 
concept that is subtly complicated because the various oppositions which characterise 
the power debate are not necessarily mutually exclusive (2006:10). Gaventa (2006:23-
24) elegantly outlines the central definitional problem of the concept in this way, 
 
 Some see power as held by actors, some of whom are powerful while others 
are relatively powerless. Others see it as more pervasive, embodied in a web of 
relationships and discourses which affect everyone but which no single actor 
holds. Some see power as a zero-sum concept  to gain power for one set of 
actors means that others must give up some power. Since rarely do the powerful 
give up their power easily, this often involves conflict and power struggles. 
Others see power as more fluid and accumulative. Power is not a finite 
resource; it can be used, shared or created by actors and their networks in many 
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multiple ways. Some see power a negative trait  to hold power is to exercise 
control over others. Others see power to be about capacity and agency wielded 
for positive action.  
 
Notwithstanding the differences that exist between more consensual appreciations of 
power or power to (see, for instance, Parsons, 1963; Arendt, 1970) and those who 
view power as inherently conflictual or as power over  see section 2.5.2 Power 
over and domination  there is considerable value in recognising the value of a more 
holistic approach to the concept (Haugaard, 2003; Gaventa, 2006). Indeed, and in stark 
contrast to his earlier publication on power as domination, Lukes (2005b) himself, 
recognises the value of drawing a distinction between power to and power over and 
accepts that some forms of power can be productive and transformational. For this 
reason, Lukess radical or third dimensional power (1974) is really one subset, power as 
domination, of the notion of power over which is itself a subset of a much broader 
enabling notion of power to. In short, domination is not equal to power in the 
broadest sense. In the words of Lukes, 
 
 What is clear is that the underlying concept here defined is not power but 
rather the securing of compliance to domination. The text [of Power: a radical 
view] addresses the question: how do the powerful secure the compliance of 
those they dominate?  a narrower question than that suggested by its snappy 
title. (Lukes, 2005b:109-110) 
 
Furthermore, more ultra-radical conceptions of power, where power is viewed, for 
instance, as a constitutive force (see the work of Foucault, 1980), a theme explored 
further in section 3.3.4.2 Discourse and discourse analysis, have come to inform a 
much fuller account of power. This review of the literature does not seek to provide a 
comprehensive insight into the exhaustive nature of the power debate; instead, the focus 
of its attention is on the form of power conceived by Max Weber (1962), the agent 
centred notion of power as domination. And, more specifically, the various forms that 
it can take.  
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To that end, this section of the literature review considers the application of power as 
domination in the political context. Furthermore, it considers the implications of what 
Steve Lukes (1974) calls the three dimensions of power for the types of activity likely 
to be successful at various points of the policy process. This extension of Lukess 
typology provides a key insight into the function of elite interactions within the context 
of a much broader policy process.  
 
2.5.2 Power over and domination 
 
For the most part, depictions of political power portray a classic Weberan relationship 
with the emphasis on one party realising its own will even when faced with the 
resistance of others (Weber, 1962); within such a conception, the powerful are, 
unsurprisingly,  those who are able to realise their will even if others resist it (Mills, 
1956). While Webers conception of power does not preclude willing consent in the 
relationship; it does imply the capacity for coercive power based, ultimately, on 
domination of the subject. This presentation of power as power over underpins 
practically all empirical contributions on political influence in the policy sciences field 
although there are marked differences in the form that this coercion can take.  
 
Steven Lukess (1974) typology of the three dimensions of power is a useful mechanism 
for demonstrating a fundamental distinction drawn between decisional and non-
decisional exercises of power as domination in the political sphere. Furthermore, 
utilising the typology as a metaphor for a hierarchy of system-wide exercises of power 
provides a crucial insight into the nature of political influences and, specifically, the 
relationship between politics and markets in polyarchies28.  
 
                                                
28 The use of Lukess (1974) typology to describe the macro interactions between those inside and outside 
of the formal state policy apparatus is, of course, simply one application of the typology; it is important to 
stress that the various dimensions might be found operating at all levels of government and in all social 
interactions. 
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2.5.3 The three dimensions of power 
 
The first dimension of power is that typified by pluralists with their emphasis upon 
actual, rather than potential, power; and, as a consequence, their focus on observable 
behaviour (Dahl, 1957; Dahl, 1961; Polsby, 1963). In empirical terms, the unit of 
analysis is the decision situation and exercises of power are a product of conflict of 
interests over political preferences. Despite recognising the resource advantages of 
business (Truman, 1951; Dahl, 1961), and viewing resource availability as a primary 
determinant of influence, pluralists have tended to view business as part of a much 
broader depiction of interest group politics; and, in terms of empirical enquiry, political 
theory has focused primarily on the wider role of groups within society. The specific 
activities of business have been largely ignored (Hart, 2004) and, moreover, without a 
comprehensive analysis of corporation activity we remain some way from a complete 
understanding of political influence (Salisbury, 1984; Baumgartner & Leech, 1998). 
The pluralist tendency to view business political influence as interest group pressure has 
also led to a curious paradox: at a time when interest group proliferation is seen to have 
destabilised the policy making system and weakened the overall impact of interest 
groups (Salisbury, Heinz, Laumann & Nelson, 1990), the overall influence of business 
in political affairs appears to have accelerated substantially (Gais, Peterson & Walker, 
1984; Calhoun, 1992; Crenson & Ginsberg, 2002; Leys, 2003). One possible reason for 
this is that the pluralist conception of power requires a conflict of interest but, given the 
scope of discrete lobbying practices employed by business interests, an enormous 
volume of policy activity goes uncontested (Baumgartner & Leech, 2001).  
 
Another major criticism of this conception of power, levelled by Lukes (1974), is that it 
assumes the bias of the system under observation. In other words, it is blind to control 
of the political agenda. Lukes (1974) defines, therefore, a second dimension of power 
based upon the earlier work of Bachrach and Baratz (1962) which draws attention to the 
exercises of power which may have already determined the observable instances of 
control which represent the pluralist view of power. Adopting Schattschneiders 
(1975:69) belief that organisation is the mobilisation of bias and his view that some 
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issues are organised into politics while others are organised out, Bachrach and Baratz 
go further,  
 
power is also exercised when A devotes his energies to creating or reinforcing 
social and political values and institutional practices that limit the scope of the 
political process to public consideration of only those issues which are 
comparatively innocuous to A. (1962:948) 
 
In doing so, they introduce the concept of non-decision making; a means by which 
demands for change  
 
can be suffocated before they are even voiced; or kept covert; or killed before 
they gain access to the relevant decision-making arena; or, failing all these 
things, maimed or destroyed in the decision implementing stage of the policy 
process. (Bachrach and Baratz , 1970:44) 
 
The most obvious exercise of such an activity in the political sphere is that of agenda-
setting; where the agenda takes on a strategic form since it is grounded in matters 
outside of the policies at hand and beyond the more immediate scope of policymakers 
(Mouw & Mackuen, 1992). Like the constitutional-choice decisions found in Kiser & 
Ostroms institutional contribution (1982), such pre-decisional activities are of critical 
importance in determining the decisions that will, ultimately, be made down the line 
(Cobb & Elder, 1983; Long & Rose-Ackerman, 1986).  
 
Following McCombs & Shaws (1972) seminal study of the relationship between public 
and media agendas, a good deal of attention has been focused on correlations between 
levels of saliency in different domains and, in particular, between media, public, and 
policy agendas (Rogers & Dearing, 1988). Since there is evidence to support the 
contention that media agendas, and the activities of the media, have an influence on the 
policy agenda (Gilberg, Eyal, et al., 1980; Cook, Tyler et al., 1983; Wanta, Stephenson 
et al., 1989) and the public agenda (McCombs & Shaw, 1972; Funkhouser, 1973; 
Iyengar & Kinder, 1987), the role of the media must be considered in any discussion of 
power relations and policy initiation. Relative saliency on the media agenda is central to 
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the formation of the public agenda which, consequently, influences the activities of 
policymakers (Dearing & Rogers, 1996). Closer analysis of the concentrated ownership 
of media assets and, furthermore, the actual sources of media stories provides evidence 
that the commercial imperative and information dependency of the media results in an 
inherent bias to the selection and depiction of events; a bias that informs the public 
agenda and serves the needs of corporations, politicians, and bureaucrats alike (Gandy, 
1982; Herman & Chomsky, 2002). Furthermore, the growth and role of public policy 
research institutes or think-tanks (Weaver, 1989; McGann, 1992) and an analysis of the 
supply of technical and professional policy expertise at all levels of government (Brint, 
1990) suggest both an agenda-setting role and a degree of informal capture by 
professional experts. Ultimately, all information is mediated in some way but the extent 
to which the dynamics of political decision making are being defined by information 
bias has potentially profound implications for the shape and tenor of policy debate.  
 
To these first two dimensions of power, Lukes adds a third:  
 
A may exercise power over B by getting him to do what he does not want to 
do, but he also exercises power over him by influencing, shaping or 
determining his very wants. Indeed, is it not the supreme exercise of power to 
get another or others to have the desires you want them to have? (1974:23) 
 
The notion of latent conflict is central to this approach; created by a contradiction 
between the interests of those who exercise power and the real interests of those who 
are dominated.  With echoes, once more, of Gramscis cultural hegemony (1971), the 
third-dimensional form of power might best, within the macro context of political 
influence, be seen as operating at the level of ideological or normative predisposition; at 
work somewhere within, and between, the structural determinants of society and the 
issue definition and agenda setting activities of the policy process.  
 
2.5.4 The challenge of third dimensional power 
 
Since the publication of Lukess Power: A Radical View (1974) a number of important 
criticisms have been levelled against his notion of third dimensional power (see Clegg, 
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1975; Bilgrami, 1976; Hindess, 1976; Young, 1978; Digesser, 1992; Hayward, 2000). 
Not least of these are those that apply to the underlying assumptions of such power and, 
with specific relevance to the empirical task at hand, questions of how to satisfactorily 
verify its existence.  
 
It is worth pointing out that Lukess (1974) contribution must be set against the context 
of debates concerning community power in the 1950s and 1960s between elite ((Hunter, 
1969; Mills, 1956) and pluralist theorists (Dahl, 1961; Polsby, 1963). These fierce 
debates, with their concern for the fundamental nature of power structures and the 
empirical challenges facing political scientists, were fuelled further by Lukess (1974) 
notion of power through consent. Not only did he challenge the pluralist conception of 
observable power but he maintained that Bachrach and Baratzs (1962) depiction of 
non-decisional power was also flawed in its dependency upon pluralist mechanisms and 
methodology. Critically, he suggested that, given the approach, non-decisions were still 
very much decisions on the part of A to limit the decision making possibilities of B; but, 
as Lukes states (1974:21) 
 
decisions are choices consciously and intentionally made by individuals 
between alternatives, whereas bias of the system can be mobilised, recreated 
and reinforced in ways that are neither consciously chosen nor the intended 
result of particular individuals choices.  
 
Furthermore, both first and second dimensions of power assume that B is aware of his 
interests in the face of demands to conform to the will of A; which presupposes that B 
accepts the will of A in full knowledge that to do so is not in his interests. If B has no 
particular interest in the outcome, and there exists an absence of conflict, pluralist and 
non-decisional advocates alike suggest that he has not been subject to the influence of 
power. But, according to Lukes (1974:23), the most effective and insidious use of 
power is to prevent such conflict from arising in the first place. In short, a lack of 
conflict, and the appearance of consensus, does not equal an absence of power.  
 
This distinction has implications for the focus of empirical inquiry. Whereas pluralists 
locate power in the decision process and elitists situate it in controlled preferences, 
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Lukes (1974) looks to a distortion in the interests of the subject and this requires a 
fundamental dissociation of interests from preferences. In other words, subjects can be 
manipulated or socialised into a false appreciation of their interests, and thereby act 
against them, while at the same time, can be seen to be acting according to their 
preferences (Young, 1978). Since subject preferences are, therefore, inherently 
unreliable as an indicator of interests, it is necessary to identify the subjects real 
interests in some other way. While providing the mechanism for empirical lines of 
inquiry, after all, real interests can be compared with stated preferences to provide 
evidence of distortions or manipulation, the notion of ascribing real interests, or 
identifying the counterfactual, has spawned significant criticism of the approach. Aside 
from the highly subjective and political nature of such ascription, the suggestion of real 
interests raises a significant problem of regress as Young (1978:647) notes, 
 
one must assume a society which does not distort the individuals perception of 
his interests; that is, in the radical view, a system uncontaminated by power. 
Interests are framed with reference to this ideal. Such a system can only be an 
ideal, for to create or act truly in it, it would be necessary for power never to 
have been exercised and constraining structures never set up. Otherwise, if 
power dissociates preferences from interests, all preferences (even the ones 
which drive us toward this other world) are arguably distortions born of 
distortions. 
 
2.5.4.1 Recent debate and revisions of third dimensional power 
 
Returning to the subject, thirty years after publication of the first edition, Lukes (2005b) 
continues to defend the issue of real interests while, at the same time, attempting to 
relax the implications of this most contentious of empirical issues, 
 
the claim that compliance to domination can be secured by the shaping of 
beliefs and desires must invoke cognitive and evaluative judgments that are 
distinct from the relevant actual beliefs and desires of the actors alleged to be 
subject to it. In other words, the very idea of powers third dimension requires 
an external standpoint. Power as domination, I have argued, invokes the idea of 
constraint upon interests, and to speak of the third dimension of such power is 
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to speak of interests imputed to and unrecognised by the actors[The 
difficulties associated with identifying real interests] become less serious if one 
simply takes what count as real interests to be a function of ones explanatory 
purpose, framework, and methods, which have in turn to be justified. There is 
no reason to believe that there exists a canonical set of such interests that will 
constitute the last word on the matter  that will resolve moral conflicts and 
set the seal on proffered explanations, confirming them as true. 
 
This clarification and easing of the nature of real interests has important consequences 
for the utilisation of third dimensional power moving forward. No longer is it necessary 
to struggle with Lukess original, and vague, prescription for identifying real interests29; 
researchers are now able to focus on the phenomena without becoming embroiled in 
endless discussions related to the ascription of counterfactuals. From a purely pragmatic 
perspective, not to address issues of domination and discrete power simply because 
there is no reliable empirical means of identifying real interests could hardly be said to 
make sense. And, while others had attempted to supplement the third face of power in 
order to circumvent some of these theoretical and empirical issues (see Komter, 1989; 
Fletcher, 1992), Lukess response provides a more elegant and faithful, if not entirely 
satisfactory, re-working of the concept.  
 
Furthermore, the revised version of third dimensional power re-situates Lukess 
conception of power-over as a sub-set of power-to30 and, in so doing, recognises the 
critical importance of powers capacity. It also represents a significant departure from 
the earlier depiction of unitary interests in favour of recognition of the existence of 
multiple, often competing, interests. In his own words (2005a), 
 
[Power: A Radical View] offers a very partial and one-sided account of the 
topic. For one thing, it focuses entirely on the exercise of power and, for 
another, it deals only with asymmetric power  the power of some over others  
and, moreover, with only a sub-type of this, namely the securing of compliance 
                                                
29 Lukes (1974) suggests a number of ways to identify real interests including comparison with other 
cases, a focus on core values or abnormal times (i.e. when subjection ceases), and by drawing attention 
to those who, while subject to power relations, find ways to resist it.  
30 Derived from Spinozas distinction between power as potestas and power as potentia 
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to domination. Furthermore, it treats only of binary relations between actors 
who are assumed to have unitary interests. Plainly a fuller account must 
obviously relax these simplifying assumptions and address power among 
multiple actors with divergent interests [] a better definition of power in 
social life than that offered in PRV is in terms of agents abilities to bring about 
significant effects, specifically by furthering their own interests and/or affecting 
the interests of others, whether positively or negatively. 
 
In his revised edition, Lukes is at pains to depict a far more nuanced set of processes 
and outcomes than his original edition suggests. For instance, he restates his position on 
intentionality in this way (Lukes, 2005b:136), 
 
As I have repeatedly insisted, to focus on manipulation by defining the 
concept of power as deliberate intervention is to unduly narrow its scope. 
Power can be at work, inducing compliance by influencing desires and beliefs, 
without being intelligent and intentional. 
 
And tellingly, in a response to criticism of his later edition, Lukes again finds it 
necessary to clarify this point (Lukes, 2006:171), 
 
it is that I propose viewing the power of agents broadly, and so not requiring 
when instantiated, explicit intentions, actual foresight or positive intervention. 
Power, in other words, does not, when it is at work, need to involve deliberate 
and strategic manipulation [] Viewing power in this broader way, one is 
significantly less inclined to see social arrangements that induce powerlessness 
and failures to solve collective action problems as unconnected to the powerful, 
as merely structural or attributable to luck, though sometimes one may 
conclude that they are. 
 
The issue of intentionality remains contested even among those who would defend 
Lukess third dimension of power (Dowding, 2006) and, it must be stated, it is not the 
only issue in Lukess revision of the model to engender criticism. That said, like Avery 
Plaw (2007) I do not believe the critiques of Morriss (2006), Shapiro (2006) or 
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Hayward (2006)31, notwithstanding the significance of certain of their arguments, to 
detract from an ongoing appreciation of third dimensional power; even if this 
appreciation is more limited in its scope as power over or power as domination. 
And, with specific reference to its empirical flaws, 
 
the appropriate standard for assessing the continued salience of Lukess three-
dimensional model of power should not be whether it offers a perfect method 
for illuminating the insidious operations of third-dimensional power. A more 
sensible standard is whether these power effects do indeed exist and whether 
anyone else has offered a more compelling approach to tracing them [And,] 
while there remains extensive controversy among scholars regarding how best 
to identify and analyze third-dimensional power, Lukess revised approach is 
plausible, and in some respects more promising, than its competitors. (Plaw, 
2007:498-500) 
 
Whatever the difficulties related to third dimensional power, it is clear that many of its 
most ardent critics are unwilling to fully discount the approach. Indeed, while power 
may continue to be an essentially contested concept, Lukess third dimensional form 
has, theoretically at least, become one of the established conceptual mechanisms for its 
interpretation. Seeking to affirm or negate its existence is, in a sense, a pointless 
exercise; we should instead look to better understand the nature of its being. In the 
words of Ian Shapiro (2006:149), 
 
saying that the third face of power sometimes operates in society is  by itself 
 trivially true, even though some scholars have sought to deny this. When, 
where, how and why it does operate are the interesting questions. They can be 
fruitfully tackled only by working from the problem to the theoretical account, 
                                                
31 Peter Morriss (2006) asserts that Lukess revision of third dimensional power no longer accurately 
represents power at all; instead, it is a more narrow depiction of domination and might more accurately be 
titled Domination: a radical view. Ian Shapiro (2006: 149) attacks weaknesses related to Lukess shift on 
the issue of multiple real interests arguing that [Lukes] seems not fully to appreciate the radical 
implications of affirming an anti-reductionist understanding of real interests. Making this move  which I 
agree with Lukes that we should  commits one to the view that there is no ex-ante reason to prefer one 
type of explanation to another, and therefore no way of knowing in advance of empirical research whether 
some putative real interest is in fact at stake. While Clarissa Hayward (2006) points to the absence of 
one of the most significant forms of social control, that produced by social structures and contexts, as a 
significant weakness in Lukess conception of power. For an excellent overview of the arguments see 
Avery Plaws (2007) analysis of the discussion.  
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not the other way around. In this sense looking for a theory of powers third 
face is akin to looking for a theory of holes.  
 
Equally, it is fair to say that there are many configurations of power that are not 
addressed by Lukess third dimensional form. Unpicking these various influences and 
focussing on the specific elements of third dimensional power is a critical challenge for 
this research. Furthermore, it will be necessary to address a key argument raised by 
Barry Hindess (2006) concerning the nature of political power and governmentality. 
Drawing firstly on the writings of Locke and, then, the ideas of Foucault, Hindess 
(2006) emphasises the constitutive role of power relations in order to suggest that 
Lukess form of power is not appropriate to an understanding of certain configurations 
of contemporary government, among them formal and informal networks, because they 
are not easily reduced to notions of competing factions and interests. Indeed, he argues 
(2006:120), with the partial exception of the economic sphere, it is far from clear who 
benefits and who loses from this style of government. Moreover,  
 
government is a configuration of power that helps to make us who we are and 
many of its effects at this level precede the formation of interests. (2006:120) 
 
This is an important argument because, as Hindess (2006) points out, and Lukes 
concedes (2006), the idea that power might be at work even where there is a lack of 
overt conflict is as applicable to his view of government as it is Lukess view of 
domination. But, notwithstanding Lukess own acceptance of this point, Hindesss 
characterisation of the configuration of government power preceding interest formation 
surely overlooks the role of certain interests, conscious or otherwise, in the development 
and nurturing of certain forms of governmental activity. As Lukes (2006: 164) observes, 
every way of seeing is also a way of not seeing and a key challenge with this research, 
if it is to reliably identify third dimensional influences within the context of 
transnational networks, will be to ascribe interests and factional roles. If Hindess is 
right, we might expect to see very little factionalism within such forums and interests 
are likely to be the product, rather than the stimulus, for such gatherings. Conversely, if 
Lukes is right, we might be able to observe subtle changes in preference not out of a 
 76
sense of becoming but, instead, because of very real mechanisms of third dimensional 
power. As Lukes (2006: 167) states, 
 
we have to discover whether three-dimensional power is at work and, if so, in 
respect of which interests, to what extent, and through what mechanisms. 
 
2.5.4.2  In search of third dimensional power 
 
As will no doubt have become apparent from this discussion, identifying third 
dimensional power and satisfactorily demonstrating the extent of its influence is not a 
straightforward empirical exercise. As John Gaventa (1980) notes, all studies of power 
require assumptions to be made concerning three key concepts: interests, consciousness 
and consensus. And, since Gaventas study of inequality and power relations in a 
Central Apalachian valley is frequently seen32 as the most sustained and sophisticated 
attempt to apply Lukess ideas to empirical material (Haugaard, 2002:38), his approach 
may provide clues about how best to approach this study of third dimensional power. 
Certainly Gaventas (1980:29-30) discussion of key concepts appears to have 
significantly prefaced many subsequent empirical debates, 
 
the observers interpretation of what appears in a given context to be in Bs 
interest may be used as a methodological tool for discovering whether power 
relationships are such as to have precluded the active and conscious choice by 
B about such interests, regardless of what the outcome of that choice actually 
would be. What B would choose (were B free from the power of A to do so) 
would be Bs real interests  but they do not require identification for the study 
of power. That B is prevented from acting upon or conceiving certain posited 
interests is sufficient to show that the interests that are expressed by B are 
probably not Bs real ones. 
 
The stance has ramifications for the consideration of consciousness. The 
unfortunate term false consciousness must be avoided, for it is analytically 
                                                
32 Gaventas (1980) study is universally agreed to be the definitive empirical application of Lukess 
original conception of power and statements to this effect are to be found throughout the literature 
concerning third dimensional power. Examples include Hayward (2000) and Shapiro (2006).  
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confusing. Consciousness refers to a state, as in a state of being, and thus can 
only be falsified through negation of the state itself. If consciousness exists, it is 
real to its holders, and thus to the power situation. To discount is as false may 
be to discount too simply the complexities or realities of the situation. What is 
far more accurate (and useful) is to describe the content, source, or nature of the 
consciousness  whether it reflects awareness of certain interests and not of 
others, whether it is critical or assuming, whether it has been developed through 
undue influence of A, and so on. 
 
To argue that existing consciousness cannot be false is not to argue the same 
for consensus. Real consensus implies a prior process of agreement or choice, 
which in a situation of apparent consensus may or may not have been the case. 
The process may not have occurred; it could have been shaped or manipulated; 
the consensus could be maintained by power processes, etc. 
 
This outline concerning core assumptions will provide the conceptual starting point for 
my own analysis of elite power relations in the transnational setting. However, 
Gaventas (1980:27) inclusion of processes of communication, socialisation [and] 
acculturation as mechanisms, while being faithful to Lukess own conception of the 
workings of third dimensional power, has been the cause of some debate. Danziger 
(1988:24), for instance, argues that,  
 
socialisation is more relevant to discussions on ideology rather than inquiries 
into the exercise of power. A and B can be located in the socialisation 
framework only in so far as A is the individual or group which benefits from the 
ideology into which a given community is socialised , while B loses out. A 
cannot be identified, however, as the agent which is causally responsible for the 
perversion of the given ideology, since socialisation is a diffuse phenomenon 
whose sources and perpetrators range throughout society and history. A 
discussion on the exercise of power in which the exerciser of power cannot be 
identified becomes meaningless [] In the case of socialisation, even if A 
could be identified, in order to determine empirically that A had exercised 
power over B it would be necessary to strip B of its Weltanschauung. The 
manufacture of this counterfactual evidence would be an unworkable means for 
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studying the exercise of power over B, is so far as lifting B out of its ideological 
context would be tantamount to discussing an actor other than B. 
 
Danziger (1988) chooses, instead, to focus attention on harder mechanisms such as the 
control of information and, in so doing, largely ignores the essence of third dimensional 
power. The argument that socialisation processes are diffuse and that A cannot be held 
causally responsible does not necessarily stand up to close scrutiny; it largely depends 
upon the impact of different influences and the relationship between a prevailing 
organisational culture and its processes of reinforcement  and change. To what extent 
these processes are controlled, and how they function, are both critical questions in this 
regard; socialisation and acculturation processes may well be difficult to grasp but this 
does not mean that they cannot serve as instruments or mechanisms of third dimensional 
power. In some senses, the problem is solved if we accept that these processes are just 
one part of an overall depiction of socialisation processes; it is not necessary to see them 
as influential in an absolute sense. As Lukes (2005b:150), himself argues,   
 
powers third dimension is always focussed on particular domains of 
experience and is never, except in fictional dystopias, more than partially 
effective. 
 
For his part, Gaventa (1980) draws attention to a number of types of evidence that might 
be supportive of third dimensional power. He points to the historical development of 
apparent consensus and suggests that it may be possible to identify whether the current 
situation has been influenced by power relations and, in addition, whether key 
symbols, cues, or routines may form part of a discrete language of power without 
knowledge of their antecedents (1980:27). As already stated, he identifies processes of 
communication, socialisation and acculturation as a possible source of the relationship 
between those that exercise power and those that do not. Specifically, Gaventa (1980) 
highlights the possibility that conditions, such as identifiable barriers to the 
development of Bs actions and consciousness, may exist that prevent challenges to the 
power of A. He also suggests, where possible, that speculative or actual challenges 
might be made to the status quo in order to gage the responses of members of the 
population. Such responses may help to demonstrate how power mechanisms prevent 
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the emergence of such challenges. Finally, he points to Lukess own prescription as 
possible further sources of evidence before concluding, 
 
if after following such guidelines, no mechanisms of power can be identified 
and no relevant counterfactuals can be found, then the researcher must conclude 
that the quiescence of a given deprived group is, in fact, based upon consensus 
of that group to their condition, owing for instance, to differing values from 
those initially posited by the observer. (Gaventa, 1980:28) 
 
2.5.5 Conclusion: Conceptualising third dimensional power in elite interactions 
 
Despite the considerable revisions made by Lukes to the 1974 edition of Power: A 
Radical View, Swartz (2007:108) correctly identifies that he 
 
offers no new model empirical studies that illustrate what he is proposing. 
More disconcerting is that it is not clear what an empirical study following his 
framework would look like. The book offers no methodological suggestions for 
the researcher interested in following Lukess conceptual framework in both 
choosing and analyzing an empirical object of power. Just what kind of 
empirical research would his framework lead to? Lukes does not say. 
 
In itself this observation is problematical for anyone attempting to apply the framework 
but the problem is compounded when the selected empirical domain provides a more 
nuanced example of power relations than might otherwise be the case. At first glance, 
interactions within elite communities do not appear to provide an ideal setting for the 
analysis of power as domination; after all, such interactions, by their very nature, take 
place between recognisable power holders, rather than between the powerful and the 
powerless. The absence of an obvious B category, to use the parlance of power theorists, 
might render such an analysis irrelevant. But, as tempting as it is to view a lack of 
factionalism or overt interests within elite networks as evidence of consensus and 
homogeneity or, as Hindess (2006) suggests, to view many of the effects of such 
activity as preceding interest formation altogether, it is only by applying lenses such as 
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Lukess third dimension of power that we are able to test the veracity of these 
assumptions.  
 
2.6 Summary and conceptual model 
 
Theories of initiation and change in the policy process literature have tended to reflect 
systems theory developments in other fields where the system is seen as, ultimately, 
incapable of self generated transformational change. Such change is seen, therefore, as 
exogenous to the system based determinants of the policy process and largely beyond 
the scope of policymakers. The depiction of the role of elites within the policy process 
is that of a group that is largely responsive to contextual pressures and events; agents 
who are, at best, only capable of interpreting and identifying opportunities presented by 
determinants that are out of their control. This representation reflects a prevailing view 
of structural context as some kind of extant reality rather than a social construct given 
form and function through the shared understanding and articulation of elites. Such a 
conception is, therefore, limited and significantly underestimates the collaborative 
ability of elites to articulate and diffuse broad forms of consensus that serve to act as a 
structural referential for the downstream policy process.  
 
A significant body of literature demonstrates how the structural interdependency of 
politics and markets is central to any understanding of political change in liberal 
democracies. By utilising Steven Lukess three dimensions of power typology, it is 
possible to provide a conceptual model of such influence and, in so doing, situate the 
role of collaborative elite interactions. 
 
2.6.1 Elite shared understanding and transformational change: a conceptual model 
 
The use of Steven Lukess (1974) typology of power as a hierarchal framework for 
understanding macro level political influence raises a very important line of inquiry 
related to the strategic options available to those seeking dynamic change. If, as has 
been suggested, a fundamental market-driven requirement for economic and political 
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stability results in a political process that is highly resistant to demands for 
transformational change; what happens when its the market that demands the change?  
 
Attempting to introduce radical policy initiatives at the level of retail politics (Stone, 
1989a) - see figure 2.2 - is unlikely to yield results since the definition of the issue is 
pre-defined, there are dominant existing coalitions informing debate, and significant 
institutional constraints governing the scope and substance of policy discussions. This is 
not to suggest that significant gains or losses are not achievable; simply that the scope 
of such gains or losses is largely defined by pre-existing terms of reference.  
 
Likewise, attempting to introduce a radical policy departure at the agenda-setting level 
requires a sizable shift in perceptions of a given issue. Agenda-setting is, itself, a 
function of institutional patterns and a prevailing discourse surrounding the 
attractiveness and political feasibility of new proposals. This political discourse 
delineates the accepted boundaries of state action [] and defines the context in which 
many issues will be understood (Hall, 1993:289). Of course, actors may seek to 
exercise power in pursuit of their desire to see proposals appear on the policy agenda 
but unless such proposals are framed within existing structural parameters, and promote 
a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and remedy 
(Entman, 1993), it is unlikely that they will be able to enter, or survive, the policy 
process. Change that requires a more fundamental punctuation can only take place at the 
structural level; structural determinants must be reinterpreted, redefined and reinforced 
in order to influence the ideological predisposition and normative values of those 
charged with consideration of political agendas. Moreover, these structural articulations 
must be transmitted throughout society in order that policymakers retain essential 
legitimacy.  
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Figure 2.2 Power relations and policy initiation 
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Source: Compiled by the author  
 
Critical to the comprehension of how structural determinants are purposed by political 
activity at the pre-agenda stage of the policy process is the creation of elite shared 
understanding. Theoretically distinct from earlier constructivist descriptions of the 
definition of issues (Blumer, 1971), their attendant causal stories (Stone, 1989b) and 
coherent systems of normative and cognitive elements that define world views (Surel, 
2000); shared understanding is the product of purposeful dialogue between elites. It 
concerns the formation of shared structural assumptions that underpin the very 
foundations of public policy activity, relating to, among other things, the role that the 
state sees for itself in the pursuance of its duties, the nature of the relationship that exists 
between politics and markets, and conditions that lead to the overall betterment of 
society.  
 
Given that shared understanding concerning these first principles is the foundation upon 
which the discursive parameters of polyarchies are based, it is essential to recognise the 
role played by it in regulating demands for transformational change. Such change may 
not always be initiated by elites, but it will, out of necessity, require their support if it is 
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to find its way onto the policy agenda. The development of elite shared understanding 
represents a structural shift that will, in time, facilitate access to the policy agenda in 
both political and societal terms.  
 
Transformational change takes time but, if it is to occur, the requirement for it must 
enter into collective consciousness at the level of shared understanding between elite 
groups. Shared understanding is by no means assured but when consensus is formed, 
and that consensus starts to act as a structural referential within the policy process, it is 
argued that the homogeneity of the economic and political elite and, in particular, the 
role of economic forces in forging such homogeneity, has profound implications for the 
discursive and deliberative parameters of policymaking. In short, it is argued that when 
the market needs transformational change, it seeks to affect the structural tolerances that 
prevent it from taking place. When the call for change emerges elsewhere, the market 
deploys its resources in order to protect existing socio-economic arrangements.  
 
In the absence of a formal global governance framework, the implications of elite 
consensus formation activity in transnational circles, for policy related activity at the 
national, regional and global level, are potentially far reaching. Interconnected elite 
groups in the transnational setting could be said to resemble a global communications 
network of elite interests but the limited depiction of elite interactions available in the 
literature is overtly instrumental. Such networks, informal as well as formal, are not 
reliable transmitters and do not necessarily represent a clearly defined homogenous 
interest. The most powerful of these groups do, however, appear to be engaged in a 
form of activity responsible for the ongoing construction, and dissemination, of beliefs 
and ideas related to complex global problems. When formed, and accepted within the 
wider group, these beliefs, or shared understandings, can provide a powerful contextual 
framework for the consideration of many issues.  
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2.6.2 Research opportunity 
 
The literature review demonstrates a significant gap in the area of elite interactions and 
pre-agenda policy activity. Specifically, overly functional depictions of collaboration 
and consensus formation activity have largely overlooked the socio-political context and 
dynamics of power that have framed the emergence of such activity, shaped its 
parameters of acceptable discourse, selected its participants, and fundamentally driven 
its output, tangible or otherwise. 
 
The consensual nature of elite interactions requires an approach to the interpretation of 
power relations within such groups that looks beyond more observable and coercive 
forms. Lukess (1974) third dimensional power lens provides a key mechanism for 
exploring more discrete dynamics of power within such settings. In particular, for 
understanding whether the interests and preferences of elite participants have been 
influenced, from what they might otherwise have been, by processes of elite 
communication, socialisation, acculturation and fraternisation within such communities. 
Empirical difficulties with the approach have meant that there are very few examples of 
a faithful application of third dimensional power and, most notably, none within the 
context of elite communities.  
 
Finally, the subject of informal transnational elite communities has received scant 
attention in the literature and there is very little data related to the post-Cold War period. 
Given the significance of the end of the Cold War to formal international relations 
activity, this is a glaring omission.  
 
The pivotal question addressed by this research is, therefore: 
 
How have discrete power relations shaped transnational elite thinking 
related to political problems and acceptable public policy responses in the 
post-Cold War period? 
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In order to address this fundamental question, two sub-themes will need to be 
considered: 
 
How accurate and meaningful a description of the product of 
transnational elite interactions is the notion of consensus formation? 
 
How coherent is the transnational policy elite? 
 
2.6.3 Research question 
 
In straightforward terms, this research aims to explore the role played by discrete third 
dimensional power mechanisms in the determination of a general policy orientation 
among the transnational policymaking elite. In order to do this, it will consider 
transnational elite interactions in the post-Cold War period, an era in which traditional 
security-based alliances have, it has been argued, given way to a more fluid depiction of 
international cooperation.  The title of the study is, therefore, defined as, 
 
The dynamics of third dimensional power in determining a pre-
orientation to policymaking: an exploratory study of transnational 
elite interactions in the post-Cold War period 
 
In broad terms, this exploratory research will seek to better understand the nature and 
dynamics of elite consensus formation activity in the transnational arena. It will 
consider the veracity of the consensus formation label, the nature of transnational elite 
collaboration, processes of communication, socialisation, acculturation and 
fraternisation within such communities, the purposeful extent of such activity and, 
finally, elite perceptions concerning the effects of such interactions.   
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3.0  RESEARCH PHILOSOPHY AND METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1    Introduction 
 
Having identified a research opportunity and question, it is necessary to consider the 
methodological, and underlying philosophical, choices that inform the study.  
 
It is widely acknowledged that situating the research within the context of an 
appropriate philosophical framework is a necessary precondition for rigorous and 
successful social science research (Blaikie, 1993; Easterby-Smith, Thorpe & Lowe, 
2002; Gill & Johnson, 2002). In the words of Roger Trigg (2001:252), 
 
 the practice of social science cannot be detached from philosophical 
assumptions about peoples nature and the way that society is formed and 
changed [] empirical social science must itself start from a properly 
articulated philosophical base if it is to be successful. Quantitative analysis, and 
measurement, of whatever kind, is of little use without an understanding of 
what is being measured and why it matters. The philosophy of the social 
sciencesis the indispensable starting point for all the social sciences. 
 
This chapter will present the ontological and epistemological foundations of the 
research and the rationale for a qualitative study of elite interactions. It will also provide 
details of the data collection and analysis methods adopted for the study.  
 
3.2      Ontological perspectives 
 
Broadly speaking, there are two interrelated philosophical treatments of the term 
ontology: the first is concerned with the rather abstract question of being itself and, 
the second, is concerned with the more specific assumptions that underpin our sense of 
reality; assumptions, for instance, related to the nature, essence and characteristics of an 
object. For the most part, certainly within the context of its political application, the 
latter, more narrow, interpretation is the most prevalent to be found in the literature 
(Hay, 2006b). 
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This, more directed, reading of ontology is concerned with the underlying structure of 
reality (Crotty, 1998) and, more specifically, with articulating the nature and structure 
of the world (Wand & Weber, 1993:220). It refers to the  
 
claims or assumptions that a particular approach to social enquiry makes about 
the nature of social reality  claims about what exists, what it looks like, what 
units make it up, and how these interact with each other.(Blaikie, 1993:6) 
 
Fundamentally, within the context of social research, it relates to the role of the 
researcher in defining the nature of the phenomenon that is to be the subject of the study 
and, critically, acknowledging the implications of this account of reality. In short, in 
comprehending our view of the world, assumptions are made concerning the intrinsic 
nature of things; these assumptions reflect our individual understanding of what 
constitutes reality. 
 
Ontological philosophical positions are usually presented and differentiated by use of 
some kind of continuum; a continuum that typically has a variant of classical positivism 
at one end and a form of interpretivism (see Blaikie, 1993) or constructionism (see 
Crotty, 1998; Easterby-Smith et al., 2002) at the other. Ontological labels, and the 
meanings attributed to such labels, vary by author, and reflect a raft of perspectives and 
nuanced positions, all of which makes the task of identifying and describing ones own 
ontological position somewhat difficult. What is undeniably clear, however, is that the 
various perspectives along the contested continuum represent a largely successful 
challenge, made during the past fifty years, towards the once dominant paradigm of the 
natural sciences, positivism, and its appropriateness to many areas of interest in the 
social sciences. Before describing the ontological distinctions between these various 
dominant perspectives, however, it is important to note that the claims of one 
ontological tradition are unlikely to ever satisfactorily displace the claims of any other; 
as Colin Hay puts it (2006b:82), 
 
 Ultimately, no amount of empirical evidence can refute the [ontological] 
claims of the atomist or the structuralist; neither can it confirm or reject the 
assumption that there is no separation of appearance and reality [] Whether 
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we like it or not, and whether we choose to acknowledge it or not, we make 
ontological assumptions  in Wendts terms, we do ontology. These 
assumptions profoundly shape our approach to political analysis and cannot 
simply be justified by appeal to an evidential base. 
 
The positivist ontology in the social sciences is premised on a belief that society, like 
nature, exists in a scientifically observable form; a form that is independent, or external, 
to the individual and represents, therefore, an objective reality. Research is conducted 
on the basis of observation and purports to objectively measure phenomenon for the 
purposes of creating, confirming or falsifying theoretical claims (Easterby-Smith et al., 
2002). In a similar vein, realism, usually presented as a kind of half-way house between 
the poles of positivism and constructionism, argues for the existence of an extant reality, 
independent of our knowledge of it, and while accepting fundamental differences 
between the natural and social sciences, suggests that the core principles of scientific 
observation in the natural sciences are essential if we are to comprehend the nature of 
social reality (Blaikie, 1993). The critical point within this is that realists recognise a 
distinction between the way the world is and the meaning and interpretation of that 
world held by individuals (Snape & Spencer, 2003). For realists, therefore, individuals 
are preceded by the social structures into which they are born (Hodgson, 2004). The 
classic articulation of this worldview is provided by Bhaskar (1979), 
 
People do not create society, for it always pre-exists them and is a necessary 
condition for their activity. Rather, society must be regarded as an ensemble of 
structures, practices and conventions which individuals reproduce and 
transform, but which would not exist unless they did so. Society does not exist 
independently of human activity (the error of reification). But it is not the 
product of it (the error of voluntarism). (Bhaskar, 1979:36) 
 
This point is critical to an understanding of the realist position and, importantly, the 
fundamental distinction that is drawn between realism and social constructionism. It 
suggests that social structures are real, in an objective sense, while all the while 
accepting that they could not exist independent of human activity. In other words, it is 
the human acceptance of structure in a deterministic or voluntary manner that confirms 
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its very existence. For social constructionists, it is impossible to conceive of how such a 
reality might exist in anything other than the minds that created it and given that this 
study is concerned with elite consensus formation activity, where individuals are 
conceived as consciously or unconsciously constructing reality through their social 
interactions and inter-subjective meanings, the social constructionist perspective is 
clearly the most appropriate philosophical foundation for the research. 
 
3.2.1 A social constructionist ontology 
 
It is important, at the outset, to recognise a confusion of terms at the social 
constructionist end of the ontological continuum. A preoccupation with different 
ontological questions and applications has led to a proliferation of descriptive labels. All 
such accounts, if not rooted in post-modern thinking then certainly encouraged by it, 
reflect a rejection of the positivist conception of a knowable external reality but there is 
considerable debate concerning the creation of meaning and knowledge. The 
relationship between two terms, constructivism and social constructionism, in particular, 
requires further consideration.  
 
Both constructivism and social constructionism are predicated on the belief that 
knowledge and meaning, the constructed representations of reality, are the product of 
experiences and interactions between individuals in given social contexts. For 
constructivists, however, such processes take place internal to the individual where 
knowledge, or meaning, is either integrated into pre-existing cognitive schemes or 
results in adapted schemes to fit the nature of the environment (Piaget & Inhelder, 
1969). For social constructionists, it is through social interaction and discourse that 
meaning is created and shared and may, in time and space, attain a structural quality 
(Berger & Luckman, 1966). Knowledge is not objective or external, it is the product of 
a continuous negotiation between individuals and reflects an inseparable link between 
subject and object (Sandberg, 2005). Social constructionists point to the primacy of 
relational, conversational, social practices as the source of individual psychic life 
(Stam, 1998:199) and, with a focus on constructed identities over essential selves, social 
constructionism rejects the idea of a inherent human nature and suggests that we are 
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composed of multiple identities that are defined within different relationships and 
cultural contexts (Raskin, 2002). In general terms, 
 
social constructionism contends that knowledge is sustained by social 
processes and that knowledge and social action go together. It is less interested, 
or not at all interested, in the cognitive processes that accompany knowledge. 
(Young & Collin, 2004:376) 
 
This distinction between constructivism and social constructionism is not always 
accurately reflected in the literature and the terms are frequently used interchangeably. 
For some, this reflects the fact that the terms are not as inseparable as proponents of one 
or the other might have us believe (Raskin, 2002) but the vagaries of the concepts 
necessitate some clarification of how social constructionism is conceived within the 
context of this study. In broad terms, social knowledge is inter-subjectively interpreted 
and defined by individuals within given social contexts where meaning is established 
and disseminated. Over time, these meanings can emerge as established rules or norms 
that come to represent the social context of ongoing individual interactions.  
 
Drawing upon Giddens theory of structuration (1984), I intend to apply a social 
constructionist ontology which has, at its core, a number of interrelated assumptions 
concerning structure and agency: firstly, inter-subjectively defined knowledge creates 
the structure which simultaneously constrains and enables action; secondly, structure 
and agency, therefore, mutually interrelated. Agents actions are defined by structure 
but the inter-subjective meanings that they interpret from structure can, themselves, be 
the mechanism by which structure itself is changed; thirdly, social or political order is a 
product of normative prescriptions that are embedded within structure.  
 
The power of these prescriptions, in the form of social routines and practices, lies in 
their capacity to reproduce the intersubjective meanings that constitute social structure 
and actors alike (Hopf, 1998:178); the politics of identity within such an approach is 
conceived, therefore, as a continual contest for control over the power necessary to 
produce meaning in a social group (Hopf, 1998:180). This power, to control inter-
subjective understanding, has obvious relevance to consideration of consensus 
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formation activity in elite communities. It is entirely consistent with the notion of third-
dimensional power outlined in the literature review and, significantly in recent years, 
has underpinned significant insights in the field of international relations (see Wendt, 
1992; Wendt, 1999). 
 
3.2.2 An interpretivist epistemology 
 
Epistemology, or the theory of knowledge, is concerned with how social science 
theories are constructed, evaluated and justified (Gill & Johnson, 2002). It concerns 
what can be known, and what criteria such knowledge must satisfy in order to be called 
knowledge rather than beliefs (Blaikie, 1993:7). Given the ontological perspective 
described previously, an interpretivist epistemology is, unsurprisingly, applied to this 
study. After all, such an approach implies an ontology in which social reality is the 
product of socially negotiated interpretations and represents a complex of socially 
constructed meanings (Blaikie, 1993: 96). Interpretivism rejects 
 
any view which attributes to the social world a reality which is independent of 
the minds of men. It emphasises that the social world is no more than the 
subjective construction of individual human beings who, through the 
development and use of common language and the interactions of everyday life, 
may create and sustain a social world of inter-subjectively shared meaning. 
(Burrell & Morgan, 1979:260) 
 
The central objective for interpretivists, therefore, is to make sense of the individuals 
and groups lived experience of their reality (Prasad & Prasad, 2002) which represents 
a logical extension of the social constructionist ontological paradigm. Such inquiry is 
 
principally concerned with explicating the processes by which people come to 
describe, explain or otherwise account for the world (including themselves) in 
which they live. It attempts to articulate common forms of understanding as 
they now exist, as they have existed in prior historical periods, and as they 
might exist should creative attention be so directed. (Gergen, 1985:266) 
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In order to satisfy the demands of such an approach, it will be necessary to interpret the 
meanings implicit within participant accounts of their social world and, using inductive 
logic, tentatively reconstruct these meanings into social scientific language and theory 
(Blaikie, 1993). The key challenge, therefore, lies in the soliciting of participant 
accounts; the collection and analysis of these accounts will lead to an understanding of 
the rules that underpin behaviour (Harre & Secord, 1972).  
 
3.3 Methodology 
 
While it is true that social scientific enthusiasm for qualitative methods based upon 
interpretive approaches has increased significantly in recent years (Flick, 2002; Prasad 
& Prasad, 2002; Denzin & Lincoln, 2005), the choice is, by no means, assured. Neither 
should the issue of methodology be reduced to a simplistic distinction between 
quantitative and qualitative approaches; it is crucial, instead, to recognise that real 
methodological distinctions lie in the ontological and epistemological underpinnings of 
the research (Symon & Cassell, 1998; Alvesson & Kaj Skolberg, 2000). In the case of 
qualitative research, for instance, a multitude of interpretive philosophical perspectives 
make use of the approach (Prasad & Prasad, 2002) but, ultimately, the qualitative form 
is guided by very different methodological considerations that influence the 
conceptualisation, design and implementation of the project (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005). 
 
3.3.1 An exploratory qualitative approach 
 
Despite the many differences that exist within the interpretive research tradition they 
are, nevertheless, unified through a belief in the relationship between subject and object 
and, crucially, the rejection of an objective reality that exists independently of the 
individual. The subjects, and their world, are intimately related; the world is an 
experienced phenomena and knowledge is formed through experience of this individual 
reality. This has very real implications for methodology, in the words of Denzin and 
Lincoln (2005:3),  
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Qualitative research is a situated activity that locates the observer in the world. 
It consists of a set of interpretive, material practices that make the world visible. 
These practices transform the world. They turn the world into a series of 
representations, including field notes, interviews, conversations, photographs, 
recordings, and memos to the self. At this level, qualitative research involves an 
interpretive, naturalistic approach to the world. This means that qualitative 
researchers study things in their natural settings, attempting to make sense of, or 
interpret, phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to them.  
 
Qualitative techniques have undoubtedly emerged as the most widely adopted 
exploratory mechanism for probing individual experience and meaning (Geertz, 1973; 
Alvesson & Kaj Skolberg, 2000; Gill & Johnson, 2002; Easterby-Smith et al., 2002). 
They are particularly relevant when dealing with emergent themes and the discovery of 
new issues (Robson, 1993; Symon & Cassell, 1998) and, although a crude and overly 
simplistic distinction, qualitative methods are frequently characterised as hypothesis 
building rather than hypothesis testing devices.  This study is concerned with 
processes and practices that are, by their very nature, nuanced and discrete; it is 
extremely unlikely that quantitative techniques could be employed to meaningfully 
explore such underlying, and often unconscious, mechanisms. 
 
3.3.2 Methodological choices 
 
At heart, the research process should represent a logically ordered set of choices and, in 
large part, is guided by whether it is exploratory, descriptive, or explanatory. In the case 
of exploratory research, the key objectives are to discover the nature of things, to seek 
insights and to probe and assess, typically through the application of qualitative 
techniques (Robson, 1993). The combination of choices and approaches means that a 
bewildering array of options for the researcher (Cresswell, 2007) but, in practical terms, 
the main methods utilised by qualitative researchers are observation, textual analysis, 
interviews and recording/transcribing. And these four approaches are often combined in 
some way (Silverman, 2001). 
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The choice of qualitative methods for this study is influenced by two considerations: 
firstly, the philosophical concerns that are implicit in the ontological and 
epistemological perspectives; and, secondly, the obvious challenge of researching 
private interactions between transnational elite members within organisations that have 
well observed rules of non-disclosure. The study of elites is, in general terms, hampered 
by issues of access and reliability but it is difficult to imagine a more discrete example 
of elite activity than that represented by private interactions in transnational elite 
communities. With this in mind, the selection of methodological techniques is guided, 
for the most part, by the necessity for gathering as much rich data on such interactions 
as possible.  
 
Since the study is concerned with the personal accounts of participants, observation 
techniques were not considered appropriate; besides which, it is extremely unlikely that 
an invitation to one of the more exclusive of elite gatherings would have been proffered 
by any of the groups concerned. Analysis of text, documents and recordings might be 
relevant if such material were to present accurate and reliable accounts of the reflections 
of elite members on the nature of transnational elite interactions. What limited, and 
available, secondary interview data that does exist has been analyzed in detail for the 
purposes of this study. Ultimately, personal interviews were considered the most likely 
and appropriate vehicle for eliciting substantive accounts from elite participants and, in 
the event, provided the bulk of interview data for the study. 
 
In summary, this study utilises a multiple method qualitative approach which 
incorporates an analysis of available secondary data, whether from interviews or 
published accounts, along with data collected from the principle method, that of elite 
interviewing. 
 
3.3.2.1 Elite interviewing 
 
An interview provides an interactive opportunity for the researcher to explore ideas, 
themes and experiences with a participant subject. Moreover, the researcher is 
instrumental, and actively involved, in enabling the participant to explore, in detail, their 
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opinions and personal beliefs (Easterby-Smith et al., 2002). Elite interviews do, 
however, come with something of an empirical health warning with problems related to 
sampling, researcher bias, participant validity, reliability and ethics. They are, 
nevertheless, widely recognised as a crucial methodological tool (McEvoy, 2006:189) 
and one of the most potent, high-yield ways of studying political elites (Peabody, 
Webb et al., 1990:454). If properly addressed, the utilisation of an elite interviewing 
method can provide a unique insight into the functioning and workings of elite groups. 
This insight simply cannot be discovered through documentary or historical evidence 
alone (Seldon, 1996; Davies, 2001). Dependency upon documentary sources can be 
misleading since, not only might they omit significant aspects of the debate (Herman, 
1995), but deliberate attempts to manipulate the official record make reliance upon them 
questionable (Glynn & Booth, 1979).  
 
In order to address the potential pitfalls of elite interviewing, it is appropriate to deal 
with them, in turn, and consider how they may impact the design and output of this 
study. 
 
3.3.2.1.1 Issues with elite interviewing: sampling 
 
 Defining the sample is, of course, a major concern with any research but a critical 
consideration with elite interviewing is the issue of random error; such error will be 
introduced if researchers only get access to certain types of respondents (Goldstein, 
2002:669). While acknowledging these dangers, and the disadvantages of a dependency 
on personal connections, Goldstein (2002:671) recognises, nonetheless, the great 
difficulty posed by the scheduling of elite interviews; ultimately, stating that 
completing elite interviews involves a fair bit of luck [] I think it would be foolish 
not to take advantage of any points of access that one has. Likewise, Woliver 
(2002:678) highlights the importance of embracing serendipity and pragmatism in elite 
interview scenarios, 
 
although it is probably a sin in political science to admit it, luck plays a big 
role in fieldwork and interviews. If you are interviewing someone and they ask 
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you if you would like to accompany them to their next meeting, or ride in the 
taxi with them [] make sure that you do so.  
 
Notwithstanding these contributions, the most obvious means of addressing the issue of 
sample error is to interview as many people as possible from the sample group (Lilleker, 
2003; Goldstein, 2002) and to ensure that systematic lists of potential participants from 
a variety of backgrounds or sympathies are used for selection purposes (Seldon, 1996). 
Given that members of transnational elites represent a defensive community33, where 
information is likely to be guarded or unforthcoming, it is appropriate to highlight the 
problem of access and the likely outcome of non-probability sampling34. 
 
3.3.2.1.2  Issues with elite interviewing: researcher bias 
 
Researcher bias is another important consideration with elite interviewing since the 
study of elites, by implication, constitutes a number of normative predispositions; for 
instance, [it challenges] some conventional and widely shared assumptions about 
modern western societies [and raises] some fundamental questions about the way 
society ought to be organised and the roles of the individuals who comprise it (Moyser 
& Wagstaffe, 1987:2). Such a predisposition might certainly influence the shape and 
tenor of the research and its findings but, with the exception of self awareness and 
methodological rigour, there is little one can do to entirely satisfy claims that the 
research is, itself, the product of such a normative framework. Indeed, becoming 
preoccupied with such concerns is arguably counterproductive; after all, it is worth 
bearing in mind that all social science research, and most certainly research in the policy 
sciences, is a product of an explicitly normative process (Lasswell, 1951). In order to 
guard against too partisan a representation it is essential, where possible, to triangulate 
data and constantly question the interpretation one is placing upon participant accounts.  
 
 
 
 
                                                
33 See Paul Arthurs case on defensive elites in Northern Ireland (1987) 
34 For an example of the rationale for such an approach see Werning Rivera et al (2002) 
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3.3.2.1.3  Issues with elite interviewing: validity 
 
The issue of participant validity and reliability is a particularly important consideration 
when relying upon individual accounts of events. A number of researchers highlight the 
importance of recognising participant related problems such as excessive discretion 
(Seldon, 1996), exaggeration (Seldon, 1996; Lilleker, 2003), and selective or partial 
recollection (Seldon, 1996; Davies, 2001). Another problem, this time related to the 
interviewer, is also highlighted: that of power inequality, an overly deferential 
researcher (Berry, 2002), and the difficulty of getting prestigious, well-informed, people 
to hew to a standardised line of discussion (Dexter, 1970:6). Ultimately, problems of 
this kind are not easy to discount with explanations of methodological rigor. One can, of 
course, attempt to triangulate data and ensure that there are multiple sources for 
accounts that seem too improbable to be credible. But, it is important to accept the very 
real role played by the researcher in the interview; self awareness, honesty, and an 
acknowledgment of the transactional nature of the elite interview are pivotal to eventual 
success with the research project (Dexter, 1970). Certain aspects of the interview can be 
prepared for, such as a well stated letter of introduction (Goldstein, 2002; Aberbach & 
Rockman, 2002) and thorough background research on the interview subject and field 
of discussion (Leech, 2002; Werning Rivera, Kozyreva et al., 2002; Lilleker, 2003), but, 
ultimately, interviewing elites is both an art and a craft (Peabody et al., 1990:451). 
According to Leech (2002:665), what you already know is as important as what you 
want to know. What you want to know determines which questions you will ask. What 
you already know will determine how you ask them. 
 
3.3.2.1.4  Issues with elite interviewing: ethical considerations 
 
Finally, the question of ethics needs to be addressed, especially, given that the group 
being approached is, most definitely, defensive in character. Discussing the interaction 
of political and economic elites with participant subjects will likely produce a wealth of 
material, some of it specific to individuals and groups, and almost all of it achieved 
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through a commitment to the Chatham House Rule35. Participants are unlikely to go on 
the record with their accounts and will, almost certainly, require clarification and 
further confirmation of precise disclosure rules. Any notice of the objectives of the 
research, along with details of the areas if interest, may be taken as an ethical 
commitment and, although this doesnt require disclosure of a theoretical perspective, it 
is important to recognise that the ethical dimension will have an  
 
inevitable bearing on access, methodology, and, above all, interpretation of 
data and publication. This is because one of the most important ethical 
considerations relates to the intentions of the research and the researcher. 
(Phillips, 1998:9) 
 
Thus, the ethical commitment extends beyond assurances made to participants and can 
manifest itself in terms of a general commitment to the type of work one wishes to 
produce. An interesting example of this approach is provided by Woliver (2002:677) 
who observes that, 
 
in group politics, conflicts are sometimes important since they add to the 
fragile nature of a groups mobilisation. Thus I mask the conflict and discuss it 
in another way. I do not name the people who hate each other, or who feel that 
someone is hogging the spotlight or using the group for his or her political 
career or personal agenda. But, I do write about factions within the group if it is 
an important part of the group dynamics. If it is just gossip, I dont use it. It is 
up to the judgment of the interviewer to know when these conflicts are a serious 
part of the story and when they are just part of the complexities of peoples 
personalities and relationships.  
 
                                                
35 Chatham House, formerly known as the Royal Institute of International Affairs, is an independent 
organisation which promotes research and discussion on international affairs. It is a meeting place for 
policymakers, media representatives, researchers and industrialists. The rule was created to facilitate free 
speech and confidentiality at meetings.  Under the terms of the rule, information obtained in meetings 
may be used but the source of the information will not be revealed, unless express permission is granted. 
Furthermore, no data that reveals or implies the identity of the participant will be used. Broad profiles 
may be used to support the interview data i.e. business participant/multiple attendee, but care will be 
taken to ensure participant anonymity at all times. 
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The final point is, of course, key. Demonstrating the extent and nature of gossip or 
conflict within elite communities is, in itself, an important finding; to nullify or temper 
such findings might be detrimental to the impact of the overall study. A balance, 
therefore, has to be struck and decisions must be taken. The approach adopted in this 
study is that such decisions should relate to the preservation of participant identity and a 
more general inclination to avoid humiliating or discrediting participants and their 
associates. 
 
3.3.3.2 The degree of interview structure 
 
According to Dexter (1970:23), the best way to interview in a concrete situation 
depends upon the situation (including the skills and personalities of the interviewers). 
While not particularly instructive, the point is well made: there is no right or wrong way 
to interview and an adherence to methodological dogma might well prevent the best 
results in a given situation. Generally speaking, and accepting that there are many 
types of interviews with many styles of questions, each appropriate in different 
circumstances (Leech, 2002:665), interviews are divided into two types: structured and 
unstructured. It is worth pointing out, however, that structure is really a question of 
degree with a broad, grey area of semi-structured interview strategies in between 
(Davies, 2001:76).  
 
Structured, closed response, interviews are most commonly associated with quantitative 
approaches where there is little dispute over granularity in the field and where the 
primary objective is a count of some kind. Unstructured interviews are frequently seen 
as following a conversational order rather than conforming to a predefined schedule; 
even the topic of conversation may adapt or change as the interview develops. The 
disparate, undirected, nature of such interviews does mean, however, that they are 
largely unsuitable for comparative research purposes; instead, they are best used as a 
source of insight (Leech, 2002). 
 
Semi-structured interviews are appropriate when it is important to understand the 
constructs that underpin opinions and beliefs (Easterby-Smith et al., 2002) and they are, 
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by far and away, the most utilised form of interview in the policy sciences arena. 
Despite problems with the expansive nature of such an approach, and the consequential 
volumes of data that are produced, semi-structured and open-ended interviews are 
viewed as the most potentially valuable, and workable, solution to elite interviewing 
(Berry, 2002; Leech, 2002; Aberbach & Rockman, 2002; Werning Rivera et al., 2002).  
 
While providing some structure, in the form of broad themes for discussion and 
questions for consideration, the interview schedule is sufficiently flexible so as to allow 
deviation from the path; it also enables a deeper insight through more extensive use of 
open and probing questions. Indeed, drawing on earlier ethnographic interview work 
(see Spradley, 1979), Beth Leech (2002:668) suggests that,  
 
used in combination, grand tour questions and floating prompts are sometimes 
enough to elicit almost all of the information you need in a semi-structured 
interview. 
 
Furthermore, a semi-structured interview protocol allows the interviewer to respond to 
the interviewee and the situation in a way that is less threatening and more contextually 
driven; this is particularly important when discussing sensitive matters where the 
introduction depends upon a timely and discrete delivery (Leech, 2002; Aberbach & 
Rockman, 2002). Most importantly of all, however, from the perspective of elite 
interviewing, the semi-structured format enables a professional and sound footing for 
the interview while, at the same time, allowing the researcher to develop the trust and 
confidence of the interviewee based upon a more personal and potentially confident 
interaction. As Berry (2002:679) makes clear, 
 
the best interviewer is not one who writes the best questions. Rather, excellent 
interviewers are excellent conversationalists. They make interviews seem like a 
good talk among old friends. 
 
A semi-structured elite interview approach is used as the primary methodological tool 
for this research project. While an interview protocol, detailing primary themes and 
secondary areas of interest, was used as a memory aid in the pilot phase of the research 
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(see Appendix B. Interview themes), interviews for the full study involved preparation 
of no more than four or five thematic questions. These were specifically tailored 
according to the profile of the participant and enabled a conversational style of 
interview. The format provided significant opportunities to cover themes and areas of 
interest in ways that were both direct and tangential. 
 
3.3.3 Data collection  
 
Prior to conducting research for the main study, a pilot study was carried out in order to 
establish whether the claims and assumptions of the literature review were supported by 
first-hand evidence and would, therefore, represent a satisfactory research opportunity. 
In order to pilot the research, however, it was first necessary to clarify a key issue: how 
to treat the transnational policy elite for the purposes of this study. 
 
3.3.3.1 Defining the sample population 
 
An important consideration when approaching the issue of transnational elite 
interactions is whether to treat such activity in the broadest sense or, conversely, to 
identify an example of such activity. An obvious problem with the former approach is 
the difficulty of satisfactorily defining the limits of such activity; after all, elite groups 
and networks are interconnected with other groups and networks which, in turn, have a 
multitude of personal connections with many others. At what point, therefore, does such 
activity cease to represent a set of transnational elite interactions?  
 
One possible solution to this problem is to identify a number of elite networks and 
organisations that might be defined as more elite or more transnational than others 
but, such a prescription, is inherently subjective and runs the risk of over simplifying 
significant differences that exist in group composition and purpose. Another obvious 
drawback to such an approach is that, despite interconnections between groups, the 
accounts of activity provided by participants might vary considerably depending upon 
which groups or networks they are describing. In order to gain a more panoptic account 
of such activity, it is important, therefore, to identify and interview elite members who 
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have a grasp of the various different types and levels of transnational elite interaction. 
This, by implication, necessitates access to the most connected and powerful of elite 
members, people at the very heart of the transnational elite network.  
 
Of all the formal and informal transnational policy forums and networks, one group, 
Bilderberg, is considered to be the most exclusive and private. With the regular 
attendance of recognisable power brokers, and the longstanding support of notable 
European royalty, Bilderberg continues to attract select participants from the upper 
transatlantic echelons of business, politics, media, academia, and prestigious policy 
institutes. Given that Bilderberg attendees are frequently active in numerous other elite 
transnational groups and forums, they are able to provide a unique perspective of the 
purpose and effects of such activity and the significance of interconnections between 
elite communities and networks.  
 
This exploratory study of transnational elite interactions is, therefore, based on the 
accounts of Bilderberg attendees during the post-Cold War period. A comprehensive list 
of almost a thousand attendees between the years 1991-2008 has been compiled and 
represents the sample population for the study (see Appendix C: Bilderberg attendees 
1991-2008). 
 
3.3.3.2 The pilot study 
 
As stated previously, the pilot study was considered necessary for the purpose of testing 
the claims and assumptions of the literature review. Its function and relevance was 
primarily that of providing background information that might direct the objectives and 
design of the main study. As a consequence, it is not necessary to provide an exhaustive 
account of the data collection methods and findings generated by it. Instead, a short 
summary is provided.  
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3.3.3.2.1 Overview 
 
The pilot study sought to elicit data through the use of interviews from three separate 
groups of participants: policymakers, informants and Bilderberg attendees. In interviews 
with policymakers, the researcher was looking for personal accounts of structural, 
institutional and political constraints placed upon the initiation and consideration of 
public policy alternatives. Through interviews with informants, or expert witnesses, the 
researcher sought to understand more about the purpose and activities of transnational 
elite networks and, where possible, attempted to acquire, previously unseen, secondary 
interview data. This data collection activity was complemented by analysis of further 
secondary data: media interviews with Bilderberg attendees. In total, secondary data 
from eight interviews was identified and transcribed for analysis purposes. Finally, the 
researcher contacted a small number of Bilderberg attendees for the purposes of 
understanding whether such access was possible, on what terms it would be granted and 
how reliable interview data from such sources was likely to be. 
 
3.3.3.2.2 Pilot study - Policymakers 
 
Three senior policymakers were interviewed face-to-face. Two were, or had been, 
senior civil servants in the UK government or European Commission. The third was a 
private sector member of various UK policy networks who had personally advised 
government ministers and had been present on numerous consultation and advisory 
committees. The sectors represented were defence, housing, and equal opportunities. All 
interviews were conducted according to the Chatham House Rule but, in each, 
permission was granted to record the session. Interviews were personally transcribed 
and inductively coded in a freehand fashion. 
 
The findings of this small study of policymakers were broadly in line with empirical 
conclusions in the policy sciences literature and support the central contention that 
transformational policy change exists largely beyond the capacity of policymakers. The 
study was, by no means, comprehensive but did provide a sense of the everyday 
concerns experienced by those with knowledge of the policy initiation and design 
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processes. The process is, indeed, complex and multi-layered. The actual impact of 
individuals is often limited but political entrepreneurship is a prized characteristic; each 
of the policymakers cited timing and opportunism as important aspects of the process. 
All depictions were, however, limited to the observable functioning of state processes; 
questions related to the formation of ideas and agendas were viewed, in the main, as a 
result of events and wider saliency. At no point, were such assumptions fundamentally 
challenged by interviewees. 
 
3.3.3.2.3 Pilot study  Informants 
 
A small number of expert witnesses, or informants, were seen as having had special 
access to, or expert knowledge of, elite transnational networks. Justification for the use 
of such witnesses can be made on the grounds of difficulties likely to be encountered in 
accessing actual members. Furthermore, it helps  
 
the investigator to acquire a better picture of the norms, attitudes, expectations, 
and evaluations of a particular group than he could obtain solely from less 
intensive observationsnaturally, it will often be preferable to combine the use 
of informants with other interviewing and with other methods of data 
collection. (Dexter, 1970:8-9) 
 
Five people, three journalists and two academics, were contacted but two declined to 
participate. One academic source provided substantial background information on 
transnational elite networks and two respected journalists provided data including three 
complete interview transcripts from Bilderberg attendees. The content of these 
transcripts is included in the main study.  
 
3.3.3.2.4 Pilot study  Bilderberg attendees 
 
The researcher wished to gain an understanding of whether, and on what terms, 
Bilderberg attendees would consider participating in the study. Initially, since each 
recipient required a bespoke letter of introduction, it was decided that only a small 
number of attendees would be contacted directly by email. After a considerable effort to 
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discover the addresses of certain attendees, it became clear that the email approach was 
not working. Rather than proceed with a blanket email to potential respondents, the 
decision was taken to replicate the approach with twenty further attendees; this time 
using formal letters of introduction. Again, no responses were received. While it is 
feasible that follow up letters and telephone calls may have yielded a response of some 
kind, the researcher was unwilling to upset the possibility of future interviews by 
clumsily approaching potential participants. Instead, it was decided to approach 
attendees through the use of referrals and introductions of one form or another. Since 
the objective was simply to discover whether access was feasible, in as short a period of 
time as possible, sampling was convenience based. In short, two interviews were 
conducted with Bilderberg attendees. 
 
The first interview was the result of a journalist suggesting the name of an attendee he 
felt would be willing to participate in the study. An introduction was made and an 
interview followed some time afterwards. The second interview was also the result of a 
personal introduction; this time via someone known to the researcher. While the process 
of gaining access was somewhat protracted and required use of intermediaries, it was 
concluded that the difficulties were not insurmountable. The terms of access were not 
overly burdensome and the interviews appeared to be remarkably open and frank. Data 
collected in these interviews was used for the purposes of the main study. 
 
3.3.3.3 Main study 
 
Given the findings of the pilot phase of the research, a decision was taken to proceed 
with the main study. The process of data collection and the methods utilised are outlined 
here.  
 
3.3.3.3.1 Sampling 
 
The non-probability sampling method used to secure interviews was a combination of 
convenience and snowball approaches. The necessity for convenience sampling stems 
from the obvious challenge of reaching transnational elite participants - a process that is 
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largely dependent upon the use of intermediaries. The selection of intermediaries in this 
study was, ultimately, based upon two factors: who it was possible to reach directly; and 
who might be able to make introductions to members of the Bilderberg group. In some 
instances, it was necessary to use an additional intermediary to reach the desired 
intermediary, in effect, two degrees of separation from the eventual participant. In the 
final analysis, however, the sampling of intermediaries was based upon convenience 
and this clearly has some implications for the eventual sample. And the incorporation of 
snowball sampling, which calls upon eventual participants to make further participant 
introductions, may be seen to compound these issues. While snowball sampling has 
emerged as an important qualitative tool for understanding power relations, social 
capital and social networks (Noy, 2008) it is long known that it is vulnerable to the 
introduction of sample bias (see, for example, Goodman, 1961). Given the difficulties 
associated with securing interviews with elite participants of this kind, however, it was 
felt that such bias was an unavoidable consequence of such activity. In short, this study 
makes no claims concerning statistical validity; it is a qualitative exploratory study 
designed to better understand the nature of elite interactions. The specific comments of 
one participant are as potentially valid to the findings as comments repeated by the 
whole group.   
 
In the event, the only purposeful aspect of the sampling process was a mild attempt to 
ensure representation of participants from the fields of business, politics, media, 
academia and policy institutes. Of the intermediaries who assisted with introductions, 
none are known to be familiar with each other although such a possibility could not be 
discounted. It is significant, however, that when presented with a list of possible 
Bilderberg contacts there was very little cross over, in terms of possible introductions, 
between intermediaries. 
 
3.3.3.3.2 Interviews 
 
In total, interview data from sixteen Bilderberg participants was gathered from two 
sources: thirteen semi-structured interviews were conducted with attendees of the group 
over a period of twelve months, and a further three, unpublished, interview transcripts 
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with Bilderberg participants were made available for analysis by respected journalistic 
sources. Twelve of the semi-structured interviews conducted by the researcher were 
face-to-face and one had to take place, at short notice, over the telephone. Of the 
interviews provided by journalists, one was conducted face-to-face while two were 
telephone interviews.  
 
Of those interviews conducted by the researcher, introductions via intermediaries were 
necessary in all cases. Meetings and introductions were required with all but one of the 
intermediaries, often on the pretext of understanding their own views of such activity 
before the request for further introductions could be made. It became apparent 
throughout the process of meeting with intermediaries that the screening of personal 
introductions was fairly commonplace; with many people willing to make introductions 
once they were satisfied that their own personal credibility was not going to be called 
into question. In the course of the study, eight intermediaries were used in order to 
secure the final Bilderberg interviews. Further intermediaries were contacted and, in 
turn, offered to assist but these, unfortunately, did not result in interviews. It should be 
noted that, of the intermediaries, five might be described as being part of a policy elite 
while three were elite members of the business community. Three Bilderberg contacts 
declined to participate on the grounds of being too busy; three further contacts agreed to 
be interviewed but, at the time of writing, had still to make themselves available for a 
meeting. Two contacts did not respond to the introduction.  
 
Interviews were conducted with European participants from the UK, Germany, Spain, 
Turkey, Belgium and Switzerland. All interviews were conducted according to the 
Chatham House Rule and care has been taken to ensure participant anonymity during 
the analysis stage. While it might have been desirable to tabulate participant details with 
descriptions such as nationality, sector, and years of attendance; presenting just a small 
amount of such correlated data can frequently, and inadvertently, reveal the identity of 
the participant. For this reason, general descriptive data for the sample will be presented 
but descriptions in the findings will be restricted to only those that preserve the identity 
of participants and their associates.  
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The duration of face-to-face interviews varied from 53 minutes to 90 minutes and all but 
one of the interviews were digitally recorded. In the case of the latter, the participant 
asked that his comments not be recorded but he was happy for me to make notes. Notes 
were, indeed, taken and great care was taken to ensure the accuracy of statements.  
Within minutes of the interview ending the researcher had revisited the notes and 
ensured that statements were both readable and an accurate representation of the 
interview. All interviews were personally transcribed by the researcher. Of the three 
remaining telephone based interviews, transcripts for two were made available by the 
journalistic source. The third, conducted by the researcher, was made at short notice, 
after the cancellation of a meeting, and it was not possible to record the discussion. 
Notes were taken during the call and immediately revisited after the interview to ensure 
accuracy. Telephone interviews were shorter than face-to-face meetings, ranging in 
duration from 15 minutes through to 25 minutes and questions and responses tended to 
be more direct than those in face-to-face interviews.  
 
3.3.3.3.3 Overview of participants 
 
All of the studys Bilderberg participants are men. In broad sectoral terms, there are five 
representatives of business, five representatives of politics, two representatives of 
academia and four representatives of the media sector. Allowing for multiple interests 
and responsibilities, the sample group comprises (past and present): 
- The editors of three national newspapers and a financial journalist 
- Two professors  
- Two foreign ministers 
- A minister of defence 
- The head of an international institution e.g. World Bank/IMF/NATO 
- The governor of a central bank 
- The chairmen of four international banks 
- An EU Commissioner 
- The head of a policy institute 
- An ambassador  
- The chairman of a business federation 
- The CEO of a television network 
- The chairmen of three international business conglomerates 
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There are five one-time attendees and four participants who had attended more than 
seven times during the period 1991-2008. A further seven participants attended between 
two and five conferences. On average, study participants attended the Bilderberg 
conference 4.25 times during the period 1991-2008. The mean number of sample group 
attendees each year at the conference was 3.77 - see Table 1. In addition to regular 
invitees, the sample group contains five known members, past or present, of the 
Bilderberg steering committee and two of this group were, or are, members of the inner 
advisory group.  
                                 
      Year                      Attendees
1991 4 
1992 3 
1993 2 
1994 3 
1995 6 
1996 3 
1997 4 
1998 4 
1999 5 
2000 4 
2001 4 
2002 3 
2003 4 
2004 4 
2005 4 
2006 4 
2007 4 
2008 3 
 
Mean   
3.777777778 
 
SD  
0.878203752 
  
Table 3.1   Sample group attendees at Bilderberg conferences 1991-2008 
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3.3.4 Data preparation and analysis 
 
3.3.4.1 Transcripts 
 
All interviews, with the exception of those provided by journalists, were subsequently 
transcribed by the researcher. While this was a painstaking process, it did allow for the 
data to be revisited and appreciated in its entirety; rather than, as might have been the 
case with transcription by a third party, a more selective appreciation of the content and 
contextual references. Clearly, this is a shortcoming with the journalistic transcripts, but 
the value of the data, which is not in the public domain, coupled with the accuracy of 
the conversational content of the transcripts, more than compensates for any 
shortcomings in this area. In the case of the researchers own interviews, early 
transcripts attempted to include references to such things as laughter, lengthy pauses 
and utterances; but, as the process unfolded, it became clear that much of this notation 
was both tedious and surplus to the requirements of the study. Where such data was felt 
to have an immediate bearing upon the meaning of the response, notes were taken. For 
instance, when a respondent was felt to be evasive in his responses, this would manifest 
itself in a number of audible and non-audible ways. In such instances, the researcher 
recorded the evasion and, indeed, later returned to such evasions for the purposes of 
further inquiry.  
 
3.4.4.1.1 Unit of analysis 
 
Establishing the unit of analysis is critical to research concerned with theory building 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). Furthermore, explicitly defining the unit of analysis is a central 
component in the effective planning and conceptualisation of the overall research 
project (Neuman, 2000).  
 
The unit of analysis for this study is the individual. Through the use of semi-structured 
interviews, transnational elite participants have provided accounts (Harre & Secord, 
1972) of their beliefs, experiences, and perceptions of inter-subjective meanings that 
underpin this form of elite interaction and consensus formation.  
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3.3.4.2 Discourse and discourse analysis 
 
Discursive approaches to qualitative analysis are rooted in the social constructionist 
movement (Berger & Luckman, 1966) in which language is viewed as central to an 
understanding of the way in which individuals interpret and reproduce socially 
constructed reality. While there is no single unifying definition of discourse, the term is 
used widely in the social sciences and, in its broadest sense, is often taken to comprise 
all forms of spoken interaction, formal and informal, and written texts of all kinds 
(Potter & Wetherell, 1987:7) Emphasising the role of language in social construction, 
Burr (2003:65) suggests that, 
 
discourses, through what is said, written or otherwise represented, serve to 
construct the phenomena of our world for us, and different discourses construct 
these things in different ways, each discourse portraying the object as having a very 
different nature from the next. Each discourse claims to say what the object really 
is, that is, claims to be the truth. 
 
The purpose of discourse is the subject of some debate among post-structuralist 
contributors with, for many, the subject being inextricably entwined with issues of 
identity, knowledge and power. Foucault, for example, views power as dispersed 
throughout all social relations; where individuals are  
 
always in the position of simultaneously undergoing and exercising power. 
They are not its inert or consenting target; they are also always elements of its 
articulation [] individuals are the vehicles of power, not its points of 
application. (Foucault, 1980:98) 
 
Furthermore, it is in the mutually supportive nature of knowledge and power, of which 
Foucault (1980) refers to regimes of power-knowledge or discourses, where the 
relevance of discourse to the structural means of knowing and exercising power 
becomes most apparent. The significance of individuals and discourse within this 
conception of power is critical since 
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discourses do not simply produce, transmit and reinforce power relations, they 
also threaten, expose and render them fragile. (Knights & Vurdubakis, 1994) 
 
This critical turn, with its emphasis on power relations, has led to calls for a distinction 
to be made between different discourse approaches. One such distinction, made by 
Mumby & Clair (1997), is between that of interpretive discourse, and its concern for 
socially constructed meaning, and critical discourse, with its concern for issues of 
power and identity. In the case of the former, interpretive approach, discourse is the 
principal means by which organisation members create a social reality that frames their 
sense of who they are (1997:181). In the case of the latter approach, critical discourse 
(analysis) is concerned with the role of discourse in producing and reproducing 
structures of power and inequality. Since this study is principally concerned with elite 
interactions and shared understandings, and since the stated epistemological stance is 
interpretive, the approach taken here, in the broadest sense, is that of interpretive 
discourse analysis.  
 
Consistent with the breadth of their definition of discourse to include all forms of 
spoken interaction and written text, Potter and Wetherell (1987:7) maintain that 
discourse analysis is the analysis of any of these forms of discourse. But the question 
of what constitutes analysis is pivotal to an understanding of what practices fall within 
the parameters of the discourse analysis. Antaki et al (2002) argue that certain practices 
definitely do not represent discourse analysis, but they are less inclined, for reasons of 
inclusiveness, to state which practices they feel do. Their analysis leans towards a more 
thorough textual interpretation, depending upon a very detailed form of transcription 
which includes pause timing, laughter, utterances and inflexions, and owes a 
considerable amount to the approach developed by Jefferson (1985). The distinction, 
given such a perspective between content analysis, a more quantitative analysis of 
textual data, and discourse analysis is abundantly clear. The distinction, however, 
becomes less clear as one moves along the spectrum from content analysis, through 
thematic analysis, and into what the authors might view as more pure forms of discourse 
analysis.  
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Thematic analysis is a widely used method of textual analysis in the social sciences but 
is largely overlooked, and often confused with, other methods of discourse analysis. As 
Braun and Clarke (2006:79-80) conclude, 
 
it can be seen as a very poorly branded method in that it does not appear to exist 
as a named analysis in the same way as other methods do... in this sense, it is often 
not explicitly claimed as the method of analysis when, in actuality, we argue that a 
lot of analysis is essentially thematic  but is either claimed as something else (such 
as discourse analysis or even content analysis) or not identified as any particular 
method at all. 
 
In practical terms, thematic analysis, probably best viewed, at this time, as a variation or 
constituent within the broader definition of discourse analysis activity, involves 
identifying, analyzing and reporting patterns [themes] within the data. It minimally 
organises and describes your data set in [rich] detail (Braun & Clarke, 2006:79). 
Drawing on the earlier work of Boyatzis (1998), Braun and Clarke (2006:79) note that it 
often goes further than this and interprets various aspects of the research topic. 
 
This study utilises an inductive, thematic, discourse analysis; similar, in essence, to a 
grounded approach (Glaser & Strauss, 1967), to categorise and interpret data and 
subsequently build theory. 
 
3.3.4.3 Coding 
 
The interpretive coding protocol used for the study is broadly in line with the 
framework for classification and description of qualitative data manipulation operations 
outlined by Spiggle (1994); namely categorisation, abstraction, comparison, 
dimensionalisation, integration, iteration, and refutation. Through the use of these 
operations researchers organise data, extract meaning, arrive at conclusions, and 
generate or confirm conceptual schemes and theories that describe the data (1994:493). 
The coding itself is a combination of open, axial and selective approaches based upon 
the inductive identification of thematic categories. The interview transcripts were 
initially open coded in a bottom-up fashion starting with interview one and working 
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through to interview sixteen. By the time that interview twelve was coded, the number 
of thematic groups was reaching saturation with only a small number of groups being 
added after this point. Broadly speaking, each category of data is a collection of 
interview extracts, words, sentences or whole paragraphs, with similar thematic 
meanings.  
 
In order to manage the sheer volume of data, QSR NVivo 8.0 software was used to 
assist with open coding. After the initial stage of working through transcripts, 
approximately 120 thematic categories had emerged from the data with 1444 interview 
extracts (see Appendix D. Coding/Thematic categories). The largest category of data 
had as many as seventy extracts associated with it, while others had only one. The 
abstraction phase of the process was more complicated and required a number of 
iterations over several days. During this time, the researcher attempted to create higher 
level thematic abstractions based upon clusters of lower order categories. This was not 
as simple as creating hierarchal trees and nodes, to use NVivo parlance, since a great 
many interrelationships existed between categories and, in some cases, questions arose 
concerning the inclusive nature and relevance of abstractions. In the event, five thematic 
meta-categories of data emerged: 
 
- The structural context of elite interactions in the  
transnational setting  
- Collaboration in the transnational arena 
- Transnational networks and networking 
- Consensus formation and the narrowing of differences 
- Hierarchies of influence 
 
Within these five meta-categories, initial thematic constructs were once again 
reconceptualised and a smaller group of higher order themes were created. The meta-
categorisation of data and these higher order themes produced the structure of the 
findings.  
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3.4 Conclusion 
 
A social constructionist ontological perspective with an interpretivist epistemology is 
employed for the purposes of this study. A qualitative methodology is considered to be 
the most appropriate means of addressing the objectives of the research and multiple 
data collection methods are employed. The primary mechanism, however, is that of elite 
interviewing.  
 
An inductive, thematic, form of discourse analysis is utilised and, through a process of 
abstraction, theory is tentatively developed. The key thematic abstractions are presented 
in the following findings chapter.  
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4.0 RESEARCH FINDINGS 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This study attempts to explore how the dynamics of discrete power, specifically third 
dimensional power, in transnational elite interactions may have shaped elite thinking 
related to political problems and public policy responses in the post-Cold War period.  It 
is concerned with the nature of such interactions and the dynamics of consensus 
formation within transnational elite networks. Moreover, it aims to consider the veracity 
of the consensus formation label, the purposeful nature of collaboration within 
transnational elite networks and the processes of communication, socialisation, 
acculturation and fraternisation that characterise interactions within such settings.  
 
An inductive analysis of data gathered from sixteen interviews with Bilderberg 
attendees during the period 1991-2008 is presented in this chapter. Extracts from these 
interviews, which are presented throughout the findings, are labelled Interview 1 
through to Interview 16. In addition, a minimal amount of secondary interview data, 
gathered during the pilot phase of the study, is used to support some points raised by the 
analysis; such extracts are labelled Interview 17 through to Interview 21.  It is important 
to note that the findings present the main thematic abstractions developed by the 
researcher during the course of the data analysis; given the sheer volume of data, and 
the possible extent of interpretative analysis, it is simply not feasible to provide 
commentary on every aspect of the data provided by participants. In the interests, 
therefore, of coherence and readability, the extracts used, in a singular and collated 
sense, support general thematic abstractions and are not analyzed, extract by extract, for 
the purposes of providing explanations of additional phenomenon. It is intended that 
such analysis will be the subject of further studies. 
 
The findings are split into five thematic sections reflecting the abstractions identified in 
the coding stage of the study. Theme 1, which concerns the structural context of elite 
transnational interactions, considers participant accounts of international relations 
activity in the post-Cold War period and the role of informal elite networks before, and 
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after, the fall of the Berlin Wall. It analyses the changing nature of political power and 
the role of legitimacy in international affairs and considers global governance in the 
contemporary setting. Theme 2 explores elite collaboration and, specifically, the logic 
and practice of multi-stakeholder collaboration in the transnational arena; while Theme 
3 considers transnational networks and networking activity and, crucially, the changing 
nature and significance of such activity. Theme 4, on the issue of consensus formation 
and the narrowing of differences, presents a more nuanced account of transnational elite 
interactions but, at the same time, identifies considerable sources of bias within such 
settings. The effects of such bias, specifically its consequences for shared understanding 
within elite networks, are explored. Finally, Theme 5, which analyses hierarchies of 
influence within transnational elite groups, considers the role of the individual and 
individuals within such arenas as well as the seductive lure of such activity to elite 
participants.  
 
4.2 Theme 1. The structural context of elite interactions in the transnational 
setting  
 
It is important to state, at the outset, that contemporary elite interactions in the 
transnational setting do not exist in a structural vacuum; they are as much a product of 
the complex interweaving of historical, geographical, economic and socio-political 
forces as one might expect of any other sphere of elite, or human, interaction. What 
makes them potentially more interesting, however, is the lack of structural homogeneity 
that exists in the international context. Not only are structural realities more complex, 
disparate and nuanced, they also represent a fiercely contested discursive backdrop to 
international relations activity. As a consequence, the formation of elite consensus 
related to the nature of international challenges should not be viewed simply as an 
attempt to collectively grapple with complex, and otherwise insurmountable, problems. 
It must also be seen as a contested process governing the pervasiveness, or otherwise, of 
certain structural paradigms within the elite transnational community.  
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4.2.1 Elite transatlantic interactions in the post-Cold War period 
 
This contestedness has become a more prominent feature of transatlantic elite 
interactions during the post-Cold War period as the relative certainty of earlier alliances, 
based upon security and economic principles, has given way to a period of much greater 
complexity in world affairs. In the words of one participant, 
 
There has been a dramatic change in the post-Cold War system. The Cold War 
system was a structure and the reason structuralist schools were so successful 
during the Cold War period was that everything was inside the structure. 
Nothing could really move outside of the structure in the West and in the 
Communist countries. Even in the third-world, even though their realities were 
very different from the industrialised countries of the West or the Communist 
world, it was still completely absorbed in structure. But now were living 
outside the structure. (Interview 3) 
 
The decline of the perceived Soviet threat, disquiet concerning the pervasiveness of the 
Washington Consensus and the globalisation project, significant international disputes 
over Bosnia and Iraq, major advances in technology and communications and the 
emergence of, what some see, as multi-polarity in world affairs, have led to the 
suggestion that traditional transatlantic relationships are declining in importance. For 
European members of the transatlantic elite, however, it is a mistake to underestimate 
the residual strength and exclusivity of certain economic, social and cultural 
transatlantic ties, 
 
Its been overstated. I think youll find this transatlantic relationship has been 
transformed by the end of the Cold War in the sense that its automatic reflexes 
have gone i.e. wed better hang onto each other otherwise those horrible 
Soviets may overcome us. But the need for it is about to make quite a big 
comeback and, with the US presidential elections, its already making a 
comeback. You can see with President Bushs trip around Europe right now 
that its all about how we can work together. So I think the period between 
2000-2006 will come to be seen as an aberration. (Interview 12) 
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It seems that, whatever their differences, the Europeans and the Americans 
have a basic need for a World Trade Organisation and that, whatever their other 
preoccupations, the bigger picture requires them to go beyond their dissenting 
elements. (Interview 14) 
 
There is, of course, the divide that nobody wants to talk about between East 
and West. Here in Istanbul, this is where East and West meet. But there is still a 
feeling that a Muslim country shouldnt be a member of a Christian club. Its 
not discussed, but its there. (Interview 6) 
 
The final point, raised by a member of the Turkish business elite, highlights a perceived 
dividing line that exists between what he sees as participation and full membership of 
the European, and hence transatlantic, club. This distinction may have as much to do 
with Turkeys place in global economic affairs as it has to do with culture or religion, 
but the perception here is clearly that European and transatlantic affairs exhibit a 
historical and cultural dimension that reinforces feelings of exclusion. As another 
Turkish representative commented, 
 
countries such as France, Holland, many countries, look upon Turkey as the 
other who doesnt belong in this club. (Interview 5) 
 
And this tendency towards historical and cultural alliances is mirrored in the 
composition of transatlantic elite forums and groups as one recent Bilderberg attendee 
confided 
 
I was struck by how Western European the whole thing was and I did say that 
to people. And they said, well, we did try to have East Europeans in before but 
the size of it became too large. But it struck me as quite an old style alliance 
thing, you know, Western Europe and the United States. I mean, I can see the 
rationale from a scale point of view but, if youre talking about Europe, you 
cant talk about Europe in just West European terms. But clearly that persists 
here. (Interview 2) 
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A former member of the Bilderberg group expressed similar surprise when informed 
that East Europeans were still largely absent from the annual conference, 
 
I presumed that they would now have all the Europeans there, I mean, when I 
was there we didnt want the Warsaw Pact people because that would have 
raised all sorts of difficult problems but, nowadays you would expect the Poles 
and Hungarians and suchlike, I dont know, I suppose they dont want it to get 
too big. (Interview 4) 
 
While it is clear that formal international relations activity may have been transformed 
by the end of the Cold War, it seems that informal ties and networks, based largely on 
prior relationships and a shared understanding of world affairs, continue to reflect 
traditional alliances. One obvious reason for this in the case of transatlantic elites, aside 
from considerable economic ties, is the continued significance of organisations such as 
NATO; especially, once more, in response to the perception of renewed Russian 
economic and military aggression. During the Cold War, the vacuum left by the absence 
of a formal international political apparatus, and the failure of member countries of 
NATO to develop a meaningful political function for the organisation, led to a situation 
in which informal relationships became a significant adjunct to formal international 
relations activity. Explaining the void, one participant noted, 
 
you had an organisation, NATO, that was supposed to be rounded in the sense 
that they talked on political issues as well as on defence. But they really only 
talked about defence and I think that was an error. I think it was the only 
organisation, at that time anyway, in which the Americans and the Europeans 
got together; there was no other organisation, well there was the European 
Union but, otherwise, there was no way the Americans had any input into 
European thinking or that Europeans had input into American thinking. 
(Interview 4) 
 
As if to reinforce this point, the political importance of informal elite networking to the 
cementing of transatlantic relations appears, to this day, to be contingent upon the 
nature of perceived threats and opportunities. In political terms, this is evidenced by 
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formal involvement and engagement with informal groups during the period 
immediately after the end of the Cold War and the resurgence of political interest in the 
period leading up to the invasion of Iraq in 2003, 
 
 [After the end of the Cold War], the Americans got less interested in it 
politically; business wise they didnt. I think they began to think that Europe 
wasnt quite as important, there wasnt going to be a nuclear war and therefore 
we were a lot of quarrelsome people who didnt matter very much. And, 
anyway, theyd rather go to China or wherever. (Interview 4) 
 
In the months leading up to the second Gulf War, however, informal groups and 
networks had, once again, become a critical political mechanism for the exchange of 
views and information, the airing of grievances, the creation of alliances, and the 
attempted formation of consensus; although, as one participant recalls, 
 
[on the Iraq invasion], you had two consensuses: on the one hand, a consensus 
around the position of countries like France and Germany; and, on the other, 
around the position of the United States and the UK. It divided, polarised, 
Europe, it polarised the United States, not at that moment but later, and it 
polarised the Security Council. It was not possible to reach a single consensus. 
But the consensus building processes, in think tanks and among the elite, 
continued to operate. It was mainly in these sorts of forums, that we found 
legitimacy or enough legitimacy. It was a very, very, active period for many 
think tanks, institutions, foundations, academic circles and media groups. For or 
against, but especially for, this machinery worked very well for. (Interview 3) 
 
The suggestion of instrumentalism, implicit within such an account, points to an 
acknowledgement of the role of such groups in the intellectual legitimisation of foreign 
policy activity and, moreover, the role of power relations in establishing a sense of what 
constitutes legitimacy in the first place. One crucial component in such power 
relationships, is the collective need of participants to contain political disputes and not 
allow them to spill over into all areas of bilateral cooperation. In this respect, economic 
interests play a very important role in maintaining dialogue and political relations. As 
one participant recalled, 
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it was clear that during the Iraq saga, relations between some European 
countries and the United States were not the best in the world and, the fact that 
the business community felt they would not be distracted from their long term 
strategy in relation to this, was a very useful element. In other words, you dont 
translate a quarrel on Point A into an across the line relationship. (Interview 
14) 
 
The suggestion that political issues can be ring-fenced in this way is, of course, overly 
simplistic but it is interesting to note, all the same, the perceived transcendental quality 
of business interests - a theme that is returned to in section 4.5.1 Consensus formation 
and elite shared understanding.  
 
4.2.2 States, power and legitimacy 
 
Notwithstanding the obvious involvement of non-state interests in the transnational 
political sphere, there exists, within the participant group, strong support for the view 
that government, and the state, is and remains, the key protagonist in international 
relations activity. As one participant unequivocally stated, 
 
ultimately, political power rests with nation states and with completely overt 
national political processes. These meetings are a useful adjunct to that but 
theyre never a substitute for that. (Interview 13) 
 
This view is qualified, in the international setting, by the suggestion of power residing, 
increasingly, with multilateral power structures based upon the collective sovereignty of 
nation states. It is important to recognise, therefore, that global economic and political 
developments are being driven by 
 
governments largely, the shareholders of the international system. The 
shareholders of the international system are still governments, and they decide 
collectively, more and more, multilateralism, to do certain things together 
mainly because these things cannot be done by individual countries. So, in the 
UN, they decide to do a whole lot of things ranging from climate change to war, 
aggression, peacekeeping, world health and any number of other things. In the 
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IMF and World Bank, they decide other things, and in the WTO they regulate 
international trade. (Interview 12) 
 
Multilateralism is viewed as essential because the power of the nation state, and 
political leaders, is believed to have diminished significantly in the contemporary era. 
Cooperation between governments, and other stakeholders, is seen as the only means of 
coming to terms with complex global problems. 
 
The margin of influence that leaders have on events from the political to the 
economic to the social bears no resemblance to what they had in the thirties. 
Life has become much more complex. The margin for manoeuvre, the capacity 
to act of democratically elected governments, has become smaller and the 
problems have become larger with geographical dimensions that go way 
beyond anything that anybody could have invented before. So the world runs in 
a chaotic fashion and will continue to run in a chaotic fashion. (Interview 14) 
 
One of the most frightening things, of course, if you are anywhere near people 
who are in charge of governments or large businesses, is how they too are like 
corks bobbing around on the stream of what's carrying on.  I mean people 
hugely overestimate the ability of individuals to change the course of history 
[] I'm absolutely convinced it's impossible for anybody to rule the world. 
(Interview 18) 
 
Of course, such complexity does not preclude political influence; it does, however, have 
a significant bearing upon the form that it takes. There is broad agreement that the terms 
under which state power can be exercised in the international setting have changed 
almost beyond recognition during the post-Cold War period. In an interconnected and 
interdependent global setting, legitimacy, as a basis for state action, has become a 
critical pre-requisite. The consequences of acting without perceived legitimacy, or, 
worse still, losing legitimacy through ones actions, are potentially profound. As one 
participant sees it, 
 
you have an asymmetric world at this time. You have moments in which you 
have to use power but the traditional instruments of international relations, for 
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instance diplomacy, have completely changed now because of transparency; 
because of the need to be more accountable. If you use diplomacy, you have to 
use it in a different way and you have to explain what you are doing, what you 
are saying, and why you are saying it. When you use the traditional instruments 
of power, you have to use them in a different way or you cannot use them at all. 
And, crucially, you have to use new instruments of power. The rules of using 
power, everyone has to accept them, even the United States, because of this 
transparency. (Interview 3) 
 
Given the transparency that exists both, upwards, within the international community 
itself, and downwards, to a much more informed, and increasingly socially responsible, 
constituent base, the way that political leaders manage the relationship between forms 
of hard and soft power is critical to the question of legitimacy. This depiction of 
international relations has some parallels with the idea of social capital in which 
qualities such as trust become vital to ones ability to function effectively.  
 
There is a necessity to have a minimum of trust. You need to have a capacity 
not simply to force people to do things because you believe that you are in a 
position of strength. That is not how the world is run. There is a balance of 
power and that [way of working] is not sufficient. (Interview 14) 
 
The idea that there exists a balance of power or some kind of equilibrium to power 
relations represents an important reality for most states, as participant 3 observes, 
 
very powerful countries, who use traditional instruments, are now talking 
about soft power; they have hard power, military power, diplomacy, pressure, 
sanctions and so on, but then they also have soft power. For example, power 
related to cooperation, culture, development, scientific advances and so on. This 
is the case for very powerful countries. Then you have a second group of 
countries: the UK, France etc. These countries have more difficulties when they 
try to use traditional instruments. Why? Because, lets argue that the United 
States is an empire, it isnt, but given the way it works and acts, it is the number 
one and it has to protect its position. From this point of view it is an empire. 
Everyone understands they will use everything to protect this agenda. But the 
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others, we are not protecting such positions; we are less and less imperial from 
that point of view. Our societies are not asking us to protect hegemonic 
positions in the world; they want us to be good players, to be more ethical in 
our foreign policy. At the same time, however, each sector of society is asking 
us to protect certain national interests related to them: corporates are asking us 
to protect their interests from an economic and trade point of view; Europe is 
making similar demands etc. We will be less and less able to use the hard power 
instrument and will, more and more, need to have both hard and soft power. 
(Interview 3) 
 
This requirement for subtlety in international relations is also leading to the 
development of different kinds of leaders; leaders capable of managing instruments of 
soft power and persuasion. Against such a backdrop, those who utilise more traditional 
instruments of power or shows of strength run the risk of alienating wider potential 
support. This can be a rather subtle process, as one participant notes, 
 
things have changed. I mean when I reconsider the last ten-fifteen years, and 
the two Iraq Wars and so on, I know many, including myself, who have, in the 
process, changed their view. With hindsight, and knowing better perhaps, I 
think this is an indispensable tool that we must all use, to be critical with 
ourselves. Ive always found that those who have a very strong view on 
something and do not give, despite the world changing around them, were not 
the best people youd like to talk to. (Interview 9) 
 
It is clear that, in the run up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, and the perceived failure of 
softer attempts to foster a single consensus, the harder line of the neo-conservatives 
became more pronounced in informal, as well as formal, elite interactions. As one 
Bilderberg attendee confided, 
 
dAvignon36 acknowledged to me the change in the Democrat/Republican 
relationship abroad. Previously they presented a fairly united front. He 
suggested that, perhaps now, the neo-cons were too well represented. 
(Interview 8) 
                                                
36 Viscount Etienne DAvignon is the serving Honorary Chairman of the Bilderberg group 
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Another participant, recalling an exchange with Richard Perle at that time, provides 
another interesting example of frustration with the perceived intransigence of the neo-
conservative position and personalities, 
 
 We said, what is your objective here? You want to get rid of Saddam, fine, 
but what are you talking about? Because if you go in there with a huge force 
and occupational theories, you will open up a Pandoras box. We know from 
history that all these maps were drawn hastily by our friends from Britain after 
the first war and they were not natural maps, ethnically or in terms of national 
essence, it was not there [] And so, in the context of this, we said all the 
ethnic tensions will come to the surface, we tried to point out all the difficulties 
and how these might be managed, what kind of consortium could manage this, 
and Richard Perle came in and said well, sorry, but you dont know anything, 
we have all the intelligence. When our forces go in there, all the Iraqi people 
will hug them, embrace them, and it will be a waste of time. And this was a big 
difference of opinion and we didnt like his style very much and the way he 
was. (Interview 6)  
 
Notwithstanding such differences, it is important to note that a desire to maintain good 
relations arguably led to a coercive form of consensus in the period leading up to the 
Iraq invasion; a consensus that was to fall apart again soon afterwards. One of the more 
profound implications for countries at the centre of heated confrontations in the days 
leading up to the invasion of Iraq has been the varying degrees of international 
legitimacy enjoyed in the aftermath of the war. Referring to the position of France, a 
political participant observed, 
 
what the world has learned after Iraq is that, in the short term, not accepting a 
broad consensus is terribly difficult. But, if you are right, in the long term it 
becomes extremely important and it very much reinforces your position. 
(Interview 3) 
 
Conversely, the Bush administrations perceived loss of legitimacy in world affairs, as 
well as being disastrous for its reputation and international bargaining power, has had 
far reaching and unforeseen consequences.  These have been undoubtedly compounded 
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by recent events in global financial markets. Indeed, some view this as a significant 
turning point in the development of global regulation and the essential subjugation of all 
countries to such a framework. As one participant suggests, 
 
The Bush administration has utterly wasted whatever legitimacy it had  
whatever power it had economically, politically and militarily. There is a shift 
from an Atlantic to a Pacific world and America cannot dictate to the rest of the 
world any longer; it will have to come to the table. The Washington Consensus 
is out of our way, I think we will have a much more regulated world. The global 
financial crisis has put the last nail in the coffin. The US is weakened. If you 
need foreign capital to save your biggest institution, if you have to go to such 
lengths to save Bear Stearns from falling into foreign hands, you can hardly 
steer the world in the same direction. We will have to revitalise the Bretton 
Woods institutions and the United Nations will require refashioning for this 
new world. Its not going to happen overnight but we will get there. (Interview 
8) 
 
The view expressed here was, for the most part, not reflected as forthrightly by other 
participants but there was, nevertheless, a detectable degree of anti-American sentiment, 
or general cynicism, to be found in a small number of the interviews.  
 
4.2.3 Global governance  hard and soft regulation 
 
There is considerable disagreement among the wider participant group on the likelihood 
of a global regulatory framework and, moreover, whether existing power structures, 
governmental and non-governmental, are capable of delivering such a development. In 
the words of one participant, 
 
I think there is a potential real conflict between the interests of multinationals 
and the interests of governments which, at the moment, is being settled in 
favour of the multinationals because, with modern communications, they can 
move around much more easily than they ever could. And, therefore, if they 
dont like the way, particularly on tax, that a country is behaving they can 
simply transfer business, or parts of their businesses, to other countries that will 
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treat them differently. And I think, therefore, that were going through a phase 
when they are in a position to dictate their terms which is, to an extent, not 
desirable but to which I see no answer. If Europe, the Unites States, China and 
India all got together, I suppose they could dictate to the multinationals; but Im 
not sure of that. But supposing they could, that would require a degree of 
political rapprochement between the major economic groupings of a degree it is 
very difficult to foresee. (Interview 11) 
 
Reflecting a common thread of such realism among the participant group, and, at the 
same time, an interesting acceptance of dominant elite logic, the idea of supranational 
organisations regulating and policing hard global regulation is seen as largely 
unattainable at this time. As one participant put it, 
 
I think the idea of getting the United Nations to subject multinational 
companies to certain rules is, quite frankly, completely for the birds. Its 
never going to happen. It was tried in the 1970s and it was a complete flop; it 
wont work. Its safe to say, there wont be [a global regulatory framework]. 
(Interview 12) 
 
Against this backdrop, the emergence of soft regulation is viewed as critical to the 
development of a new world order; indeed, some see it as the starting point on a path 
that leads to the eventual hardening of regulation and formal global governance. This 
process has been driven by changing conceptions of development partly brought about 
by the emergence of global civil society movements; as one participant suggests, 
 
the concept of development has completely changed. In the 1950s and 1960s 
development was equal to growth, economic growth. Today, we all accept that 
development is something else. It requires justice, conflict resolution etc. As a 
response, you also see the role of multinational companies changing, for 
instance, with the Global Compact framework where many important 
companies have decided to accept the ten principles. This is only the beginning 
of a new framework; it is still too weak but Im sure it is going to evolve. 
(Interview 3) 
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Interestingly, perhaps, trade and business regulation are seen as two of the more 
advanced domains of international hard regulation. Part of the reason for this lies with 
some of the more protectionist aspects of the globalisation project. Confidence and trust, 
coupled with the creation of favourable business regimes for already successful 
businesses, ensures that the interests of certain groups are protected in the international 
setting. The transcendental quality of such regulatory diffusion is seen as taking place 
almost despite the conflicting demands of government. In the words of one participant, 
 
I think one outcome of networking, at least thats the way I always saw it, is 
corporate governance, or the spreading of governance standards across borders, 
across continents, even across oceans. I think that had a lot to do with 
networking and personal experience, by participants much more than by 
government action. Its fair to say that business totally accepted globalisation, I 
mean its our daily life. We dont even discuss it whereas politicians still, at 
least in this country, continue to discuss whether they should have it or not. As 
if they could still make such a decision! I doubt it. I think [national] politics is 
totally at odds with globalisation; [politicians] do not understand how their old 
confirmed right, that whatever they said was binding within the borders of the 
national entity, is no longer true. They cannot escape the influence from abroad 
and this makes them sick and tired. (Interview 9) 
 
It is through trade legislation, however, and the globalising effects of economic 
incentives and sanctions administered through key international institutions, that hard 
forms of regulation have really taken hold. As one participant observes, 
 
trade is an interesting case because it is, of course, the one area in which weve 
probably come nearest to world government. We do have a regulatory 
framework that regulates international trade and, if you step across it, and you 
get brought before a panel and the panel rules against you, then compensation 
may be taken by the offended party against the offending one. So thats a very 
advanced form although there is no world government at the WTO. Its a 
governmental organisation, an intergovernmental organisation, and the 
regulatory aspects are pretty hard. (Interview 12) 
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As another participant notes, the power of international financial institutions, notably 
the World Bank and IMF, has enormous direct implications for emerging economies, 
 
the IMF, of course, was the epicentre, the key agency for imposing, for 
pushing, for urging, or for advising countries; mainly because, the stability of 
the financial system, of the whole world economy, could be established if these 
[Washington Consensus] principles had been applied. So, your budget should 
be in order. If youre in deep trouble with your budget deficit it immediately 
affects your public sector debt, puts pressure on interest rates, which 
concentrates the problem and you will see pressure on your exchange rate [] 
The IMF, and other international organisations, have always said first, clear up 
your house and then well sit and talk to each other. (Interview 7) 
 
This influence has been traditionally focused upon financial indicators but increased 
civil society pressure and transparency has brought social policy requirements into the 
frame. As a consequence, we are witnessing a blurring of the lines between economic 
and political instruments, between hard regulation and soft regulation, and between 
governmental and non-governmental activity. For some, these developments mark a 
significant departure from existing conceptions of international relations activity and 
power relations. As participant 3 reflects, 
 
as I see international relations in the twenty-first century, I think the state is 
losing the protagonism it had during the previous system; we are now 
transitioning to a new system of international relations. And in this new system, 
there are new actors taking power from the state: upwards to the supranational 
organisations and institutions and downwards to communities, individuals and, 
of course, multinational corporations. (Interview 3) 
 
4.2.4 Summary of theme one 
 
Transnational elite interactions in the post-Cold War period take place against the 
backdrop of a formal international relations setting that is in a state of considerable flux. 
The structural certainties associated with traditional alliances have given way to a 
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period in which legitimacy, and legitimacy building, has emerged as a critical activity 
between governmental power brokers.  
 
In macro terms, certain ideological tenets continue to underpin such discourse; as 
participant 14 suggested rather rhetorically,  
 
this is the reality of the world [] who contests the market economy today? 
Nobody. (Interview 14) 
 
And, furthermore, there is support for hegemonic depictions of American economic 
influence in world affairs although such support has been called into question by recent 
events. The lack of a dominant consensus in international relations has created 
uncertainty and fear; as participant 3 notes, 
 
many of these actors in the past considered that their survival was linked to the 
acceptance of a consensus. Now, what Iraq has shown, is that survival is not 
linked to this broad consensus [...] the landscape of today is that nobody is 
convinced what is best for their survival. So, we are in a moment where 
everyone is trying to find the best way to ensure survival and this obviously 
creates a much more complex scenario. Its not clear what the best position is 
and that is why we are in transition. It might be that after a few years there will 
be one way, one direction, but it will never be the same as it was in the past. 
(Interview 3) 
 
Further evidence will be presented (see Theme 4: Consensus formation and the 
narrowing of differences) that suggests a role for informal elite interactions, given 
global uncertainties and the lack of global policy mechanisms, in the development of 
shared understandings related to global challenges. Such understandings, however, far 
from emerging in a structural or rational-choice vacuum, are, instead, the product of a 
fundamentally contested process. An appreciation of discrete power relations is critical 
to our understanding of preference formation within such settings. 
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4.3 Theme 2: Collaboration in the transnational arena 
 
4.3.1 Collaborative ideology 
 
Given the obvious problems of complexity in international relations, it is hardly 
surprising, perhaps, that collaboration, very much the watchword of political activity in 
contemporary liberal democratic societies, should have emerged as the principal 
mechanism for dealing with it. The extent to which such logic has permeated the very 
foundations of elite discourse within such settings does, however, reveal more than a 
ready acceptance of the strong case for collaboration. Indeed, the idea that such a case 
should warrant consideration in the first place is almost inconceivable to many 
governmental and non-governmental elite members. As one political participant 
questioned rather incredulously, 
 
collaboration not being for the public good..? The object of collaboration, I 
hope, is for the public good but youre suggesting that collaboration is just an 
easy way of doing things, everyone agrees, go on and do it is that it? If there 
was no collaboration you might not be able to get anything done.  
(Interview 4) 
 
Collaboration between different interests is now seen as so fundamental to getting 
anything done that to question its legitimacy is, it seems, to be naïve about the ways of 
the world. For many elite members, it is not only an indisputable truth that collaboration 
is a force for good, it is also integral to their understanding of democracy, 
 
when youre really talking about democracy, its about the culture of grey, a 
culture of compromise, tolerance and coexistence (Interview 5)  
 
You need to bring them together for obvious reasons: business influences 
society and politics influences society. Thats purely common sense. Its not 
that business contests the right of democratically elected leaders to lead; 
democratic leaders should take the maximum amount of information. They can 
only work if theres a sufficient degree of discussion and trust [] at the end of 
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the day, if people listen, they must believe what they are being told in good 
faith. (Interview 14) 
 
I would say that there are two important sources of legitimacy: the first is that 
its a more democratic system and the second is that it is a more transparent 
system. (Interview 3) 
 
Im talking [collaboration] within the context of a Prime Minister getting on 
with business people to help him run things better [] When I produced that 
[report for the government], I used individual business people to help out and I 
think its completely legitimate, if youre running something, to get anyone. 
You can get businessmen, academics, trade unionists, it doesnt matter, as long 
as its properly done [] I think its legitimate, my point is that it needs to be 
done with some subtlety and thoughtfulness. I dont think anyone was really 
worried about the legitimacy of it and I dont think its ever been a political 
issue. Quite the reverse. The party would say its rather good having an 
independent body. (Interview 10) 
 
The final point, raised by a member of the financial business elite close to policy circles 
in the UK, emphasises an interesting aspect related to the general perception of policy 
collaboration: namely that it is somehow more legitimate and independent than policy 
processes conducted by government ministers and civil servants within the closed 
circles of formal politics. This reflects an apparent distrust of processes that are 
perceived to be inherently biased by political or ideological considerations and, 
importantly, processes that are perceived to have been discredited by the failures of the 
past. Set against such a backdrop, the exerting of influence from outside of government 
represents  
 
a change that is largely for the better I think. I like the idea of it all not being 
contained in policymaking, not all being taken by government. (Interview 10) 
 
Within an historical context, such sentiments are nothing new and, indeed, might be 
viewed as a natural continuation of the distrust of ideology to be found in policy circles 
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of the post-war era. As one participant, commenting on the failure of political processes 
and the emergence of international collaborative networks put it, 
 
As you know, politics should involve people who are not politicians. 
(Interview 20) 
 
The pervasive logic of collaboration, and the language of consensus, in the everyday 
vernacular of policy elites, nationally and internationally, does however, disguise very 
real concerns related to legitimacy and accountability. Often these concerns are 
subsumed within a grander overriding belief in the mutual benefits of such activity such 
as the avoidance of international disputes, the championing of international causes, or, 
more typically, the necessity for expert knowledge in certain areas of decision making. 
 
I think these networks are rather ominous from the point of view of democratic 
accountability because you dont know whos saying what, and why, and to 
whom they are accountable for what theyve said. Its all done in private. I 
guess thats the upside of it, because so much talking is done and there are so 
many informal contacts, the risk of breakdown in the international system into 
war and protectionism is much lower. (Interview 15) 
 
Well, it has [a claim to legitimacy] in exceptional cases. At the end, we say it 
is so important that we should do something. For instance, the issue of free flow 
of goods and the Doha round and so on. It was about three years ago when we 
had a panel on free trade at Davos, the International Business Council. I mean it 
was so important for the world that we should issue a statement. So we issued a 
statement and we decided that each one, each member, should get in touch with 
their national governments to say how important, on behalf of business, free 
trade would be. That is one I remember. (Interview 16) 
 
I think I was very much aware of it and I always regretted it [the lack of 
legitimacy]. What you are really try to do is influence politicians, tell them 
what is happening outside of their view with stuff that is normally restricted to 
the edge of their plate; when we were forced to look beyond that. And so you 
turn it in very polite ways and try to tell them what you see there, being out 
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there, what new developments are likely and, whatever they might think, you 
help them to understand that this is going to hit us or reach us within the next 
weeks, months, years or whatever. That, if we dont prepare for it, we will be 
overrun, unable to respond successfully. (Interview 9) 
 
Legitimacy, therefore, is not directly related to questions of right or accountability; it is, 
instead, related to the value of the exercise. Given this view, democratic considerations 
can be overlooked and, indeed, must be overlooked, in order to achieve more pressing 
and immediate global objectives. They are, in a sense, a hindrance to effective global 
governance since an insistence upon their requirement would mean an almost certain 
retreat to more formal, and fundamentally flawed, international relations activity. Such 
activity, based on the representation or defence of constituencies, is seen as incapable of 
transcending the interests of the state or party. Interactions within transnational 
networks and forums is seen, therefore, as an indispensable mechanism for protecting 
states or parties in the international setting from the demands of their own 
constituencies; or, more to the point, for protecting global constituents from the 
inevitable, and irreconcilable, consequences of their own demands.  
 
It is very much in the public interest that powerful people get together in a 
private environment and exchange views. Are they [elite networks] in the 
interests of mankind? I think they are. (Interview 1)  
 
The first one I went to was the Koenigswinter, the Anglo-German one, which I 
think was quite literally to make sure that such terrific bonds were built up 
between the elites of both countries and, in so doing, make it less likely a war 
would happen. Its purpose is to get closer relationships between countries, 
genuinely and Im not being cynical. I have taken part in, or listened to, 
discussions between people of both countries where you see genuine cross over 
of policies, and thinking, between countries. (Interview 10) 
 
I think [the claim of global government] is exaggerated but not totally unfair in 
the sense that those of us in Bilderberg really felt that we couldn't go on forever 
fighting one another for nothing, and killing people, and making millions 
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homeless. And to the extent that we could have a single community throughout 
the world, it would be a good thing. (Interview 20) 
 
In this world, thats why you need global networks, to really get people 
communicating and trying to find common wisdom, a common understanding; 
which will, of course, in no way eradicate clashes of countries but will create 
some methods where clashes, conflicts and wars can be resolved by working 
out more rational ways of overcoming misunderstandings and conflicts. 
(Interview 5) 
 
I think two years ago I sat between a Palestinian and an Israeli. Now, you 
know, this is all anecdotal evidence but I would say that these two guys not 
only got along very well, and had very interesting discussions, but I also started 
to understand why it is so complex, why its not so easy [] I think it helps in 
many discussions you are having, and with all the other hundreds of thousands 
of people on many different levels. So, I think its adding to and improving the 
world, making the world better, overcoming barriers, cultural barriers and 
religious barriers. I think that when we work together with people from 
different religions and you start to appreciate each other and understand why 
certain answers are not as easy as you might think from a distance. Its quite 
amazing. (Interview 16). 
 
It is tempting given the, almost self-evident, merits of such activity, and the support for 
it among the elite community, to unreservedly accept the logic of collaboration. Elite 
interactions are, after all, nothing new and, provided that they are demonstrably in the 
public interest and attract the right kind of elite participant, it seems natural that we 
should accept such activity as legitimate. As one participant mused,   
 
usually, most people who are members of elites spend a lot of time denying 
that they are and saying that elites are a bad thing. But, actually, they love them. 
I like them but I dont deny that Im part of them; neither do I think that they 
are a bad thing. Im afraid, I dont. I think thats the way the world works, thats 
the way. And, as long as theyre meritocratic, thats the important thing. Are 
these people members of elites because theyve got some real knowledge or 
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because theyre prepared to put in some real service to the common cause? If 
they are, well, whats wrong with elites? (Interview 12) 
 
To uncritically accept the logic of elite collaboration, however, is to ignore fundamental 
questions related to the precise nature of elite transnational interactions. Without 
consideration of their actual purpose, scope and participant composition, we cannot 
possibly understand the nature of the contribution they make to international relations 
discourse. 
 
4.3.2 The nature of elite collaboration in the transnational setting 
 
While its clear that elite participants perceive many obvious justifications for 
collaboration in the international setting, a curious dimension to such activity is that it 
tends to be rather limited in scope. The focus of such activity has much more to do with 
business and political issues, and the relationship between them, than broader societal 
concerns, 
 
It seems to me to stand for what it says on the can: its business and political 
elites talking together. (Interview 2) 
 
Well, if the politicians dont deliver on that [the economic imperative], 
everything else is more difficult. (Interview 1) 
 
Its business and politics. Strangely enough, these meetings have very little to 
do with the third big field which I think is culture. That seems to be a different 
network. There are some [from the field of culture] and you always run into 
someone who you know is active there, and you might make a meeting over 
breakfast to discuss something from this cultural view. But, normally, this isnt 
an official issue in meetings [so its the] the economic stroke political I 
would say. There is no good politics without economic backup. I mean you 
cannot be successful in politics if youre not successful, if theres not an 
economy supporting the political side. (Interview 9) 
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As if to reinforce this point, another participant, who considers himself a member of the 
other category, explains the benefit he derives from such gatherings,  
 
Ive always accepted invitations to join. I mean, I went to Koenigswinter, 
which is the Anglo-German bi-lateral, for many years, and then the Collot, the 
Franco-British one, Bilderberg, and the Anglo-Spanish one. People ask me why 
I go and, it might interest you this, theyre fundamentally political gatherings. 
You have current or recently retired politicians, senior civil servants, political 
journalists, political academics and I always say theres a category called 
miscellaneous. And Im one of the miscellaneous and my view is that its 
always much more interesting for us in miscellaneous than the rest because they 
talk to each other all the time about the same subjects. (Interview 10) 
 
With the exception of media representatives, the inclusion of non-political or non-
business representatives is the exception rather than the rule in such settings37. And this 
exception highlights a very important aspect to elite collaboration in the transnational 
setting; namely that business and political elites share a sense of each others purpose 
and motivations. Furthermore, each is seen as integral to the activities of the other while 
representatives of other elites tend to be seen as external, peripheral or just supportive to 
the core activities of the group. This is not necessarily a conscious outcome, and many 
elite members enjoy considerable contacts across multiple sectors, but the lack of 
meaningful discourse between categories is potentially a weakness in the collaboration 
process. As one participant suggests, 
 
there are different layers, I wouldnt say necessarily in importance. But in 
these layers you have the business layer of the network, then there is a political 
layer of the network and then there is this cultural layer of the network. There is 
                                                
37 The World Economic Forum is an obvious exception but the core attendance is still primarily 
business/political and, while there is an overarching commitment to social development, the focus of most 
sessions, open or closed, is largely with business and political issues. There are other events, such as the 
annual Bohemian Grove gathering in California that bring together North American elites from business, 
politics and the arts but, like the World Economic Forum, the scale of the event means that there is a 
strong argument for seeing such activities as elite socialising and networking rather more than discursive 
policy oriented activity. Another, much smaller, example that provides a curious interaction between 
business, political and faith based concerns is the St Georges House event held at Windsor in the UK. 
With Prince Philip at the helm, this private talking shop has a significant Anglican presence within its 
participant group. 
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lots of horizontal networking but maybe not enough vertical, through these 
different layers to interconnect them. Which I think is sometimes so important. 
(Interview 9) 
 
Another interesting aspect to this lack of representation from non-business and non-
political quarters is, perhaps, a belief among some of the elite that cultural or societal 
issues can be factored into discussions without the necessity for expert contribution. As 
one participant put it, 
 
business makes their interests and their challenges more explicit to politicians 
and politicians, of course, talk about their challenges. And business talks about 
its challenges what it needs to grow; that is certainly an element and its 
probably more outside the events, where you sit together and have a beer, but I 
dont think that it is characteristic of the meetings themselves. You have 
business people who are very often more political and more cultural; its a 
much more intellectual debate than an agenda debate. (Interview 16) 
 
The idea that cultural and societal issues are somehow factored into elite discussions has 
also led to a fervent belief among many participants that elite groups reflect diverse 
interests. As will be demonstrated later in the analysis (see 4.5.2 The mobilisation of 
bias within elite interactions) this is highly questionable but, nevertheless, the 
conviction is deeply held and was a recurring theme in interviews, 
 
I dont think its a global ruling class because I dont think a global ruling 
class exists. I simply think that people who have influence are interested to 
speak to other people with influence. But it can be an influence in business, and 
influence in research, and influence in education. For instance, were going to 
have at our next Bilderberg meeting a real study on education because that is 
really a need of society. You need people who can contribute and be listened to 
by other people. And in a certain fashion, that is how the world works; its a 
logical consequence. (Interview 14) 
 
First of all, you have very mixed groups, on purpose. Theres a steering 
committee and each year they invite many people from NGOs and you get a 
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very mixed picture and very critical input. I mean, outside Washington, we had 
all these protestors standing around for three days and I said, we should invite 
them into this room, theyd be shocked to hear what we are discussing. You 
know, there was more discussion of social issues and environmental issues than 
these people would ever have thought. So its absolutely not the case [that there 
is not diversity]. Take last week, we had a meeting in Davos on corporate social 
responsibility; a very, very stakeholder oriented approach. (Interview 16) 
 
The discrepancy might, in part, be a reflection of the increasingly important role of 
NGOs and civil society organisations in the global context and, specifically, their 
impact on both hard and soft regulation in the international setting. This presence is 
something that business and political elites are consciously aware of and, to an extent, 
believe is responsible for substantial parts of the global policy agenda, 
 
despite the strong position of very important think tanks, over the past few 
years the decisions now being taken reflect much more what civil societies are 
saying. This consensus [] there is probably a technical expression to describe 
how these groups work, but these lobbies are trying to influence decisions. 
(Interview 3) 
 
Its an important one [source of influence]. I mean its driven, of course, by 
the fact that there are civil society pressures to live up to commitments; so 
showing that people havent lived up to these commitments will have an 
indirect effect on electoral politics. Its not as simple as just shaming them in 
the sense of a schoolboy, you know, making somebody look bad in front of the 
rest of the class, its more complicated than that, but in the end, it does work. 
[And, in the international setting,] if you take examples like the landmine 
convention, that was driven almost entirely by civil society organisations. Now 
theres a second example with the cluster bomb convention which is about to be 
signed by 120 countries, again driven heavily by civil society. So security is 
certainly not off limits. (Interview 12) 
 
A big change, now, in most areas of policy are the not-for-profit organisations 
who are seen whether its age, multiculturalism, youth, third world issues. 
Government takes very, very, seriously people operating in independent, not-
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for-profit organisations covering their patch. Ive been involved in some of the 
developing world ones and, whereas 20-30 years ago we were seen as flower 
power types, nice lovely people, today I think you will find in Oxfam, for 
instance, seriously bright people. I see much greater, increased, credibility of 
organisations that are independent of government but who have enough money 
to be expert in areas covered by government. (Interview 10) 
 
While it is true that representatives of NGOs and civil society organisations do attend 
elite conferences and gatherings, and are often familiar with political and economic 
elites within other spheres, unlike members of the media and policy communities they 
do not tend to become longstanding members or invitees of such closed groups. A fairer 
characterisation of their participation is that they represent expertise brought into such 
forums for the purposes of encouraging debate among core members of the network. 
While this might be viewed as encouraging, from the perspective of representation, the 
lack of actual membership may have a considerable bearing on the overall influence of 
such participants. This is partly a function of authority and legitimacy within the group 
but also a reflection, perhaps, of pre-existing shared understandings that may exist 
between longer-standing group participants. As one participant, recalling the inclusion 
of trade unionists at an elite meeting, notes, 
 
some of it was very revealing because you suddenly realised that these people 
had very little to say. You realised that they had poor arguments which meant 
that we would come out and say to one another, well, this will not do; you can 
forget about this. This thought would stay with you for some while and you 
would say the same kind of thing to third parties, not referring to the person but 
saying, as I see it, this movement of French Labour and the French Unions is 
not going to make it, maybe a lack of good leadership or whatever. (Interview 
9) 
 
It is important to understand, therefore, that whatever influence such external 
participants have is mediated by the shared understandings of the core elite group and, 
until such external elites become an integral part of the functioning of such 
communities, it seems unlikely that the issues they represent will become anything more 
than topical or abstract considerations for the consumption of mainstream elite 
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members. The wider issue of diversity will be explored further when mechanisms of 
consensus formation are considered later in the findings  see 4.5.2 The mobilisation of 
bias within elite interactions. For the time being, at least, it is sufficient to state that the 
issue is not restricted to the representation of sectors; diversity within the core 
business/political group is, itself, a key determinant of the nature of collaborative 
activity. As one participant puts it,  
 
The point is that you are not always meeting a lot of people. Even if someone 
from the poorest area comes along he still tends to be living a good life. So 
whether he is really representative of the poverty of certain regions is another 
question. So maybe, you know, maybe you are a somewhat insulated in the 
people you are meeting. (Interview 16) 
 
The focus of attention here, however, is on the particular form of elite collaboration that 
has emerged in the transnational sphere and, specifically, it is the interdependencies of 
business, government and media that require further consideration.  
 
4.3.3 The inter-relationship of business and politics  
 
In some senses, there is a danger of oversimplifying the relationship between business 
people and politicians; clearly there are interdependencies, but the relationship is rather 
more nuanced than is frequently suggested. What is clear is that members of the 
transnational elite almost universally accept the perceived necessity for inclusion of 
business representatives in both the consultations that precede policy formation activity 
and more formal processes of policy formation. In some cases the necessity is borne of a 
sense of political reality, while, in others it is recognition of the requirement for such 
things as expertise and implementational support. It is interesting to note, however, a 
degree of detachment on both sides of the perceived divide, 
 
the European Commission is obliged under law to make proposals. I believe 
that if you make proposals you should research them as best as possible. 
Coming from a national environment, I was struck that what existed at the 
national level did not exist in the European environment. There was a void in 
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the system and the justification was an old legal preoccupation that if you 
discussed with business leaders you lost your objectivity. I felt this was wrong, 
we didnt hear from the business people what they expected from the 
Commission. But its always useful to know where their priorities are and why 
they are different from ours. You should be big enough to know when to accept 
their counsel and when to leave it [] The business side is not the total story 
but there has to be awareness from politicians of what will be the consequences 
[of given action]. Politicians build a framework around business, it is important 
that they have heard from business people. (Interview 14) 
 
I am a member of the board of this gathering [a collaborative forum in the 
communications industry]. We try to keep a minimum level of politicians 
because if you get too many politicians involved it is good but sometimes they 
dont express their views, and they always want publicity from the press. There 
were eleven people from leading telecommunications corporations, all of them 
CEOs, but the moderator was another deputy of the Prime Minister. These 
people are just taking notes, preparing a report, and theyll later submit it to the 
Prime Minister. (Interview 7) 
 
Politicians live in a different network and my suspicion is that when they are 
amongst themselves they talk differently on different issues. I think we are, 
coming from business, much more at ease on some of these issues. Foreign 
policy is a byline for what we do. We want an open market and were all anti-
protectionist and so forth but were talking very simple lines of thought. While I 
think politicians, particularly when they are active in their own field, for them 
its all very complicated. (Interview 9) 
 
I do think that politicians and civil servants have always tended to romanticise 
about businessmen as though theyre the answer to everything. I remember 
once having lunch with a very senior civil servant and explaining to him that 
the guys who are running the FTSE were the people who failed the civil service 
exam when he passed it. I do think businessmen have things to contribute to 
government but I think they need to be handled quite subtly [] I read in the 
newspapers that business is getting a bit disaffected with Mr. Brown. The fact is 
that everyone knows he believes in the market and he is continuing to get 
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businessmen to do jobs for him of one form or another so I dont think things 
have changed. Im just a bit sceptical, I think businessmen have to be used quite 
subtly. (Interview 10) 
 
Given the interdependency of many business and political decisions, it is surprising, 
perhaps, that elite participants perceive such a clear distinction between what they see as 
a business or political issue. This appears to have some bearing upon the inclination of 
participants to contribute within elite discussions; as participants from interviews 1 and 
2 reveal, 
 
business people tend not to participate in political discussions. (Interview 1) 
 
The economic elites were slightly quieter than the politics people about 
politics and vise versa; they werent heavily weighing in there. (Interview 2) 
 
Curiously, and in contrast to political issues, the interests of business are frequently 
presented as secondary and rather two dimensional in accounts of elite interaction. This 
might be because there is a perception that business elites are not primarily interested in 
issues beyond their sphere of influence or it might possibly be evidence of an accepted 
stereotype among elite participants, 
 
The issues that interested participants were primarily political issues; the 
business sessions were, more or less, an afterthought. (Interview 1) 
 
Business people are technocrats; theyre interested in running their company 
but theyre not interested in talking about Afghanistan, the ageing society in 
Japan or whatever else. If its not business related they dont want to come. 
(Interview 16) 
 
Business interest, when you look at it from a very objective angle, its very 
sane. Nobody wants fights, nobody wants instability, nobody wants a 
fluctuating currency, nobody wants wars, nobody wants bitter conflicts, nobody 
wants to create trouble here, there or anywhere. (Interview 5)  
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At the most general level, business leaders want stability, they want open 
markets, they want a generally supportive environment, and, usually, they dont 
want to be bothered by too much regulation and a whole host of other things 
that come up in the political process. Its perfectly obvious that this is what 
business leaders want [] I think the main function of these things [elite 
networks and forums] for business leaders is to find out what the policy makers, 
who make the world they live in, think. They want to know how policymakers 
view the various problems and crises in the world, how they are likely to 
respond, the extent to which there is agreement among policymakers in 
different countries. This makes the world in which they live. (Interview 13) 
 
Some of these events have politicians and business people together in the 
sessions; you have just as many Ministers or Prime Ministers  who come to 
these meetings to listen to what business leaders think [] I mean, basically, 
we want market liberalisation, free trade, competitive environments with some 
regulation; I think thats the structure we want to see at this time. For me to be 
interested in this is just a natural thing because I believe in private enterprise. 
(Interview 6) 
 
An interesting question, if we are to accept the apparent transparency of business 
interest and the suggestion of business disinterest in non-business issues, is why so 
many business leaders would take the time to participate in transnational elite forums 
and networks. Clearly, close proximity to policymakers in the transnational setting can 
provide significant and beneficial insights into geopolitical thinking, as one participant 
recalls, 
 
We went to this one conference, a very good one, run by the American 
Enterprise Institute. It was a small circle and a little bit right-wing, Republican, 
but they invited people from other parts. This was under the Clinton 
administration many years ago when XXXXXX opened the discussion. We 
talked not about the axis of evil but Korea, Iran, Iraq and so on. And, for the 
first time, as a European, I felt something was going to happen, they were 
building up a momentum in the United States and this was before Bush. And, 
you know, to hear that and to get somewhat familiar with this kind of thinking 
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was very important  to have this feeling in the United States long before 
anyone talked about it in Europe. (Interview 16) 
 
Furthermore, transnational forums, very often with their veil of privacy, can provide 
unique opportunities to discuss market issues in a more informal setting. One 
participant, questioning the idea that industrial leaders talked to each other frequently, 
noted,  
 
well, they dont really. If you were, say, the chairman of a major oil company, 
obviously you would occasionally have industry wide functions but very rarely 
I suspect, because theyre afraid of being accused of colluding over trade 
practices, cooking up prices or whatever, they would be rather careful from that 
point of view. And there arent all that many functions, industry wide get-
togethers, so I think one motivation might be to meet colleagues from 
competing companies without it being criticised. (Interview 11) 
 
While the personal motivations of participants will be considered later in the findings 
(see 4.4.2 Elite networkers) it is important to state that the distinction made between 
business and political issues has, to a degree, been somewhat overstated and 
oversimplified by some participants. By way of supporting this claim, it is important to 
note that a number of participants highlighted the interest and involvement of certain 
business people in political discussions; whether such interest is personal or 
professional is difficult to determine but, either way, such a clarification is irrelevant to 
the fact that some business people do, indeed, participate in discussions of a substantive 
political nature 
 
There are people who are not interested in that; its a simple as that. Who ask 
themselves is there any benefit, any added value, for me and maybe come to the 
conclusion its not. On the other hand, I must say, if you become part of that it 
makes you much better informed and its a very enriching experience. 
(Interview 16) 
 
I went there and saw the politicians talking over two days; speaking about 
stuff that was not part of my world and I was quite privilegedI think its 
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probably a rather good thing that people like me get involved, in a mild way 
through things like the Anglo-French Collot. (Interview 10) 
 
With the 1980s, as the whole world was rolling along with the globalisation 
bandwagon, Turkey was bound to be left behind if we werent part of a liberal 
economy. Given the previous narrow minded approach to economic problems, 
you cant bring about any major changes in the economic structure and life if 
youre lost somewhere out there. Thats the point where TUSIAD started 
forming a good number of committees...[Its different to a] think tank situation; 
theyre usually just thinkers, not executors. TUSIAD represents about 50% of 
the Turkish economy, all the blue chips are here, very heavy boys who can lean 
quite strongly for some of these things to happen. (Interview 5) 
 
The final point, raised by a recognised Turkish business leader, emphasises the role of 
TUSIAD (Türk Sanayicileri ve İşadamlari Deneği), Turkeys most powerful business 
federation, in influencing government economic, political and social policy in recent 
years. He went on to explain how TUSIAD had played an important, informal, role in 
mediating between certain international economic organisations and various 
governments in Turkey. An interesting dimension to such activity is the increased 
sponsorship of think-tank activity, and specifically research, designed to support the 
activities of government and, crucially, add legitimacy to the market oriented demands 
of TUSIAD. In such a way, the interests of business and politics become inextricably 
entwined and the notion of coherent demarcation between the interests of one or the 
other becomes somewhat meaningless. The process was described by participant 8 in 
this way, 
 
[TUSIAD] doesnt drive foreign affairs but it does have quite an impact, for 
instance, it had a significant impact over the change in policy in Cyprus. [It 
does this] by adding legitimacy to the decision. When nobody can diverge from 
existing policy or entrenched positions, they legitimate an alternative direction 
[...] when 46% of Turkeys GDP speaks, people listen. (Interview 8) 
 
While such an example is unique to Turkey, the role of think-tanks in the international 
arena, and the wider contribution of intellectual thought leaders in such settings, has 
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become an important defining characteristic of international relations activity and it is a 
significant factor when considering the definition of elite agendas and perceived 
parameters of elite discourse.   
 
4.3.4 The business of research  
 
The role of policy institutes, private foundations, academics, and intellectuals in elite 
transnational forums is extremely relevant to consideration of elite collaboration since 
the collaborative principle is frequently presented as an attempt to deal with issues of 
great complexity. Within such a framework, one might be forgiven for believing that 
such voices would be critical to the definition of issues, the quality of discourse and, of 
course, downstream consensus formation. Between them, however, these voices provide 
an interesting insight into the significance of dependencies within elite networks. The 
most obvious point to note is that such voices should not be viewed as independent of 
the interests of business and politics; indeed, they are highly dependent upon their 
relationship with such groups. In the case of policy institutes and think-tanks, a number 
of participants highlighted the courtship of funding and patronage by certain groups 
and, also, a degree of perceived political determination. What is clear is that the claims 
of independence and integrity made by certain think-tanks or policy institutes are 
subject to significant qualification by elite participants in Europe 
 
Some guys came to see me, a bunch of people from the IPPR, because they 
wanted to do pamphlets on it. And I suddenly realised they were actually 
planning to write a pamphlet when theyd never heard of it and three of them, 
average age 27.5, were going to cover the whole subject. I told them to fuck off 
and get out [] I think theres a great deal of superficiality in sharp contrast to 
America where all the think tanks are properly resourced, have serious 
academics, who seriously know what theyre talking about, who arent doing it 
as a short cut to becoming Congressman or whatever [Over here,] I would 
observe that there a very good finishing school for men and women whove got 
political ambitions to go onto other things. (Interview 10) 
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Theres a considerable difference inside the Euro sceptic movement. Rodney 
Leech and Open Europe have two characteristics: one, they are very well placed 
in the City and are exceptionally well funded; the other is that it is extremely 
detailed in what you might call the scholarship of Europe. It tends to engage in 
detailed analysis rather than propaganda in so far as you can distinguish 
between those two things. I mean, take for example, the Bruges Group, theyre 
propagandists. (Interview 11) 
 
The Centre for European Reform (CER) is a sort of ginger group  it doesnt 
have a membership, it has commercial sponsors, it publishes a lot of material, it 
has a small, highly skilled, staff which organise conferences and publish 
material, and it is multinational [] The CER works with its sponsors, often 
commercial companies and others, to convene conferences on what they want 
to see discussed. Like cooperation between European defence producers or 
banking or internet provision, whatever it is. Charles Grant is a brilliant 
person. (Interview 12) 
 
The power of these small circles, these think tanks, is not the same any more. 
Take, for example, the situation with the Elcano in Spain which was supposed 
to be a bi-partisan think tank; the socialist party left the Elcano because of what 
they perceived to be political influence over Iraq. They considered that [what 
the Elcano reported] was not a cold analysis of the situation but a politically 
influenced decision. (Interview 3) 
 
Underpinning the criticism of these think-tanks and institutes is the suspicion that such 
groups are vehicles for the development of supporting evidence and, importantly 
therefore, legitimising instruments rather more than forums for the development of 
independent policy thinking. Academic support, and a reputation for rigorous research, 
provides considerable kudos that can be harnessed for the purposes of tabling, 
enhancing or challenging of policy proposals, and elite participants, while respectful of 
various institutes and think-tanks, are very conscious of differences that exist between 
them. There was, all the same, a slightly dismissive quality to the discussion of think 
tanks suggesting that they are less important to elite consideration than one might 
suppose; as participants from interviews 3 and 10 noted, 
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 I suppose we thought it was a good idea for there to be a ferment of people 
thinking up new policies and debating new things at the edge of politics. Im 
not that sure, I mean, Ive not studied it but can one think of any big ideas and 
real things that have come out of think-tanks in this country, things that have 
improved the lives of millions of people? I dont know, I suppose thats a 
rhetorical question begging the answer no. (Interview 10) 
 
Despite the strong position of very important think tanks, the past few years 
with this issue [Iraq], the decisions now reflect far more what civil societies are 
saying than what think tanks are saying. (Interview 3) 
 
Despite these observations, it is clear that certain organisations appear to transcend such 
considerations among the elite group. Organisations such as the Brookings Institute, the 
Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) and Chatham House all received positive 
endorsements from participants in the study and appear to operate as full member 
participants within elite circles. And this relationship appears to be reciprocal; many of 
the Bilderberg participants were, or had been, frequent attendees at CFR and Chatham 
House events. This reciprocity, in turn, strengthens the perception of quality and 
trustworthiness and, in so doing, reinforces the status of such bodies within the wider 
elite group. The relationship, therefore, between policy institutes, academics, and the 
business/political community provides an important dynamic to elite collaboration; such 
intellectual members, aside from providing the stimulus and expertise for discussions, 
can provide the focal point for legitimacy building exercises among other elite 
members.  
 
The impact of intellectual elite members on other members of the elite group is a theme 
that will be returned to later in the analysis (see 4.5.2.3 The role of information and 
learning in elite networks) it is important to note, however, that the relationship is bi-
directional with considerable benefits available to both parties. The same type of 
dependency relationship is undoubtedly true of media representatives within the elite 
community.  
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4.3.5 Media representation within elite transnational networks 
 
In addition to the activity of policy institutes, academics, and intellectuals, the role of 
media interests provides further critical insights into the culture of co-dependency that 
characterises elite collaboration in the transnational setting. An absence, for instance, of 
coverage relating to the policy activities of certain elite networks and forums is, 
undoubtedly, critical to the effective management of such groups. In the words of 
participants from interviews 18, 20, 16 and 17 respectively, 
 
I don't think it's true to say that we want to keep it out [of the media], weve 
never wanted to get it in.  We don't encourage people to go to the mainstream 
press because we don't encourage, you know, idle speculation about what we 
do.  We forbid individual attendees to give meetings at our concerts; and we do 
that not because were secrecy led but because we want to control the 
politicians who come.  If we let them, they would all give press conferences, 
[there] on television all day. Theyre insane.  
 
I think the confidentiality of this meeting is another big advantage Bilderberg 
has. There was one journalist, British, who liked to write about it; he has never 
been back. Because people said, you know, hes using that for information 
gathering and then hes writing about it. You cannot do that and I think thats 
true for others.  
 
You can't get people to talk openly to one another, especially in front of 
political opponents in their own country, if they're going to be quoted.  Because 
people will only talk freely if they know they're not going to be quoted and 
distorted by prurient, ambitious, journalists. 
 
The reason for the confidentiality of the meetings is that attendees can reveal 
their views without constraints. So that they do not bite on their tongues, 
worried, How will the media reflect what I say?  
 
The ability to speak freely, without fear of public disclosure, is clearly central to the 
functioning of many elite forums and networks and, although leaving such activities 
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open to obvious criticism, elites not only accept the rationale but see it as a fundamental 
rule of personal and professional conduct. Not abiding by the rule is seen as a breach of 
trust and grounds for ejection from the group or network; for some, the fear of ejection 
is palpable, as one journalistic participant pointedly remarked,  
 
 dont stitch me up [] I want to be invited back. (Interview 1) 
 
By inviting media representatives into the fold, elite groups are able to demand the non-
disclosure terms that ensure continued privacy and, additionally, satisfy a perceptual 
need to be sensitive to the issue of public opinion. For many elite members, media 
representatives are seen as being in touch with the public and, by default, become a 
vehicle for the expression of public opinion within elite groups. As participant 14 puts 
it, 
 
[We invite them] because they give us a good feel. Its not that we want them 
to write but we need to not be disconnected with what is the state of opinion; 
and media people are the best people to give us that. (Interview 14) 
 
For their part, media representatives gain access and privileged insight into elite 
discussions of global issues; access and insight that can be crucial to the ability of the 
news media to function effectively. This knowledge is designed explicitly as 
background information and journalists are free to use it as such; they must not, 
however, cite sources of information. An interesting question, given the suggestion that 
media representatives serve to express public opinion within such forums, is related to 
how representative of public opinion such figures actually are; as one former journalist 
stated, 
 
I think theres a good deal of truth [to the view that journalists share a wider 
consensus]. I mean, for instance, on economic policy, journalists tend to have a 
basic underlying, open market, analysis; theyre free traders and they believe 
the system works because markets work. (Interview 11) 
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Elite diversity is a theme that will be returned to later in the analysis (see 4.5.2 The 
mobilisation of bias within elite interactions) but journalist participants, while 
recognising the potential influence of elite consensus, were quick to resist the 
implication that they were, somehow, disposed towards certain perspectives or 
consensus positions; as participants 5 and 11 put it, 
 
No, because all my life Ive been my own man [] I hate to repeat other 
peoples ideas, I try to seek out my own mind. Even if they had such an idea in 
the back of their minds, it wouldnt do too much to me because I love to play 
my own game and speak my own mind rather than being told [what to think] 
But, of course, if its snowing outside you cannot have summer inside; there is 
an enormous interaction in the way of thinking. (Interview 5) 
 
I think you probably find yourself rather than seeking influence by broad 
movements of opinion. There are few journalists who dont [] I tend to react 
against this kind of consensus, not only on the subject of Europe, but Im 
suspicious of them and I like to form my own views. But, yes, I do think they 
exist and that they have some influence upon people. (Interview 11) 
 
This feeling of detachment is interesting because, in a sense, it echoes the precarious 
path that media interests tread when attracted by the prospect of access and confidence 
in many areas of journalistic inquiry. For those who find themselves invited into elite 
networks, any suggestion of conflict or compromise is quickly rebuffed; instead, claims 
related to the wider benefits of access, along with independence and personal integrity, 
take the place of any real attempt to reconcile conflicting demands 
 
 From a media perspective, they sometimes have considerable value as a source 
of information, a source of stories. I preferred, when I was editing XXXXX, to 
spend time in mixed groups such as Ambassadorial dinner parties or something 
like that. Obviously the Ambassador has a reason for inviting the guests that he 
does invite and, no doubt, he hopes that most of them are fairly friendly to his 
nation but, on the other hand, good Ambassadors are also very interested in 
getting to know what different currents of opinion are so the groups they invite 
are likely to have varied views. (Interview 11) 
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 For me, they were unique occasions; Ive never had the opportunity for such 
sustained exposure. Its invaluable to my work. I cant imagine why a journalist 
would not want to be involved [] because my job is to be in the know, to be 
informed. (Interview 1) 
 
 Ive gone to meetings of this kind because, as a journalist, its useful for me to 
know what people think. It clarifies. Its my job to know what people think and 
then discuss these arguments in public and bring them out. The Trilateral 
Commission is similar, all these sort of groupings are similar. If you can talk to 
people informally rather than just read the press releases or see them delivering 
speeches, talk about what problems are the way they see them, you find that 
you learn a great deal about these perceptions and whats driving policy and 
that makes it easier to write better about them. Ultimately a columnists job is 
to clarify issues and its far easier to do if you have some idea whats actually 
going on. (Interview 13) 
 
There is no way of denying the obvious attraction of elite networks to media 
representatives; a key question, however, is at what cost such access comes. Even if the 
principle of non-disclosure is accepted as a necessary precondition for open and frank 
discussion, a potentially more profound compromise exists related to the nature of the 
dependency between journalists and other elite members. While elite participants are, 
no doubt, pleased to communicate their points without fear of misrepresentation, they 
are not, at the same time, desperate for media attention. Conversely, journalists require 
access above all things and such environments guarantee that access, both at the time 
and subsequent to meetings. The seductive appeal of elite gatherings, a theme that will 
be returned to later (see section 4.6.4 The seductive lure of elite membership) and the 
power of prevailing attitudes and views within such groups, might have considerable 
implications for journalistic interpretation.   
4.3.6 Summary of theme two 
 
The case for collaboration between elites in the transnational setting is so readily 
accepted by elite participants that to question the veracity of such logic is to appear 
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naive in the extreme. A recurring, and somewhat defensive, theme related to elite 
forums and networks was the notion that this kind of thing happens all the time anyway; 
that, even without an informal network infrastructure in the transnational arena, 
collaboration between elites, and in particular business and political elites, would 
continue unabated 
 
 Do you think they wouldnt have these conversations in other forums? 
(Interview 1) 
 
 But does anybody [] suppose for a moment that these people don't meet all 
the time anyway. (Interview 18) 
 
 I should imagine that this happens all the time. Im sure the head of x bank or 
x global company can get access to a foreign minister, an energy minister 
whenever they want and vice versa. Im not a conspiracy theorist but Im not 
naïve either. So, it didnt strike me as that unusual, in fact, if you want to push 
me I would say the network I witnessed did not spontaneously come out of this 
but existed in other ways. Im sure these people see each other in other fora. 
(Interview 2) 
 
 Of course, there was a higher concentration of important, influential, people 
than there might otherwise be but Ive met these people in many other forums 
and events. (Interview 8) 
 
 There always has been [collaboration], whatever government is in power [] 
but isnt this really due to information technology? Now everything is so easy 
and people are so easy to get hold of, isnt it bound to happen that people 
collaborate more and more? (Interview 4) 
 
Despite claims to the contrary, it is the relationship between business and politics that is 
very much the focus of collaborative activity between transnational elites. Events such 
as the World Economic Forum, which prides itself on its broader concern with global 
wellbeing, does invite luminaries from societal and cultural fields but it is questionable 
whether such people enjoy an equal standing within debates related to business and 
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political issues. They might have views that are pertinent to these discussions and may, 
indeed, be asked to contribute in order to stimulate new thinking, but such contributions 
are mediated by existing contexts and relationships. Added to which, the sheer scale of 
the event means that, not unnaturally, smaller, and more select, gatherings tend to attract 
more coherent and focused elite participation. Non-business/political elites do play an 
important role in the flow of information into these more select elite groups, often 
directly but, more often, through overlapping memberships of allied groups and 
networks.  
 
The role of policy institutes, think tanks and the media is heavily influenced by a variety 
of dependency relationships. The larger, and more established, policy institutes have a 
significant cross-membership with select transnational elite forums and, in the case of 
institute leaders, enjoy positions of equal standing within the wider elite group. This 
may be a reflection of the esteem that such institutions are held in, it might be an 
acknowledgement of their role in providing insights into key issues or it might reflect 
the source of legitimacy that such organisations can provide for currents of opinion 
within the wider group. On the whole, however, elite participants are suspicious of the 
role and motives of smaller, often partisan, think tanks in Europe.  
 
The media, while enjoying considerable access to elite forums and networks, is invited 
for two primary reasons: their role in reflecting and influencing public opinion and their 
agreement to respect non-disclosure terms within such groups. The attraction of 
membership within such groups is very seductive for members of the media elite; it 
confers access and legitimacy at the highest of elite levels. While media representatives 
are wary of being seen as anything other than independent, it is unclear how such 
independence is maintained in the face of a compelling, and overwhelming, broader 
elite consensus. The suggestion that media interests are consciously co-opted is, 
perhaps, too strong a description of events although one media participant did suggest 
that this was the case, 
 
Im very old, obviously, and they tend to keep the old hacks at bay. Theyre 
bringing in new people to refresh old ideas and to pass on some of the messages 
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they want to pass on to the outside world by using them as their messengers. 
(Interview 5) 
 
This view was, however, not a commonly held perception and, although media 
respondents were often cynical about the reasons for their inclusion within such events, 
they did tend to emphasise their integrity and the wider benefits of participation. Rather 
than instrumentally reflecting some kind of coherent agenda, it seems more likely that, 
through elite fraternisation and socialisation, media elites unconsciously reflect the 
dominant and pervasive logics of elite opinion.  
 
4.4 Theme 3: Transnational networks and networking  
 
A recurring theme throughout the interviews was that of networks and networking. The 
terms were used liberally and often interchangeably suggesting that, for participants at 
least, the concepts were essentially about the same thing, namely, benefits of 
association.  
 
4.4.1 A global network 
 
Broadly speaking, the rationale for international networks is essentially one of 
communication, in particular, related to global economic affairs. As the globalisation 
project has taken hold around the world, the necessity for networked relationships has 
intensified. As participants 3, 6 and 9 suggest, 
 
The way I see it is more as an adaptation to new economic realities. It has 
always been the case that when the world becomes wider, companies try to 
become wider. So, now we have China and India rapidly becoming actors. 
(Interview 3) 
 
So I think they have created new linkages and new ties for foreign investment 
into Turkey [Take the business councils, where there is] some business 
development and discussion of trade issues with Eastern countries or the 
Caucuses, Russia, Kazakhstan and all those, it all turns into a business 
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development function where leaders from both governments come together 
with their own business communities and try to match projects and investors 
together. So that influences foreign policy in some respects I would say. 
(Interview 6) 
 
These networks are also active in Asia, maybe not so visible and known to us 
but they do exist. A typical networker there for the last thirty years has been 
Lee Kuan Yew who is extremely well connected in the Asian world. He has the 
trust of people who are certainly very different, lets say the Chinese, the old, 
and now the new, Chinese leadership certainly have very different views on 
how to run the country but they trust him. He is extremely well connected with 
some of the Muslim leaders of the region and all this he makes very good use 
of. Now the important issue for us is, here we have another regional level, how 
do we connect our transatlantic network into that Asian or South East Asian 
network? To interconnect these different patches on the globe is a very 
important issue. (Interview 9) 
 
The final point is particularly interesting because, made by one of the most networked 
members of the business/political elite in Europe, it demonstrates a very conscious 
understanding of the need to interconnect disparate elite networks around the world. 
The precise composition of such networks is not entirely clear but, aside from Western 
European and transatlantic relationships, it seems that there are significant elite 
networks in Latin America, Africa and the Middle East, South East Asia and the Pacific 
region, Central and Eastern Europe and occasionally between countries that do not fall 
neatly into such groupings. Geographical clustering is clearly still a feature of such 
networks but, with the relentless advance of globalisation and significant improvements 
in communication, interconnections and co-dependencies are being formed on a number 
of levels between groups. Some of these interdependencies are borne of formal trade 
agreements and membership of international councils of one form or another; but other, 
more informal, relationships play a not insignificant role in creating the conditions for 
wider political and economic rapprochement, 
 
Is it indispensable? My clear answer is it is absolutely indispensable. I think 
people would live in a different world if there were no exchanges, unofficial 
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exchanges, of views. I very strongly believe this [] I know from business that 
some of the most serious and most important decisions being made were made 
after a very private, unofficial, discussion, and no [formal] meetings. 
(Interview 9) 
 
I was involved in one of these things in Portugal called Da Arrabida which is 
tiny; its very, very, small. It had a whole lot of people I knew on the steering 
committee, Brett Scowcroft from the United States, Bauer from France, Otto 
Landsdorf from Germany, and they had a conference. Quite a small thing, thirty 
people, in this wonderful monastery on the coast south of Lisbon but they were 
much more enterprising. They had the Poles, the Russians; Gidar from Russia 
come along. They invited the Indians and all the rest of it. (Interview 4) 
 
Its a very small community in Turkey, certain people are part and parcel of 
transatlantic networks and some are becoming involved in Far Eastern 
networks. Traditionally these people were raised in good schools, the secular 
elite, but the new Islamic elite is becoming active in this regard whether they 
believe in it or not. (Interview 8) 
 
It's very striking in the America-Chinese relationship that the Americans have 
a number of informal contacts with the Chinese as well as the formal ones 
[where they are] staring each other down in a rather hostile and frosty way. But 
the informal networks work very well. I think there's no question that its the 
informal networks that have persuaded the Chinese they've got to act in getting 
the North Koreans to abandon their nuclear weapons program. That is the 
upside of it but how that conversation took place, what quid pro quo the 
Americans have offered for it, we will never know. This is the way the current 
world wags. (Interview 15) 
 
The idea that informal networks are a force for good in international relations is an 
accepted truism among elite participants, with many believing that benefits far outweigh 
the costs of such activity. Much of this is due to an acceptance of free market principles 
and a general belief that the benefits of market liberalisation are widely dispersed. 
Given such a worldview, the advancement of market interests is, in effect, an 
advancement of the interests of all, however poorly distributed the dividend. And while 
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some recognise inherent dangers associated with informal network interactions, there is 
a stoical acceptance of this way of doing business; as interview participants 2, 15 and 19 
suggest, 
 
Where does one begin? Very few legislative decisions in the US get taken 
without enormous shaping by corporations. Large parts of the US tax code, 
some of the deregulation, in Britain the restructuring of the NHS on market 
principles very much shaped by informal networks. You've seen in Germany 
the abuses of co-decision-making in VW where money's been changing hands 
to get the kinds of deals which are wanted. Almost nothing in China moves 
without the say-so of the Communist Party and palms being greased. It's almost 
dignified the Guānxi network. Maybe we in the West need to see these informal 
networks not being the past but the future. I think it's very difficult to think of 
any decision which hasn't been influenced by the kind of power networks we've 
been discussing. (Interview 15) 
 
 They'll get an up-and-coming politician who they think may be president or 
prime minister one day, and as globalist industrialist leaders who believe that 
politics shouldn't be in the hands of politicians, they try and influence them 
with wise words in the corridors outside sessions. (Interview 19) 
 
 There werent huddles of advisors, or things like that, for the politicians and 
even for the heads of the companies. I would imagine its rare to be there 
without somebody else; so the individualised aspects, I imagine it's a useful 
place to talk about big issues where they can rarely do that, and it is a fairly 
useful way for them to individually network with each other. And to talk and to 
do whatever they want to do with those networks, maybe build up things for the 
future. (Interview 2) 
 
Elite networking, therefore, provides a unique opportunity to fraternise and socialise 
one-on-one with other members of the elite network without fear of disclosure. Such 
networking is still largely conducted within regional elite groups and forums, although 
interlocking activity at the fringes of the network is slowly bridging divides between, 
once disparate, global elite activity. 
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4.4.2 Elite networkers 
 
Implicit within the account so far is the suggestion that networking is an activity that is 
embraced by all within the elite but this is far from being the case. Many within the 
business and political elite choose not to participate, or are highly selective about what 
they participate in, for a variety of reasons, 
 
There are always people who say this is the best one, I like to go here more 
than there. And, also, its true that some people prefer European gatherings, 
some industry gatherings, and others more global. So theres a bit of a 
difference [And, of course,] not everyone is interested in this kind of broader 
discussion. Its really not only skills, its also whether you like it or not, and, of 
course, if you dont do it, thats another thing. I mean I got into these circles 
fairly early because I became CEO here, and then you grow a little older with 
all the others. If you become CEO at the age of, I dont know 57 or so, and then 
you get involved and dont know anyone, and it takes some time to get to be an 
accepted member of these circles, maybe you say to yourself I dont want to do 
this, Im not the right person. And, for politicians, very often language skills, 
you have to speak English otherwise it is difficult. (Interview 16) 
 
When one is talking about transnational things the Bilderberg was the one; that 
was a very good example. The other one was the Trilateral Commission but 
thats much more formal. I have my doubts about some of these organisations. I 
think the Bilderberg one was successful in the way that Ive described, I dont 
think all of them are. People spend an awful lot of time going around to these 
conferences and listening to other people. I think theyre a waste of time, a lot 
of them. (Interview 4) 
 
When you are in the middle of a big policymaking machine, the British 
government, the European Union, the United Nations, whatever it is, and youre 
working full-time, you have enormous quantities of information flowing 
towards you from intelligence, from overt sources, from the public domain, 
everything, and youre grossly overworked. If youre reasonably successful, 
you are grossly overworked and you have very little time. Regrettably in my 
view, people in that position, working full-time jobs, tend to be fairly 
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dismissive of all the penumbra of civil society activity and networks and so on. 
They just dont have time to do it all, theyre exhausted. They have a family life 
and they dont want to lose all their weekends, so their involvement in these 
things is not that great.  
(Interview 12) 
  
Central to an understanding of the significance of elite networks is the central question 
of why busy and powerful people should engage in such activity. Notwithstanding the 
many reasons why senior members of the business and political elite might not attend 
elite events, it is clear that the most prestigious gatherings have no trouble attracting 
elite participants who forego days at a time from their busy schedules. As interview 
participants 12 and 18 point out, 
 
Ive never needed to sell it [Bilderberg] to anybody is all I can say. The only 
reason I've ever heard somebody say that they didn't want to come was that they 
couldn't on the dates concerned.  I mean people are attracted, I think, by sheer 
curiosity at being in a group like this and hearing certain things from the 
horses mouth as it were.  And I think that the personal relations that are 
formed there, not in the sense of some ghastly freemasonry or some sort of 
secret society, it is not that at all, it's just the fact that people get the chance to 
know each other as individuals rather than as people that they come across in 
their government or business careers. (Interview 18) 
 
Ditchley38 is a case point. I dont know, youd have to ask a number of people 
who go there but they have no lack of takers. And since they take place at 
weekends, they presumably think its a worthwhile use of their weekend to do 
that. They like meeting the other people, they find it intellectually challenging 
to discuss the subjects that are under discussion, they find it, I think, very 
                                                
38 The Ditchley Foundation runs conference events several times a year and usually over the course of a 
weekend. According to the Ditchley Foundation website, it was established by Sir David Wills in 1958 
to advance international learning and to bring transatlantic and other experts together to discuss 
international issues.  Sir Davids original objective was to promote Anglo-American understanding. 
 American and Canadian sister Foundations, set up in 1964 and 1981 respectively, remain our most active 
partners.  Since then Ditchley conferences have broadened to include the concerns and participation of 
nations all over the globe. http://www.ditchley.co.uk/ (accessed 7/11/08) 
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welcome to do so in a way that is not on the record, which is completely 
private. (Interview 12) 
 
An important question, therefore, is why people find such networks of value and, 
although the theme will be returned to when considering hierarchies of influence (see 
Theme 5) there are a number of immediate reasons suggested by elite participants. 
 
I think, first and foremost, its a form of self-enrichment. You know more 
people, you have more people to pick opinions from, you get to know some 
people better than others and may wish to engage them in some form. So, for 
instance, if you are on the board of a French company you can say, why not 
choose someone from Britain for our board? Its high time we did so with all 
the business we have there. And they say, yes, but we dont know anyone, so 
you suggest someone, or two or three, which means, in turn, that you meet more 
often with these people and on it goes [] And this very often leads to 
something that Ive always regarded as a special phenomenon: someone 
approaches you and says, Ive heard from x, who knows you from the 
Bilderberg meeting, that youre willing to do this or that or that youre 
interested in this and that. How about that, could we talk about it? Or, would 
you like to join our board? Ive never met this guy before but it comes through 
some kind of network. (Interview 9) 
 
One of the reasons is that the subjects were not only economics; they were 
different subjects, for example, the green revolution. The President of the Green 
Party and also three or four professors from the University of California came 
along and discussed genetically modified food. Plus there were lots of, so 
called, prominent members: Hilary Clinton on one hand, who I saw several 
times, or Rockefeller. It was a very good platform for me first of all to learn 
something and then establish a good relations. Also, they want to establish a 
good relationship, its a two way street, no question about that. And then you 
get a different kind of atmosphere. (Interview 7)  
 
I asked people what they got out of it and, you know, you get very anodyne 
answers. They get networks out of it, they get contacts. The coffee breaks were 
very important to them it struck me; thats probably almost the reason for being 
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there. Im sure they got a lot out of it. The abstract chance to discuss world 
issues is quite rare without the constraints of being free to say what you want to 
say. (Interview 2)  
 
Selahattin Beyazit was a member of the Bilderberg management committee. 
Why? Because Selahattin Beyazit was a graduate of the London School of 
Economics and, elsewhere, he served the minister of foreign affairs. He was 
also a private secretary of the late Prime Minister Menderes who was hanged in 
the 1960s. Selahattin Beyazits roommate in the London School of Economics 
was Wolfensson; during this period he was the Head of the World Bank. 
Always, in international relationships, that kind of good personal relationship 
can help. (Interview 8) 
 
I do think an awful lot of the people who make it in these competitive public 
life things are very theyre actors, and they need stripes on their shoulders, 
they want to be seen in places and have ticks in the box. We all want a bit of 
that, Im not very strong on that. Ive got other vanities and weaknesses but I 
think being seen in those circles [] I dont know, why do politicians become 
politicians? They like the buzz of being in Whitehall, the feeling of feeling 
close to the centre of things, its part of all that. (Interview 10) 
 
While there are clearly perceived benefits associated with networks of this kind, it is 
possible that some of these benefits are overstated or, at least, relevant to only certain 
members of the network. As will be discussed later (see section 4.6.4 The seductive lure 
of elite membership) elite participants who exist at the periphery of group activity are 
more inclined to be seduced by the presence of prominent members and to believe that 
access to such people is a benefit in its own right. As other participants point out, 
however, powerful people dont normally have issues gaining access to other people 
 
 [Good connections can help with opening doors?] I dont think so. I really 
believe that if someone is important doors will open. If somebody needs 
support he will get it or he wont get it. The fact that he knows somebody can 
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help him here and there but it is only ten percent of the hundred percent. 
(Interview 14) 
 
 I think some people attach great importance to them, which I never have, 
partly as a way of making contacts. I havent ever found that that was really 
necessary. I mean if you hold a position where you ought to have access, you 
have access. If you dont hold such a position at that point then people may give 
you time for old times sake, or whatever, but you dont have a position of 
influence from which to argue your case. And they have, therefore, no 
particular reason to be influenced by what you have to say. So I dont believe 
that access arises out of having been there. (Interview 11) 
 
The instrumental notion that such forums provide access is, again, tempered by the issue 
of individual standing within the group. While some of this is related to personal and 
professional factors, it is clear that certain individuals enjoy greater prominence than 
others within elite forums because of specific interests or skills. As a consequence, 
some members of elite groups are seen as being better equipped than others and 
inherently more suited to this kind of interaction. Political participants, in particular, 
were seen as having the combination of knowledge and skills that frequently led to their 
prominence in networks of this kind, 
 
 So I think the political classes [have an advantage in these networks]. I mean 
take Peter Mandelson, he always goes to these things and hes brilliant at them. 
Hes absolutely spectacularly good. Now why would he carry on going? I guess 
he gets stuff out of it. Yes, you get an opportunity to relax with people who you 
dont normally, and you can talk at great length and talk seriously, backstage 
gossip; well thats not me because I dont do it for a living. Im not in politics 
for a living. For me, I get educated. Thats probably a good thing really, its 
probably a very good idea for me to have some idea as to what the guy 
responsible for world trade is thinking. And Pascale Lamy always used to 
come. (Interview 10)  
 
 There are people who are less interested, either they dont have the academic 
background or they dont feel comfortable in this kind of thing. Its quite an 
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intellectual discussion that you have. Everybody tries to be as intelligent and as 
well informed as possible, you know, its obvious. And you get into this kind of 
mood where you ask questions that you wouldnt normally do in business 
circles. And some people find that this is all nice words but there is no action. 
Or they dont feel comfortable in these kinds of gatherings but the primary 
thing is that you have to be open to many of these issues. If you are a 
businessman, running a big company in Texas or wherever, are you really 
interested in talking about the Palestinian-Israeli conflict? Many years ago we 
had a lot of discussion between the Greeks and Turks about Cyprus. Now, how 
was this relevant to many of us? They talk now about Georgia and Russia and 
some people would say, well, you know, Ill leave that to the politicians. 
(Interview 16) 
It is important to stress, however, that many business people within the elite are highly 
interested in global political issues and, moreover, voice their interest when 
opportunities arise. What these comments demonstrate is the significance of personal 
interest and motivation to the functioning of elite networks. Members of the elite, while 
exhibiting certain similarities, should not be seen as a homogeneous whole; they 
represent a network of like-minded individuals with varying degrees of interest and 
commitment. And, while interview participants frequently expressed civic minded 
sentiments, and, on occasion, even a sense of calling, it is clear that a variety of more 
immediate personal considerations motivate many others within elite networks. This 
theme will be returned to later in the findings (see section 4.6.4 The seductive lure of 
elite membership). 
4.4.3 A dynamic elite or an old boy network? 
One difficulty that presents itself for anyone concerned with elite interactions is the 
question of precisely what constitutes the elite, and the problem is compounded still 
further when one considers the possibility of elites within elites. With literally hundreds 
of forums, councils, institutions, networks and panels in the transnational arena, 
applying the term to all those who participate would quickly result in the term ceasing 
to have any kind of meaningful value. Clearly, there are some forums and networks that 
have a more elitist orientation than others but there is considerable boundary spanning 
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activity between organisations with many of the same people appearing on the boards, 
steering committees or membership rolls of several groups, 
 
The funny thing is, of course, that unfortunately were not talking about a huge 
group of people. Its sort of an old boy network; you bump into each other 
every time. Not all of them, of course, but I have different levels, different types 
of international connections. (Interview 5) 
 
The Trilateral Commission is very much the same, the European Roundtable, 
there are so many. I mean, there was this Club of Three39 in which I 
participated many times but eventually I said to the organiser, its too much. I 
suddenly realised I was meeting people there who [sic] Id met on other 
occasions and so I told the organiser, it doesnt make sense for me to continue 
here; Im not able to add any new input. Why dont you take somebody from 
the younger generation? (Interview 9) 
 
The final comment is particularly interesting since it certainly appears to be the case that 
people are reluctant to relinquish positions within such groups, even after they retire 
from service. As participants 16 and 12 note, 
 
There is a French-German get together that takes place at the highest levels. 
Actually I wouldnt say its about levels, its more about size. For instance, 
Davos is very big but there is a group which is called the International Business 
Council (IBC). This is about a hundred CEOs of the largest companies meeting 
together, sometimes under the umbrella of Davos. It meets twice a year and 
normally it has about fifty percent participation, so only fifty people but they 
are top level, CEO representatives of the largest global corporations. Its a bit 
more difficult maybe to get the [politicians together], although even there, with 
politicians, you have top people in smaller circles. Its very much tradition. If 
you started as a young leader in one of these circles you normally stay. Theres 
                                                
39 The Club of Three was founded by Lord Weidenfeld in 1996 and brought together leaders from the 
public and private sectors in the UK, Germany and France. It has since changed its name to the Institute 
for Strategic Dialogue (ISD) and now invites participation on a pan-European basis. 
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another one, the Group of Thirty40, for instance, and you are asked to join and 
then people stay until they die. (Interview 16) 
 
When you retire from full-time work, you take up a lot of part-time jobs which 
still keep you, because you want to, involved in international developments and 
so on. Then all these meetings become your lifeblood because this is how you 
keep in touch with people who have full-time jobs, with other people like 
yourselves, with the literature, because youre not receiving all that information 
anymore. So, it becomes your lifeblood which is one of the reasons people who 
have retired go to these things so regularly. (Interview 12) 
 
This desire to remain in situ has led to accusations that elite groups and networks are 
largely controlled by elderly, some say geriatric41, members of the global elite. A 
common theme of interviews with steering committee members of the Bilderberg group, 
for instance, concerns the groups attempt to encourage dynamic participation rather 
than a more static club for lifetime members. And, while its true that approximately 
sixty percent of all Bilderberg participants are one time attendees of the group, a longer 
standing core of Bilderberg, approximately 15-20% of all attendees, do resemble 
something of a private club. As one former multiple attendee noted, 
 
Im not sure how up to date its kept, as I say, I think its a bit on the geriatric 
side because it has a membership. That is to say, people who go every year 
from certain countries. And that means that its very static, its the same people 
who go year after year. Its a little bit the same with the Wehrkundetagung42 in 
Munich, the big security forum, which also has a certain sense in which it is 
rather static. (Interview 12) 
 
                                                
40 According the the website of the Group of Thirty, the organisation was established in 1978, [and] is a 
private, nonprofit, international body composed of very senior representatives of the private and public 
sectors and academia [] It aims to deepen understanding of international economic and financial issues, 
to explore the international repercussions of decisions taken in the public and private sectors, and to 
examine the choices available to market practitioners and policymakers.  (www.group30.org accessed 
11/11/2008). 
41 David Rothkopf (2008):278-280, for instance, quotes the one Bilderberg attendee - a senior US official 
 as asking the question who are these old farts? And another senior US official, a former Trilateral 
Commission member, as saying the Trilateral Commission is a joke [] its a bunch of has-beens who 
do not have power except to convene themselves. 
42 Now known as the Munich Conference on Security Policy. 
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The attraction of this core group to the wider group of participants is a theme that will 
be returned to later in the analysis (see Theme 5 Hierarchies of influence) but it is 
interesting to note, at this point, that members of this inner group do represent, whether 
by accident or design, many of the most personally influential and statesmanlike figures 
within the whole; this, despite the fact that many of them are, in fact, retired or semi-
retired from public life. For certain others within the elite group, there is evidence that 
this is felt to be intrinsically wrong and, moreover, something that is consciously 
starting to change within elite circles, 
 
I think its a mistake for people who have been things to hang on and go on 
speaking and boring everyone to sobs with what theyre saying. I think its 
much better that you shut up, go there and listen to the others, and think how 
awful they are of course, but not to go on taking a part. I think its a mistake. 
(Interview 4) 
 
[On the influence of the European Roundtable of Industrialists] Well maybe a 
few words from wise old men is considered to be valuable for the [European] 
Commission but I still think the description would be advisory rather than a 
working mechanism [And] people like Henry Kissinger and David 
Rockefeller have been around for years. They are much less influential now; 
twenty years ago they were much more influential, ten years ago they were still 
influential. (Interview 6) 
 
Not everybody thinks the composition of these groups is ideal. Those who are 
interested in attending these meetings are very often has-beens. I mean, 
Bilderberg has a lot of people, I dont want to mention names but we all know 
them, the famous 80-85 year old politicians; well, Davos does not invite them. 
At Davos, when youre retired, youre retired. Which is not a bad thing because 
then you get the young people moving up as well. (Interview 16) 
 
It is important to note that none of these criticisms are levelled at the notion of elite 
networks per se; they are, instead, observations related to the perceived sources of 
influence within them. For most elite groups such as Bilderberg, these sources of 
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influence have been historically significant and continue to raise questions about the 
overall purpose and direction of such events, 
 
 I think there probably is an inner group who probably do want to support the 
ever closer union of Europe, for instance, and they have been there since the 
beginning whenever that was. Certainly from before the first time I went 
anyway. On the occasions that I went, Dr Agnelli was, it seemed to me, the key 
figure in some way; the figure to whom other people were paying attention and 
deferring. And the second time, there was also the Queen of the Netherlands 
who obviously played an important role and is a European federalist. But how 
that inner group works, I dont know but it had a motive in setting this up and 
supporting it and this affected [things]. (Interview 11) 
 
The role of the inner group within elite networks will be considered later in the 
analysis (see section 4.6.2 Elitism within elite networks) it is sufficient at this stage to 
say that each group or network has its own idiosyncratic membership dynamics. But 
while some groups are more consciously dynamic in the area of membership than 
others, many groups do, nevertheless, share a resistance to the idea of change. Such 
resistance might be evidenced by the sheer volume of groups performing similar 
functions with, frequently, overlapping memberships, 
 
You could merge many of them. They all have their history, they all have their 
pride, their tradition, their people who care. You could easily say, why not 
merge things; it would be far more efficient. And this question always comes 
up, to be honest. I mean, every time someone says we will consider that when 
we talk about succession planning, its very often, you know, the people who 
are involved. It never quite works primarily because of tradition. (Interview 
16)  
 
Tradition, in this sense, has as much to do with the inclinations of longstanding 
members of the group as any objective notion of preserving institutional identity. Such 
forums are extremely important to many elite participants who, in a sense, derive some 
of their own identity from associations of this kind. It is important, therefore, to see elite 
forums and networks and elite participants as mutually interdependent; neither wishing 
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to entirely disengage itself from the other. It is also important to recognise, for reasons 
that are related, that certain members within such networks will continue to wield 
disproportionate levels of influence. As participant 12 suggests, 
 
 I think the Kissingers of the future are still out there. There are few people as 
outstanding as he was intellectually but they do exist. (Interview 12) 
 
The final two thematic sections, on consensus formation and the lure of elite 
membership, will explore some of these issues further. For the time being, at least, it is 
enough to state that elite networks should not be viewed as egalitarian forums with 
dynamic membership processes; they are, instead, highly institutionalised arrangements 
with a strong sense of tradition and purpose. Nowhere is the embodiment of these 
principles more evident than in the shared values of the core of longstanding attendees 
and members. Participants brought into such forums have to contend with such 
arrangements if they are to succeed within such networks.  
 
4.4.4 The influence of elite networks and forums 
 
Determining the influence of elite networks is an inherently complex pursuit not least 
because one must distinguish between the power of individual elite participants and the 
notional power of a collective and purposeful whole. Unpicking the two things is not 
straightforward and, from an empirical perspective, is complicated further by an 
obvious issue of sensitivity related to matters of influence. An obvious example of such 
complexity, for instance, is that of the Business Roundtable organisation of the United 
States. Here, the heads of the largest corporations meet to discuss responses to market 
and regulatory issues but, instead of lobbying as an organisation, they lobby 
individually as heads of their respective corporations. Many other groups, with distinct 
ideological perspectives and formal lobbying functions, attempt to influence directly but 
also benefit from the individual activities of participant members. In other instances, the 
group or network may have no formal lobbying function, or stated ideological position, 
but may be influencing the actions of its members or participants in more discrete ways. 
The problem, of course, is not simply one of transparency. At a fundamental level, it has 
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to do with whether it is the individual or the group that is, in effect, wielding power and, 
moreover, what form of power is being wielded. As participants 14, 4 and 2 note, 
 
No, I dont think the group has power. I think individual people have influence 
but I dont think the group has power. (Interview 14) 
 
It was a very loose organisation, nothing ever came out of it. It was what you 
put into it and what you got out of it yourself; the organisation didnt do 
anything. (Interview 4) 
 
I dont think there is a story; theres possibly an interesting study to be written. 
I dont know what the story is apart from a gang of high profile people meeting 
together and having a chat. (Interview 2) 
 
Taken at face value, these comments tend to suggest that elite networks and groups, 
with no formal ideological position or lobbying function, are essentially just places or 
domains in which people exchange information. They reflect a rather observable notion 
of power and ignore the potential and significance of bias. As a consequence, they 
overlook more discrete processes of opinion formation and change. Understanding the 
impact of such processes is pivotal to understanding the broader role and influence of 
elite networks. If such activity is designed to bring people together with the purpose of 
narrowing differences, for the common good, it is only correct to question how such 
processes work and, importantly, whether such processes are effective, in an 
instrumental sense, in influencing wider outcomes. Certainly the evidence suggests that 
they are 
 
I think it happens, but it happens because if people are convinced about 
something and they participate in another seminar they will the hold the same 
language as they one the held at Bilderberg. But Bilderberg is not decisive in 
doing that. We dont plan the multiplication, we leave it to the members, not the 
members, the participants, and if they felt that something useful was there, then 
they go out and spread their convictions. And I think thats the important point; 
Bilderberg, as such, does not try to have a position. If people who come think 
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that good sense has been spoken, and that they would like to repeat it in other 
fora, so much the better. (Interview 14) 
 
Everybody goes away with their own learnings, whatever they take from the 
meeting. And I have a feeling, as I say, that every year when such meetings 
happen, 10% of the crowd that gets together goes back with a mission of 
spreading the message. But theres no force behind it saying the Trilateral 
Commission wants this, you do this.  I dont see that pact. (Interview 6) 
 
Once you participate to some degree in these networks, you come to hear other 
things or you come to hear the same story but in a very different way. And, of 
course, you file that and you return home and maybe your attitude changes; you 
insert something new back home, not only in your business but also in your 
national networks, talking to politicians and others. (Interview 9) 
 
People can change views slightly after hearing a well informed crowd from the 
world, so to some degree that might influence policy as it trickles down to these 
leaders, through words to their own presidents. So thats the message to me, as 
far as the message can get. I havent seen any radical policy changes that were 
initiated by such people. (Interview 7) 
 
Im sure there is [some influence]. People share views [] you can see what 
the world agenda will be in a couple of years. (Interview 8) 
 
My impression is that what was discussed helps to agenda set [] and I say 
this from a personal point of view, it does kind of set an agenda that goes 
beyond the group. It gives you expertise because youre getting serious people 
talking about areas they know a lot about, so when the topic comes up I think, 
yeah, I heard somebody say something, and they were head of that company 
that is key in that sector, it is probably true [] These guys pick up that others 
take it seriously. If the Head of BP and the Head of Shell say its serious, then 
theyll go away and think its serious. (Interview 2) 
 
These themes will be returned to later in the analysis (see Theme 5 Hierarchies of 
influence) but it is important to state that a number of participants pointed to changes in 
 175
the way in which such networks were functioning. The main point, related to the 
significance of communications technology, was that developments in this area had 
created the capacity for ever more discrete networks. As interview participants 8 and 15 
note, 
 
Its probably still very important but not as important as it was. There are so 
many networks. Im sure that those that I dont even know about are more 
influential, especially in this digital age, a time of instant communication. 
(Interview 8) 
 
[They were more important] before the internet. Now if people want to 
network they can do it directly rather than getting on a plane. You'll notice the 
kind of people who chair the Trilateral and Bilderberg tend to be former 
officials [] at least we knew what they were, they posted their formal agendas 
and we knew more or less who was going. Now we don't know who's talking to 
who [sic] about what because these institutions have become superseded and it's 
all done much more informally [] If you want to see where real power lies 
look at the big private equity houses and private investment banks in the US 
and the kinds of people they recruit to their boards [] When they buy stakes 
in Chinese banks, and finance oil exploration, if you imagine that all that is 
done by market mechanisms, and not by people picking up phones and finding 
out the background, then you're living on Planet Zarg [sic]. (Interview 15) 
 
Such innovations may also be helping to overcome one of the most obvious issues 
related to network diffusion; namely that there is no control over the spread and 
integrity of networked communications. As participant 9 pointed out, 
 
There is one thing with networks that you must be aware of. As kids, we 
would play this game. You write three words on a piece of paper and then pass 
it on to your neighbour and he adds a fourth, and that goes on as its passed 
around the table and comes back to you. So your original intention is totally 
reversed. Its great fun but in networks Ive found out that, from every knot in 
the network to the next, your message can be changed and it may be received 
differently two knots further down, or left or right, and so on. This is very 
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important, you have to be aware of this. You may say this is black and then 
after the next knot its already black and white, totally chequered. There may be 
some surprises after that, so networks are only as good as the transmitters they 
have. And some may not transmit the proper message on purpose, you have to 
know that. Its like in a complicated chip, sometimes it doesnt work as you 
think it will. (Interview 9) 
 
Leaving aside the problem of control, such an instrumental depiction does, also, imply a 
form of intent. Some groups and networks have more obvious intentions than others 
and, indeed, when such intent can be divined, it is important to note that it might be 
accidental or unconscious. These issues will be explored further in the following two 
themes.  
 
4.4.5 Summary of theme three 
 
An appreciation of elite networks is critical to an understanding of contemporary 
geopolitical activity. While many transnational networks tend to be regional rather than 
truly global, considerable boundary spanning activity between regional networks has 
created significant linkages on a number of levels. The pattern of such linkages might 
be seen as a function of a globalising economic imperative but we remain some way 
from a truly homogenous global elite network.  
 
Elite participants share an almost universal belief in the logic of elite networks and the 
force for good that they represent. While not all elite members are drawn to such 
networks and groups, those that are find considerable benefits of association. It is also 
apparent that certain members of the elite are more suited to such activities than others, 
and this can affect standing within the group. Crucially, personal interest and motivation 
is as critical to an understanding of elite interaction and network activity as any sense of 
objective global civic mindedness, no matter how heartfelt.  
 
Elite groups and networks exhibit a huge degree of interlocking which means that the 
overall number of elite participants is less than it might first appear. Furthermore, an 
elite inner group, something that might be seen as resembling an old boy network, is 
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preventing greater dynamism within existing networks and forums. This inner group is 
disproportionately powerful within the whole, consciously or otherwise, and has a 
considerable influence on more aspirant members of the elite. Elite networks are highly 
institutionalised arrangements and entrants into such domains must become skilled 
navigators if they are to be successful within them. 
 
The influence of transnational elite networks is a contentious area and, in a sense, a 
continuation of decades old debates related to elite and community power. And, as with 
earlier discussions, its clear that the idea of elite influence in global affairs has its 
detractors, 
 
Theres a general point about humanity which is ideas circulate and resonate 
and become ruling ideas for a while until theyre replaced by some other set of 
ruling ideas. This is a complicated process which involves books, radio 
programs, TV programs, political debate, big events like 9-11, the fall of the 
Berlin Wall, things like that and of course discussions and groupings of this 
kind [] Its incredibly difficult, I think, to identify the role in the 
dissemination of ideas and attitudes of groupings of this kind, but my own 
guess is that actually they are very, very, minor. I think they tend to echo and 
reproduce ideas which are being generated elsewhere, often by intellectuals, 
rather than actually generating them [] but there are ideas in the air. At the 
moment, for example, its the idea of globalisation. Its impossible to identify 
where that comes from and say its the World Economic Forums idea. It 
clearly isnt. (Interview 13) 
 
The intangibility of power should not, however, be confused with the absence of it. It is 
clear that such networks and forums do have some influence. Exactly what form this 
influence takes requires a more critical examination of underlying mechanisms of power 
within such groups. 
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4.5 Theme 4: Consensus formation and the narrowing of differences 
 
It is clear at this point that elite transnational forums do not represent, in any sense, a 
perfectly balanced and uncontaminated public sphere. Indeed, as participant 1 pointedly 
observed, 
 
It doesnt represent public opinion but thats not the point.  
(Interview 1) 
 
Instead, they are domains of elite communication and familiarisation; frequently 
resulting in the development of shared understandings, however broad or vague, related 
to the nature of global issues and challenges. These understandings result from the 
perceived legitimacy of arguments or perspectives, which are, themselves, the result of 
fundamentally contested processes. Since these processes of preference formation are 
extremely discrete, and do not readily manifest themselves in the form of observable 
exercises of power, it is necessary to explore the underlying processes of familiarisation, 
socialisation and acculturation in order to better, and more fully, understand the role of 
power relations in their creation. These issues are the focus of the remaining thematic 
categories within the analysis section. Before exploring such issues in some detail, 
however, it is necessary to better define the process by which participants create some 
semblance of consensus.  
 
4.5.1 Consensus formation and elite shared understanding  
 
By and large, there is an appreciation among elite participants that elite forums and 
networks are responsible, consciously or otherwise, for some degree of consensus 
formation. Some participants present a rather instrumental depiction in which the 
process is seen as the purpose of such interactions, 
 
[It creates] some kind of consensus about why some things have to be 
addressed. However difficult, one cant just trust to fatality. (Interview 14) 
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You cant deal with trade, you cant deal with climate change, you cant deal 
with the Millennium Development Goals (MDG), you cant deal with 
peacekeeping, you cant deal with the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction and so on, other than on a global basis. You have to have a global 
dimension to policy otherwise it wont work. So, how do you set about that? 
Well, you set about creating consensuses around certain policy objectives. 
(Interview 12) 
 
You have some forum, the Trilateral or something else, where you have this 
small world of officials, politicians and managers of public companies meeting, 
exchanging views. This was the way to create consensus in international 
relations in the past which is still alive and very important today. (Interview 3) 
 
You get access to other decision makers. Its an opportunity to play a part in, 
and find out what, the common sense is. So, on every issue that might influence 
your business, oil price, regulation, tariffs, China, you will hear, first hand, the 
people who are actually making the decisions - and you will play a part in 
helping them to make those decisions and formulating the common sense. At 
the moment there are a number of common senses: that the EU needs reform; 
that it needs more flexible labour markets; that its welfare states hold it back 
[] there's less international common sense about what to do with the Muslim 
world. In all these areas, the politics and economics have been hammered out in 
private sessions in these kinds of places. Now sometimes the common sense is 
right and sometimes it's wrong, but you can't deny that there is such a thing. 
(Interview 15) 
 
At the same time, other participants describe a softer  and more complex array of 
processes and outcomes,  
 
[Consensus formation], or definition of differences, I would say. I would 
observe, and I dont want to exaggerate, that people narrow differences which 
is, I suppose, the same as consensus formation. I mean its not in so far as it is 
implied that consensuses are reached on things [] It was mutual consensus, 
mutual education, the swapping of ideas. I cant place a value on it but I think 
its real. (Interview 10) 
 180
 
I wouldnt say a consensus; a consensus implies that everybody subscribes to 
it but I do think, yes, certain thinking crystallises, views emerge from these 
things. How they emerge, well its very difficult to say. They emerge from what 
people read in the newspapers, what they hear on the radio and television, what 
they read in books, what they hear when they go to conferences. Its a process 
that most human beings would find hard to describe with any degree of 
precision. (Interview 12) 
 
It can help with generating a consensus; it can also help with clarifying and 
sharpening disagreements. If you disagree, you go away with an even better 
understanding of why you disagree, and where you agree, you have a better 
understanding for a basis for cooperation. In a sense, what youre doing here is 
making the process of thinking that is driving policy more transparent, and that 
can be the basis either for better cooperation or more perfect disagreement. 
(Interview 13) 
 
It is important, therefore, to recognise that the term consensus formation is potentially 
misleading as it implies that consensus is the objective and the product of elite 
interactions. Instead, it is arguably more appropriate to use the term as a loose 
description of the underlying momentum and consequence of elite interactions within 
such contexts. As these contributions suggest, 
 
 The formation of elite consensus is a bi-product rather than a goal.  
(Interview 1) 
 
I have a little problem with the word consensus. I cant remember participating 
in anything we went to in order to reach a consensus. Normally these informal 
meetings are very good, not because they are consensus building, but because 
you get to see things on the horizon. This may lead, in the end, to a certain 
similarity in thinking, within a network and even across borders, but it was not 
originally intended to build consensus. (Interview 9) 
 
 Not really, because the problems we deal with are of a general nature and 
dont adjust to simple answers. What can come out of it is that it is [the belief 
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that it is] wrong not to deal with a problem and that we should go home and 
encourage people not to leave it on the table. But a real consensus with an 
action plan one, two, three..? The answer is no, people are much too sensible to 
believe they can do that. (Interview 14)  
 
It should be noted that such consensus in elite circles forms more readily around 
certain issues than others. This might be a reflection of shared ideological 
predisposition, for instance, related to unfettered free markets, or a reflection of broader 
structural influences, as might possibly be the case with civil society pressure in areas 
such as environmental concerns. Whatever the cause, it would be wrong to conclude 
that consensuses are formed across the board. The strength of consensus in certain areas 
does, however, provide an interesting potential insight into the motivations, interests 
and diversity of elite participants within such forums and networks, 
 
 I think the consensus is much greater there [on economic issues], because 
automatically, around the table, you have internationalists. People who are not 
internationalists would find they are losing their time and over-playing the 
importance of the international component of domestic problems. So you have 
internationalists and from this point of view you need to have a degree of rules, 
a degree of references, and every business is interested in these type of 
references [] I think that there the consensus was always very powerful. 
(Interview 14) 
 
 The one area where probably there is the least debate and most consensus is, 
of course, global warming and environmental issues; there you dont see a 
negotiating position except when you get down to specific agreements like 
Kyoto. But there is a lot of consensus as to what the world should do and what 
that means for politicians and business leaders. But, when it comes to a 
situation like the Middle East, Israel, Palestine, there are quite a range of views 
that come into the picture. (Interview 6) 
 
 Well, the broadly accepted vision was the market economy, no doubt about it. 
Absolutely. You may even say the good old traditional values of proper 
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capitalism which, maybe, fifteen years ago, wasnt a dirty word like it is now. 
(Interview 9) 
 
It is not possible with the limited amount of data gathered for this study to draw too 
many conclusions about these interests and motivations except to say that market 
concerns do appear to enjoy a transcendental place in elite engagement. All participants 
of the study were, undoubtedly, free market advocates and this ideological 
predisposition must, not unnaturally, have some bearing upon the appreciation of 
broader geopolitical issues. Given the various interests of the wider group, this doesnt 
necessarily imply that consensus is any more likely on specific issues; it does, however, 
provide an important stimulus for such discourse. 
 
The issue of self-interest, and a constantly changing environmental context, led some 
participants to acknowledge that, even when consensual settlements are reached, they 
should not be viewed as a static end result. Instead, they are constantly changing and 
evolving and this adds an important dimension to ongoing elite interactions, 
 
Politics is about conflict. Its not about consensus, its not about norms. 
Politics is about conflict and trade offs [] we dont get to consensus, we get to 
settlements and settlements constantly change. Its not static, its always 
moving as a result of events and also because those settlements are constantly 
in flux. (Interview 2) 
 
I mean bread has been produced in this world for around six thousand years 
now, since the inception of agriculture, but theyre still experimenting with it: 
trying to introduce new types; new tastes; new ways to preserve it; better ways 
to preserve it; healthier breads. Theres no end to developing taste and I dont 
see any harm in testing your ideas with new people and seeing how they react 
to it [] seeing the reaction and making some amendments if necessary or 
adding interesting components to take it further. (Interview 5) 
 
In summary, therefore, the narrowing of differences between elite participants is not 
necessarily a consciously intended outcome but it appears, nevertheless, to be a natural 
consequence of such activity. Elite participants recognise the value of creating common 
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ground and see it as an extremely valuable result of elite interactions but do not 
consciously believe that this is why they do it, which, in a sense, begs an obvious, and 
equally important, question: why do elite participants engage in this type of activity? 
And, again, it seems that very few elite members have given the question any serious 
thought, 
 
 You never think about it really, Ive never done so. Its been an important part 
of my life but unintentionally. You dont do these things because you want to 
be in a network, and youre not aware that youll be entering one or whatever, 
but you may end up being a part of it. (Interview 9) 
 
 Well its an interesting question. Im the vice chairman of XXXXX [a 
longstanding and prestigious elite transnational forum] and weve only just had 
the discussion [] what is the value for members and participants and what is 
the value for society at large? (Interview 16) 
Whatever the reasons for this lack of inquiry, there can be little denying that elite 
participants feel themselves very much drawn to such activity. This will be the theme of 
the final section of the analysis (see section 4.6.4 The seductive lure of elite 
membership) but it is enough to state at this stage that the lack of an obvious function, 
within many of the more elitist organisations, is clearly of some interest. It is almost as 
if the benefits of such activity are self-evident, and that to participate is a natural 
extension of what it is to be a member of the elite. Indeed, participation is how one is 
defined as a member of the elite. The implications of this process are potentially 
profound for any notion of eventual consensus; after all, participants are clearly 
identified, and identify themselves, as having the characteristics that mark them out as 
members of a select group of often likeminded individuals. It is important to consider, 
therefore, whether there exists a fundamental bias within agenda and selection 
processes; and what consequences this entails for group discourse.  
4.5.2 The mobilisation of bias within elite interactions 
 
As was stated earlier in the analysis (see section 4.3.2 The nature of elite collaboration 
in the transnational setting) elite participants, and core elite members in particular, are 
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keen to suggest that the composition of elite networks and groups is diverse, reflecting a 
variety of stakeholder interests. They are equally keen to suggest that many of the most 
exclusive forums and networks have no hidden agenda and that they exist, simply, to 
facilitate communication between transnational elite members. In the case of one such 
group, Bilderberg, this is evidenced, it is argued, by a lack of formal settlements and 
conclusions which is, itself, a consequence of diverse interests within the group 
 
 There is an even smaller elite business group in this country, twenty to twenty-
five people, and we once issued a pamphlet on the market but I dont think it 
had any impact. But that [kind of thing] is very rare. Bilderberg never does that 
on purpose. Thats a clear decision  they dont issue any statements. And its 
really not possible at Bilderberg to have one voice because you have so many, 
as I said, people from different constituencies that would never agree to say 
something [collectively] about free trade. You would almost certainly have 
someone from the emerging economies or from Western Europe who is 
opposed. (Interview 16) 
 
 There's no such thing as Bilderberg thinking, we have people from both sides 
of the political debate.  If you take the two steering committee members from 
the UK, [Martin Taylor] and Ken Clarke, [and they] have diametrically 
different views on the desirability of British participation in the Euro, for 
example. Generally speaking, there are more people at the Bilderberg 
conferences who would be in UK terms highly Europhile, but that isn't 
surprising because the elites on the continent are 90% highly Europhile. 
(Interview 18) 
  
 It doesnt have a political relevance and it doesnt come to conclusions. I mean 
you have a debate on whatever it might be and thats the end of that. It doesnt 
come to any conclusions; you can draw your own conclusions from it but the 
organisation doesnt draw a conclusion [] that was what it always sought to 
avoid. The conspiracy theories are terribly difficult to refute because, if you 
dont actually produce any results, people think youre hiding them. In point of 
fact, there werent any. (Interview 4) 
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 But we never discussed this as a way to go and have a consensus; all issues 
were hotly debated. I tell you they were. The most pleasant thing that we could 
imagine at Bilderberg were two parties up there on the stage almost hitting one 
another because they had totally different views on what is right, how to deal 
with the Arabs or I dont know what. And we specifically looked for people to 
make speeches with widely different views and there was never an endeavour to 
reach a common view. It was about opening the mind to two totally different 
views. And then everyone worked it over in his own brain, what to make of it. 
(Interview 9) 
 
 This doesnt mean that you reach any agreement on policy, that is clearly what 
this group is not about, but you have a better idea what people are thinking 
about [] Bilderberg does not try to reach conclusions, it does not try to say 
what people should do. Everyone goes away with their own feeling and that 
allows the debate to be completely open and quite frank. You see what the 
differences are and the only conclusion is that, whatever the differences, the 
world works better if the Americans and the Europeans get along than if they do 
not. (Interview 14) 
 
The lack of an ideological agenda is something that is disputed, however, by other 
participants within the group; participants who perceive the existence of clearly defined 
preferences and ideological biases, 
 
 These forums, theyre not official forums, but they do have organisers or a 
group of lead people who usually set the agenda. These people tend to be from 
western economies and they come to the table with an agenda which looks at 
world issues, whether theyre related to the Middle East problem, the Iranian 
situation, or the emergence of Russia as a new power and the different angle 
that Putin brings to it [] but then, as I said, most of these forums are created 
by western business or political leaders so the agenda and the views are slanted 
towards that western view. (Interview 6) 
 
 I tended not to get invited to these things because I didnt share this consensus 
and was vaguely felt to be unsympathetic, and this was certainly true with 
Bilderberg. The first time I went to Bilderberg, I was a perfectly respectable 
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European; by the second time I went, I had become increasingly critical of the 
European consensus as it existed at that time and Ive become even more 
critical since [] I certainly felt it [bias] and I think the fact that, after the first 
time I went to Bilderberg they didnt ask me again for some time, and after the 
second time, they havent asked me since, reflects the fact that I wasnt one of 
them. I mean they were perfectly polite and it was very agreeable and I wasnt 
made to feel that I was being sent to Coventry or anything of that kind [...] 
but I think they did feel that I wasnt one of them and that probably was the 
reason they didnt invite me back again. They were recruiting, looking for 
recruits, for a particular kind of view, basically a strong Europeanist view in the 
case of Bilderberg. And if you didnt hold those views, you were never going to 
hold them. They sensed it and they were more comfortable with people who 
were orthodox in that sense. (Interview 11) 
 
 There are certain issues where consensus is formed before they even turn up 
[] the people who turn up are almost all the sorts of people who believe in 
structural reform of the European market. I mean youre not going to get the 
revolutionary communists there [] its not really consensus formation; I 
would say its consensus reinforcement. (Interview 1) 
 
The perception, among countries that might be considered peripheral to the North 
Atlantic network, that the agenda and views are skewed by traditional relationships and 
perspectives has implications for the sense of standing of certain participants within 
such groups. This point will be explored in greater detail in the final theme of the 
analysis (see section 4.6.3 Dealing with fear and the importance of being interesting) 
but it is clear from all three statements that a pervasive bias was felt to be present 
despite the insistence among longer standing elite members that no such agenda exists.  
 
4.5.2.1 Norms, rules and rituals 
 
For some, the influences described above are institutional and manifest themselves in 
the norms, rules and rituals of decision making. As a consequence, presenting 
contentious points of view, or being contentious in the way that you present them, is 
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part and parcel of the process of learning to adapt and survive within such 
environments, 
 
 Ive always been on the inside, not the outside. Ive pursued my arguments 
over policy within a policymaking framework whether its the government or 
the European Union. So Ive always been on the inside but I dont think thats 
deprived my views of their sharpness or edge but you are playing by certain sets 
of rules. So, you cant be completely iconoclastic and remain inside; if you are, 
you wont be inside for very long. So, to some extent, the people who say these 
organisations and networks muffle dissent, they have a certain something on 
their side. But they only muffle what I would call extreme dissent [] I believe 
in a consensual approach to things, to dialogue, to talking things through, to try 
and reach broad agreement on the way ahead [] I speak diplomatically 
because Im a diplomat. Ive found, funnily enough, very often it works better 
than speaking in a highly hyped way. (Interview 12) 
 
 [The debate] was never heated; its an extremely urbane and sophisticated lot 
of people after all. I mean theyre not the sort of people who are going to make 
a fuss. Theyll probably go out muttering if they disagree [] did you hear 
what that fellow said, absolute rubbish, but they wouldnt say so in the forum. 
(Interview 4) 
 
 I dont think there was anything people couldnt say or didnt feel they could 
say. But if people did say radical stuff, the others would think, why the hell are 
they here?  (Interview 1) 
 
These unwritten rules and codes of conduct are particularly interesting with respect to 
the issue of bias mobilisation, because, consciously or unconsciously, elite organisations 
are discriminating based upon a collective sense of what, or who, is acceptable, and 
what, or who, is not. Certain thinking is already enshrined within the collective 
consciousness of elite networks. It is arguably so unconscious and pervasive that it has 
become uncontested within the group itself. Instead, it acts as a referential starting point 
for elite discourse and interaction. Elite participant advancement and survival is based 
not so much on the acceptance of such bias but a fundamental belief in, and absorption 
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of, it. These beliefs are extremely discrete and tend to be attitudinal rather than 
ideological, which is one of the reasons that the membership of many groups can be 
claimed to be bi-partisan or multi-stakeholder. Of course, with respect to certain issues, 
there is a closer causal relationship between attitude and ideological position but this is 
not a given, and certain elite members do appear to succeed in traversing a rather 
difficult path. For other participants, there is the definite sense, prior to acceptance 
within the group or network, that one is being tested in some way, 
 
 I just felt my way and learned how the international system works. Firstly, 
they always look to your knowledge, your approach, your policy direction. 
Secondly, they look to your power. If you have the two together in the 
international arena, you will be successful [] I had been checked by them, of 
course, for quite some time, because the Bank for International Settlements 
(BIS) in Basel is the training centre for central bank governors [] they are 
checking you. We had a formal meeting and then an informal meeting over 
dinner. First we started with six or seven governors at one table and then it 
extended to twenty or so, all of us; just choosing a subject and discussing of 
course. I was checked several times for my intervention, my approach to issues, 
and also my personal relations. (Interview 7) 
 
 Yes, I think you are constantly being tested and you will only make it further if 
those who are already established members, let me say some of the key 
members of the network, recommend you. They say, you can rely on him, hell 
do a good job, hes reasonable, hes going to listen, and he wont abuse any 
rules or whatever. I think theres something to it. But I think what they want to 
see is that youre constantly tested about your independence, not in material 
terms but in intellectual terms. (Interview 9) 
 
The final point is extremely interesting and is a theme that will be returned to in the 
final section of the analysis (see section 4.6.3 Dealing with fear and the importance of 
being interesting). For the time being at least, it is sufficient to suggest that some 
tension exists between a conscious or unconscious bias within elite groups and a stated 
desire to cultivate fresh intellectual insights and direction. An obvious example of such 
tension is in the selection of participants.  
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4.5.2.2 The selection of elite participants 
 
At first glance, one might be forgiven for believing that the identification and selection 
of participants for inclusion in elite forums and networks is a straightforward exercise 
related to merit, expertise, influence and practicality; indeed, these are very often the 
reasons suggested by group or network organisers, 
 
 People come to one's attention in all sorts of ways.  I mean, sometimes, you 
see them somewhere at a meeting, theyre very bright, sometimes you read 
something they've written [] We're looking for people who are thoughtful or 
who are going to be influential. I don't think were as good at talent spotting as 
you suggest. (Interview 18) 
 
So the way in which we pick people follows two simple principles. Firstly, we 
have to have enough people who have never been before so that we keep a 
momentum and dont simply have an old boys club, and [we have to have] 
enough people who have been before who understand the format i.e. that you 
speak briefly, that you speak your mind and that nothing will ever be quoted. 
Secondly, and taking into account the agenda, and knowing that ministers are 
very occupied and might call off at the last minute, you then try to look for 
people who would be interested in relation to their own ambition to share 
thoughts with others [] I dont think its an accident because when you ask a 
German, who do you think would be interested and who is going places in 
German politics? He will make his best assessment of the bright new boys and 
girls, people who are in the beginning phase of their career and who would like 
to get known, and the other people who would like to know them. (Interview 
14) 
 
Its not everyone who goes but there are a group of people who are more 
active and, of course, if youre one of the guys who is perceived as being 
interested, and over time you add some value, you are asked and invited by 
everyone. Its almost a self-fulfilling process. (Interview 16) 
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To elite participants, the process of identification is presented as being one almost of 
natural selection. The most prominent individuals in core sectors are invited based 
largely upon their respective success, knowledge and interests within a given sector. 
These core identifying traits are then superimposed with a variety of judgments based, 
for instance, upon inclination to participate and personal interest in networks of this 
kind. What is less frequently cited is the importance of personal contacts but, when one 
looks closely at the statements of participants, it becomes clear than new members are 
very often known to existing members of elite networks. This factor plays a 
considerable part in their access to such groups, 
 
I form an arbitrary committee [to select participants] and I make sure the 
committee meets [] I think I play a greater role in this than anyone else. The 
trouble with these forums is that they get old, the same people go again and 
again, and you have to be ruthless and disband them. I mean, like this last time, 
there were half a dozen members of the current cabinet, three or four members 
of the shadow cabinet, the heads of the security services and editors of the 
leading broadsheets blah, blah. I mean its serious, if you want to talk about 
power elite. I played a big role. If I wanted to, I could invite everyone but I 
dont. (Interview 10) 
 
I know perfectly well why I was invited. Because Bilderberg was run by Peter 
Carrington who I knew and who obviously thought I could contribute. When it 
ceased to be run by Peter and was run by somebody who I knew less well, 
Viscount dAvignon, I wasnt invited. (Interview 12) 
 
You just decided who would be a good person to have. (Interview 4) 
 
I was proposed by one of the leading business people in Turkey [whom I 
knew]. He offered my name and they readily accepted it. (Interview 5) 
 
The steering committee member selects who will participate from each 
country. We have two or three participants. There is a limited number from 
each country [] I liked XXXXXX very much for our relationship and for 
bringing me into the group. (Interview 7) 
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As a consequence of this ability, the members of boards and steering committees within 
such networks and forums wield considerable personal discretion when considering new 
members. This is important to bear in mind for a number of reasons: firstly, aspiring 
elite members may wish to ingratiate themselves with such people in return for access to 
the network; secondly, elite members responsible for selection are likely to invite only 
those people they feel will reflect positively upon them within the wider group; thirdly, 
the complex decision related to how new members will fit into existing elite 
arrangements is left largely to one person whose judgment may well be coloured by his 
own sense of what the group or network is about. In short, forces of bias on both sides 
may lead to a perpetuation of dominant group logic and thinking.  
The selection of participants within elite networks is not a scientific process and is, 
instead, arbitrary and highly discretional, and, crucially, it tends to reinforce group 
thinking. This aspect of elite interactions will be revisited in the final thematic section 
(see section 4.6.4 The seductive lure of elite membership) but is important to note that, 
while not necessarily a conscious activity, the downstream consequences are significant 
for any notion of consensus formation.  
4.5.2.3 The role of information and learning in elite networks 
 
Another key area in which bias is mobilised is through the treatment of information and 
this is particularly relevant to elite forums and networks where information, and 
learning, is frequently cited as a core benefit to such interaction. Indeed, it is interesting 
to note that elite participants, while reluctant to concede that elite networks are 
instrumental in forming opinions, are happy to suggest that the information and learning 
that they experience in such forums enables them to form new understandings, 
 
I mean, theres no consensus forming agenda; its more information sharing 
activity. Everybody leaves with a new sense of understanding. (Interview 6) 
 
Nobody is going to change my way of thinking, my approach, my wishes. I 
learned lots of things. Maybe there are some effects of that but, for my part, I 
got lots of benefits. (Interview 7) 
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It doesnt mean that you go left and right and then change your opinion every 
other day, not at all; but I do think we all must have the ability to learn and to 
improve our thinking with more information. (Interview 9) 
 
What is very difficult to quantify is that you get somewhat familiar with 
broader topics and you hear, at an early stage, what might happen to water, to 
energy, to commodities, to geopolitical conflicts and to many other things. So, I 
think it broadens your horizons at a very early stage. Its not a direct result but 
it helps you to better understand different aspects or different interests. That is 
for me the key. (Interview 16) 
 
This reluctance to suggest that personal opinions are subject to change may be 
evasiveness but it seems more likely that it is a function of a certain elite defensiveness, 
an unwillingness, for instance, to publicly admit to some kind of weakness. It does, 
however, disguise what is fairly compelling evidence that the processes of elite 
interaction do, indeed, lead to modified participant opinions. Since new participants 
within such groups and networks are screened by more established members, and since 
organisers are responsible for the agenda of meetings and the invitation of speakers, it is 
fair to suggest that this might have some bearing upon the nature of opinion formation 
within such networks. Although, again, it seems far from clear that this is the product of 
conscious intent. 
 
One key area of learning, however, relates to the significance elite members attach to 
the contribution of other elite participants, and, since these participants are the vehicles 
of much of the information that is exchanged within such networks, it is important to 
recognise the social aspects, and personal biases, of elite interaction. These themes will 
be explored in the next section (see Theme 5 Hierarchies of influence) but it is 
important to note the inter-relationship of information and information deliverer within 
such contexts, 
 
There is no objective discussion. A discussion is related to the opinion you 
have of your interlocutor. Do you think hes honest, do you think hes speaking 
true language and, even if you believe hes mistaken, do you still believe that 
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hes somebody that you can speak to? And if one believes that the world is not 
influenced by how people get along, that is not true; its true from the simplest 
aspects of life to the highest. And this is nothing new. If you look through 
history then you see major mistakes being made because people did not believe 
the person telling them. (Interview 14) 
 
They come together and the idea is to exchange views and learn about things. 
Now, there again you see, I think that its probably useful because people get to 
know one another but Im not sure the discussions are all that useful. Probably 
sometimes they are and sometimes theyre not [] I think that people are better 
informed as a result of the discussions. People, particularly business people, 
come with not much idea about the Middle East problem and theyre very much 
better informed. And I suppose, to the extent that whichever speaker they 
agreed with, theyd come away feeling that man is right. But thats about all I 
think. (Interview 4) 
 
Information is not some kind of value neutral commodity; instead, it is mediated by 
other elite participants and is laden with interpretive meaning and motive. When elite 
participants talk of the value of information and learning within such contexts, they are 
describing their experience in the round. Learning who, and what, to listen to is as 
valuable to the elite participant as learning what there is to know in any abstract sense.  
 
4.5.3 Consensus: a mechanism for change 
 
In the same way that consensus formation activity is perceived by participants to be a 
very soft and consequential product of elite interactions, the downstream impact of such 
consensus is even more difficult to interpret, 
 
 These are, in some senses, private discussions. I would assert very strongly 
that these are briefing meetings and what consequences have followed is not 
clear. (Interview 13) 
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 Does this influence the emergence of policy? Its very difficult to put your 
finger on it, you know, but just because you cant put your finger on it does not 
prove that it doesnt. Anyway the fact is its there. (Interview 12) 
 
Looking for a direct causal relationship between consensus formation activity and 
public policy outcomes is likely to be unrewarding since it is impossible to control for 
other determinants including, of course, the possibility that the consensus was reached 
elsewhere. Elite consensus is, as has been described, a loose characterisation of general 
sentiment with, very often, poorly defined boundaries. The process of its formation is 
often unconscious and invariably discrete, and its transmission is so idiosyncratic that it 
is difficult describe the whole process as deterministic in any conscious sense. Of 
course, there are elite groups with more clearly defined objectives and public policy 
intervention strategies but, again, the intervention is dependent upon the creation of 
shared understanding between parties. This is not a standard lobbying practice and 
requires mutual appreciation of challenges and goals. For some participants, it is clearly 
difficult to understand how such activity constitutes a meaningful exercise of power 
 
I think were miles from, not even close to any situation where, I mean, I dont 
think people are swapping views and coming to new views and saying lets 
impose these or something [like that] there isnt the possibility of, somehow, 
a consensus developing which is then implemented because weve both got to 
go back to our political democracies. (Interview 10) 
 
And, yet, as other participants noted, the existence of transnational elite consensus 
formation activity can, at the very least, be useful in legitimising and strengthening 
arguments within the domestic policy setting 
 
 I think that if you put all the groups together you can sort them into core 
groups which share a sort of common consensus, a common consensus which 
is, incidentally, very noticeable in the House of Lords. If you take the foreign 
policy, internationalist, group, not all of them agree, but a majority of them hold 
certain views about the future development of British policy which are similar 
to the Bilderberg group and similar to Chatham House and similar, I imagine, to 
most of the meetings at Ditchley, though those probably are rather more 
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variable. And, there are common assumptions there. Its partly generational that 
these are the common assumptions. People who were adult in the early 1970s 
when Britain joined the European Community, and they have not changed their 
view that this was the right long term development for Britain. (Interview 11) 
 
 Can it, at the margins of a problem, help to create a consensus? Each 
government needs support for what it does, particularly in the United States 
with Congress and so on, and where the action of outside groups on political 
decision making is much greater than in Europe. Do you need to do that? It can 
be useful. How useful, I cannot say. (Interview 14) 
 
 Becoming of more importance are some of these country to country meetings 
which take place, bilateral places where people gather on Friday lunchtime and 
go through to Sunday. All kinds of people meet and discuss a common agenda 
and that really is where a kind of bilateral common sense works its way out. 
And its very difficult to go against that kind of consensus. Many are there 
because theyve been elected and who can deny them their right to go? But one 
shouldnt deny the influence of these places. (Interview 15) 
 
And, it is important to note, that exposure to privy information and elite consensus can 
be very useful in cementing ones own career position, or delivering benefits to the 
organisation one represents, in certain arenas; which, not unnaturally, means that there 
are immediate and direct consequences of such access and interaction, 
 
 Just to [be able] to distribute those kinds of ideas, one or two is enough. I 
remember one new idea in one month is enough, you know, to show that this 
man is firstly, a knowledgeable man; secondly, a powerful man; and, thirdly, a 
dependable man. These are the two or three important areas for the central 
banker. [Interview 7] 
 
 A few weeks ago I was at the Bilderberg conference outside Washington to 
talk about Afghanistan, Palestine, Georgia and many other things, in a 
confidential group where you have politicians, academics, business people, and 
media people. It opens a lot of new aspects and avenues. And that has, 
implicitly of course, an impact on how you run your business or how you 
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formulate your strategy. So in that sense, I think, it is very direct. (Interview 
16) 
 
 When you get back, you use this in your own rhetoric, in explaining to people 
what would be a more sensible way out of an evident crisis [] If you are a 
good recipient of messages, you get a good amount of food for thought which 
you go back and chew over, and then you try to build it into your policies or 
take assessment of your existing policies, redesign them according to those 
ideas. (Interview 5) 
 
 People can change their views slightly after hearing a well informed crowd 
from [around] the world. So to some degree, that might influence policy as it 
trickles down to their leaders, [through] words to their own Presidents. 
(Interview 6) 
 
 I do [think its a bi-product rather than a goal of elite meetings], particularly 
when such a meeting is international and the participants return to their home 
country, and, then, under the influence of what theyve heard, they start 
networking within their own national environment [in order] to reach a goal. 
This may be a consensus on an issue with whoever would be necessary to build 
a consensus; could be competitors, different political parties, or I dont know 
what  yes true. (Interview 9) 
 
Of course, these outcomes are very much driven by individual members or participants 
and do not necessarily represent the intended consequences of a deterministic force 
within such groups or networks. But it is important to highlight a critical observation 
related to such activity, namely that the influential within society have the capacity to 
amplify what might otherwise be an inconsequential discussion between engaged elite 
citizens. It is for this reason that a better understanding of the process and its 
implications is so urgently required.  
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4.5.4 Summary of theme four 
 
Despite frequent use of the word consensus during interviews with participants, there 
were considerable differences over what was actually meant by it within the context of 
transnational elite interactions. In short, the term consensus formation is applied broadly 
in the study as a description of the momentum and consequences of elite interaction. 
The impetus for such consensus formation is not entirely clear although it is apparent 
that a combination of economic interest, civic mindedness and self interest do play a 
part. It should be noted, however, that formation of consensus is not a consciously 
intended outcome of elite interaction despite being an almost inevitable consequence.  
 
Bias is mobilised within elite forums and networks in three ways: through norms, rules 
and rituals; through selection and retention processes, and through the treatment of 
information. Whether by accident, or design, elite organisations discriminate based 
upon a collective sense of what and who is acceptable; certain beliefs and attitudes are a 
feature of the collective consciousness of elite forums and groups. These beliefs, often 
unconscious and largely uncontested, are a referential starting point for elite discourse 
and interaction. They are at odds with a frequently stated intention of encouraging fresh 
insights and perspectives along with ever greater dynamism within such environments. 
In short, forces of bias in the selection process and the participants desire to be 
accepted, lead to the continuation of dominant group logic and thinking. And, when 
elite participants talk of the value of information and learning within such networks, 
they are not describing some kind of value neutral exercise, learning who, and what, to 
listen to is a central plank in establishing oneself within the elite network. This theme 
will be explored further in the final section of the analysis (see section 4.6.4 The 
seductive lure of elite membership). 
The consequences of elite discourse and consensus formation are not always clear but it 
seems appropriate to suggest that they have a subtle bearing upon the actions of elite 
members. The effects of this influence are themselves often discrete and difficult to 
interpret, 
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 Maybe Ive acted as a little chip here and there with maybe a hundred other 
chips from a hundred other people. Maybe weve contributed to reshape things 
in some way. And sometimes, we were utterly unsuccessful; in fact, I think this 
was the more common experience. But I was not waiting for a huge impact that 
would change the nation forever, never at all. Because, I only sort of changed a 
little bit, half a degree here or there, to improve things in a certain direction. 
Something along those lines, I think that was enough. (Interview 9) 
 
It is important to state that such outcomes are not necessarily the intended consequences 
of the collective group or network. At the same time, however, the capacity of 
influential members to amplify the type of consensus created within such forums means 
that its influence should not be underestimated.   
 
4.6 Theme 5: Hierarchies of influence 
 
It is apparent at this stage of the analysis that elite members feel themselves very much 
drawn to the activity of transnational networks and forums. Such attraction represents a 
voluntary, although not always conscious, decision on the part of elite participants; 
indeed, most have never stopped to consider the implications or consequences of such 
activity. Elite participants see themselves becoming involved as a natural consequence 
of the success and standing they enjoy in their everyday lives but, unlike membership of 
international trade bodies or regional political institutions, membership of informal elite 
organisations is also based on social and personal criteria. Entrants to the elite 
transnational network must satisfy existing members of their value and worthiness 
before they are truly admitted; and this subtle dimension to elite interactions creates a 
number of unconscious compliance mechanisms within elite communities.  
 
The final analytical theme, hierarchies of influence continues with the focus on 
mechanisms of compliance within such settings and, specifically, those mechanisms 
emanating from processes of familiarisation, fraternisation, socialisation and 
acculturation.  
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4.6.1 The consequences of elite vulnerability 
 
Although it is tempting to consider elite networks in terms of a homogenous whole, it is 
important to remember that members of such networks are individuals; they dont cease 
to act or respond as individuals the moment they are welcomed into elite circles. It 
might be that their values and beliefs have subtly adapted to the requirements of elite 
membership but they remain, fundamentally, individual in the way that they engage 
with such activity. One of the most interesting observations made during the participant 
interviews, for instance, was just how disarmingly vulnerable many elite members 
actually are. Aside from displaying considerable intellectual abilities, it was noticeable 
that a number of the participants were very guarded and, at times, somewhat defensive 
during the interviews43. Indeed, some of the participants insisted upon having third 
parties present in order to observe proceedings. This is not entirely surprising when one 
considers the weight given to comments that such people might make by, among others, 
representatives of the media. But it does demonstrate a difficulty that many members of 
the elite have with issues of openness and trust.  
 
For many elite participants, public life is spent under great scrutiny and the blurring of 
public and private has meant that it is essential for such individuals to create the private 
space needed to function effectively and to, crucially, speak without fear of 
repercussion. It is for this reason that the point raised earlier in the findings (see 4.3.5 
Media representation within elite transnational networks) concerning the disclosure 
rules of elite membership, takes on additional significance. Non-disclosure is not just an 
unbreakable pre-condition of elite membership, it is a fundamental requirement of 
effective elite personal interaction, and it might, in part, explain the appeal of such 
forums and networks. As participants 2, 14, 16 and 18 note, 
 
                                                
43 The guarded and, somewhat, defensive posture of certain participants manifested itself in a number of 
ways. The most obvious of these was the visible care taken when answering questions. At times, such 
precision resulted in an unnatural amount of time spent on what might, for many people, have been a 
straightforward response. Some participants also became agitated or aggressive when discussing certain 
subjects; the form that this took was usually dismissive. In one instance, a participant reached across a 
table for the digital recorder and required further clarification of the disclosure terms. It was not 
uncommon for participants to ask for clarification, mid-interview, on how the information would be used; 
with a number of participants clarifying the terms of our Chatham House Rules agreement.  
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 The interesting thing is not why they come, but why they come back, the first 
time around, why not? Its not an expensive exercise, its not Davos. They 
come back because there is no exposure, there are no big statements and 
nobody can run around and posture. Thats why its still running after all these 
years. (Interview 14) 
 
 At least you get to talk about things openly. Its always friendly, its not 
aggressive. In political circles, at official conferences, you have to play a role 
because you are the representative of Britain, Germany, France or wherever, but 
here, you can be critical, self critical, and you can try to find new ways. Theres 
normally no leaks, no coverage, which is very good. The confidentiality of this 
meeting is a big advantage. (Interview 16) 
 
 It felt quite isolated from the rest of the world. I suppose, from a security 
viewpoint, youre cut off and there is an implicit celebration of that. You can 
talk about whatever you want to talk about. Its very comfortable, very nice. 
(Interview 2) 
 
It's a private organisation, and we live in an age that can't distinguish privacy 
from secrecy.  Privacy is then seen as secrecy and secrecy is seen as sinister by 
definition [] People who are there and talk privately over dinner deserve to 
have their confidences respected.  For me, the value has been building a group 
of friends, a network if you like, people Ive come to know and who have come 
to know me. (Interview 18) 
 
This aspect of elite interaction is significant for another reason; it reinforces a sense of 
inclusion and exclusion for both participants and those at the periphery of such activity. 
Members of the elite are welcomed into a world in which they can, in principle at least, 
speak freely, and in confidence, to other members of the elite. They also experience a 
degree of access and frankness that is stripped bare of many layers of formality, 
something they simply would not enjoy without access to such forums and networks, 
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[On a debate related to oil and energy] Lord Brown and Jeroen van der Veer 
could never have been that open in public44. On the European economy, 
Trichet45 was absolutely scathing about European structural rigidity. Now he 
could never have been so open in front of the media or his own constituents. 
Seeing Ackermann and Schrempp46 at loggerheads over off-shoring was also 
very revealing. (Interview 8)  
 
All that stuff goes on. I quite enjoyed it really. I mean it was quite amusing 
and interesting being with all these powerful people because some of them were 
powerful and amusing and others were very deeply un-amusing and awful. But 
still powerful [] I remember Vernon Jordan, a very powerful man in the 
democratic world  and I forget where we were, Germany I think, somewhere 
at a conference, he came up to me and said, meet the next President of the 
United States and introduced me to Clinton. Well a) Id never heard of Clinton, 
it was well before he ran for President and b) Id certainly never heard of 
Arkansas before. I thought Vernon Jordans a wise old man, Ill keep my eye on 
Clinton, and it was interesting because Clinton was obviously quite something, 
as, indeed, he proved to be whether you liked it or not. (Interview 4) 
 
So you get into all these kinds of conflicting views and feuds but, the more 
you get into the debates, the more you find out that the politicians who started 
all this were not prepared at all. And they dont know what to do now either. 
This is the kind of learning and sharing that you get into. (Interview 6) 
 
I always find it interesting to hear different aspects in small circles; I mean 
Condi Rice talks about Iraq and then Dick Holbrooke comes  so, you know, 
its completely different. To hear different stories with different views makes 
you richer. (Interview 16) 
I got to breathe the air. I learned a lot. I would like to give a couple of 
examples [] We started with the developments in Iraq and went on to discuss 
China's place in the world. Would it be a single-polar world or a multi-polar 
                                                
44 Lord Brown stepped down as Chairman of BP in May 2007. Jeroen van der Veer continues in the role 
of Chief Executive Officer at Royal Dutch Shell.  
45 Jean-Claude Trichet is currently President of the European Central Bank. 
46 Dr Josef Ackermann is currently Chairman of Deutsche Bank. Jurgen E. Schrempp resigned from his 
position as Chairman of Daimler Chrysler in 2005. 
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one? How Iran's nuclear power would affect all of us was discussed in detail. 
Concerns on the issue were conveyed. The developments in the United States, 
what the elections would bring, and how the public opinion in the United States 
was progressing was deliberated. The most important issues facing the world, 
from energy policies to expansion in the communication technologies, were 
reviewed. At the end of the three days, we have learned and discussed the 
world's most prominent problems with the world's experts. (Interview 17) 
It is important, therefore, that the impact of such access and openness on those entering 
the network should not be underestimated. It reinforces a feeling of exclusivity and 
attracts those for whom such exclusivity is important; in short, anyone who aspires to 
become a fully actualised member of such networks. To be privy to such openness, and 
be relied upon to respect the integrity of private conversations within such groups, is an 
important personal accolade that rewards immediately and over time. And for those who 
are seemingly rejected from such networks, the promise of possible re-entry is usually 
sufficient to ensure adherence to ongoing codes of conduct. After all, to break such 
codes would result in an almost certain denial of privileged access in future years.  
 
4.6.2 Elitism within elite networks 
 
Another important aspect to elite networks, and one that should not be overlooked, is 
the mechanistic role of elitism itself, something that is evident within even the most 
exclusive of elite communities. It is necessary to consider the impact of elitism not just 
in terms of the composition of the overall collective but, also, in terms of its internal 
functioning. Elitist attitudes and behaviour are central to the functioning of elite 
networks and the most obvious manifestations of this are in the way that participants are 
selected and, importantly, the way participants make decisions about acceptance, 
 
They all got something [or should I say] get something out of it. But you need 
high quality people. (Interview 10) 
 
But it was a different sort of person. I mean there were the Nods: David 
Rockefeller, Henry Kissinger, Agnelli, those sorts of people, smart Europeans 
and top people [] Oh yes, the Nods like the Nods. They wouldnt come if 
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they thought the people there were not comparable to them if you see what I 
mean. So, you had to keep up the quality, quality in that sense, of people who 
came otherwise it wouldnt have worked at all [] Is that elitism? I dont know 
what elitism means [] I think people felt it was a compliment to be asked. 
You were joining a rather superior group of people and, I suppose, in that sense, 
it was elitist. But they were rather superior people. (Interview 4) 
 
There is, undoubtedly, an elitist undercurrent to the creation and maintenance of elite 
forums and networks and this is often rooted in a belief that elites are most suited to the 
demands of such interactions and discourse, 
 
As long as people get there because theyre intelligent, well read, well 
informed, sensitive etc. I think the world has always been ruled by elites but the 
question is whether the elites are well qualified [] Usually, most people who 
are part of elites spend a lot of time denying that they are and saying that elites 
are a bad thing. But, actually, they love them. I like them but I dont deny that 
Im part of them; neither do I think they are a bad thing Im afraid [] Are 
these people members of elites because theyve got some real knowledge or 
because theyre prepared to put in real service to the common cause? If they 
are, well, whats wrong with elites? (Interview 12) 
 
Such activity is an expression of belief in ones rightful place at the discursive table; a 
belief that is frequently accompanied by rather patriarchal attitudes to calling, duty and 
guidance, 
 
 I definitely have pure and ethical writ large throughout my life. I definitely 
had views about trying to make the world a better place for the majority even if 
Im just pissing in the wind, only making a slight dentso, patrician, I smile, 
I quite like the idea of being a patrician. (Interview 10) 
 
 [To believe that we are a small group of Internationalists beset by those who 
cant see the bigger picture] would be very vain and arrogant. If they cant 
see the bigger picture, its because youve done a pretty poor job of explaining 
why its important and why its significant for their daily life, for development, 
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for economic growthto blame people who dont understand, you first have to 
blame people who cant explain. (Interview 14) 
 
 The older you get, the more developed your capacity to detect very special 
deformations in another persons personality. Of course, this is true. We all act 
and react differently and in the world of business, as much as in politics, there 
are people who think they cannot fail, who think they know it all, whove seen 
it all and who are, what I call, advice resistant. And they very often fail 
miserably in the end. There are others who soak up everything like a sponge 
and try to digest it and, probably, come to better decisions. There may be 
situations where this seen it all type may do better for short periods because 
they just do their thing, but that will not carry them through a longer period of 
time. (Interview 9) 
 
Interestingly, the rather sage-like sentiments expressed by participant 9 were echoed 
elsewhere in the participant group suggesting, perhaps, an elitism that places a value on 
maturity, patience, pragmatism and reflection over perceived impetuousness, dynamism, 
idealism or ambition. The elitist attitude of members of such networks is, therefore, 
borne of a belief in ones own wisdom and worldly experience, and such members are 
quick to identify those who have not actualised sufficiently to warrant full membership 
at this stage of their respective careers. Again, it is important to consider the 
implications of this for aspiring members of the network. Adapting ones behaviour and 
finding a successful balance between reverence and free-thinking (see section 4.6.3 
Dealing with fear and the importance of being interesting) becomes critical to 
establishing oneself within the group.  
 
In contrast, prominent members of the network are largely untouchable within the group 
and form an inner core or elite within the elite. For such members, rules of 
association are largely defined by how they conduct themselves and this group of 
members, whether by accident or design, has a disproportionate influence on wider 
attitudes and beliefs within the group. For instance, a number of participants highlighted 
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the vocal and confrontational style of Conrad Black47, in the days before his indictment 
and subsequent imprisonment48, and this would almost certainly not have been tolerated 
from a less well established member of the network. On numerous occasions during the 
interviews, participants suggested that there was a degree of deferment to established 
members of the network and, time and again, the same small group of names was 
mentioned. Whether this reflects intent on the part of celebrity members of such 
networks is not clear; what is abundantly obvious, however, is the degree of influence 
they wield on those who are keen to impress. The mechanisms of this influence will be 
explored further in the remaining sections.   
 
4.6.3 Dealing with fear and the importance of being interesting 
 
A common preconception among members of the elite is that they are invited into elite 
networks and forums because of who, or what, they represent. In other words, it is their 
position of responsibility that marks them out as a potential participant in elite network 
activity. As interviewees 4, 5, 10 and 11 suggest, 
 
 Im not terribly sure whether its elite power or statutory power because the 
people who are there, or in groups like Bilderberg and the World Economic 
Forum, are not invited because theyre Tom, Dick, Harry or Ahmed. They are 
invited because of what they represent. (Interview 5) 
 
 There is a bit of flattery though isnt there? If youre asked to join, I mean, if 
you think about the people concerned, who go to these things, theyre all quite 
important; particularly in the political and industrial/financial field. Youre 
flattered if youre asked. (Interview 4) 
                                                
47 When individuals of this kind were mentioned, often affectionately, it was usually to demonstrate the 
entertainment value of such people which, itself, might be seen as an indication of inner group elitist 
attitude and membership. 
48 It is interesting to note that, subsequent to Conrad Blacks indictment, many members of the 
Bilderberg group were quick to distance themselves from his dealings and activities. Although many 
remained loyal to him, and still do to this day, there was considerable disquiet at the 2004 conference 
among those who had been involved with Blacks company Hollinger Inc. As one participant confided, 
His board had lots of Bilderbergers, he liked having these people on his board. People like Kravis, 
Kissinger and Pearl. Largely political and no experience of business, he liked to be around the political 
rock stars [] at the 2004 meeting, Pearl was lamenting the legal problems he had through his 
association with Black. 
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 I was a successful entrepreneur. I had my own successful businesses and I was 
doing a lot else besides [] I was very famous and everyone read about me. I 
was the pick of the month. And when Mrs Thatcher came to power, she held a 
party and there was I with a small group of other entrepreneurs, various 
permanent secretaries and the chairmen of numerous nationalised industries, 
and that was it. It was just the kind of thing that happened to me then. That was 
my moment. (Interview 10) 
 
 It had a motive in setting this up and supporting it and this affected things. On 
the selection of people, it seemed to me on the occasions I went that they liked 
to select people who were in some way prominent. (Interview 11) 
 
Given the perception, therefore, that importance is a prerequisite to participation within 
elite transnational networks, being invited becomes an affirmation of ones own 
standing, not simply in terms of the industrial, political or national sphere in which one 
operates but, more specifically, in terms of a higher level sphere of influence: that of 
transnational elite cooperation. As a consequence, receiving an invitation to join one of 
the more esteemed elite gatherings or networks is, at once, flattering and humbling, 
flattering in the sense that one is being recognised as a successful and pre-eminent 
presence within a particular domain, and humbling in the sense that one is aware of a 
higher order level of influence within which one must, once again, seek to establish 
credibility, 
 
I expressed myself, I spoke, and I asked questions, not only in the formal 
sessions but the informal ones. It was a channel for increasing the credibility of 
yourself, your institution and your country. (Interview 7) 
 
Everybody tries to be as intelligent and well informed as possible, you know, 
its obvious. And you get into this kind of mood where you ask questions in a 
way that you wouldnt normally in business circles. (Interview 16) 
 
And, while the position one occupies in public life might well be enough to ensure an 
invitation into such circles, to be truly welcomed is as much a test of how one responds 
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to the challenge of being oneself, rather than the representative of an organisation or 
constituency, in the eyes of others within the group. Failing to recognise this and, 
importantly, failing to reciprocate a degree of openness and free-thinking in elite 
interactions of this kind, is a key reason, cited by participants, for exclusion from such 
elite networks, 
 
 In that kind of gathering, you cannot sit on the fence or just stay in line; you 
have to say something. This something should be a contribution of new ideas or 
new dimensions that will give other people, the audience, something. 
Otherwise, going there, having lunch, dinner, sitting around, listening and 
saying things like, its been lovely, what a lovely view doesnt work. You 
have to be active in this sense. (Interview 7) 
 
Well, thats clear. If youre not invited again, there are a few things to 
consider: did you add value and did people feel that you were engaged? If you 
spend three days and never open your mouth at the conference or in the 
evening, at dinners or lunches, if you sit somewhere apart, which happens you 
know, then people say hes not a very interesting guy. This, in these circles, is 
what counts. Its a little bit like university or school, its about being an 
interesting discussion partner; its not whether youre important or rich. Its a 
question of whether you are attractive and whether its interesting to talk to you. 
If I were to boil it down to one thing, I would say its the intellectual curiosity 
which is the most important thing, you must be intellectually curious and you 
must respond to the intellectual curiosity of others. You must at least have some 
kind of fresh view or your own opinion. If you quote all the time from CNN or 
comment constantly on what the FT is writing, people are likely to say, well, 
we dont need him, hes not adding any creativity, anything new, no dynamism, 
nothing that makes him an attractive discussion partner.  (Interview 16) 
 
 If you were not a devoted participant, that is, a participant who opens their 
mouth and asks, hopefully, good questions or provides good answers or 
whatever, and participates in the debates in sessions but also out of session, 
maybe over dinner, they would say, hes a very dull person, obviously very 
little to say. We dont want to see him again.  (Interview 9) 
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Interestingly, those who were rejected from such gatherings tended to identify the same 
kind of rationale for their exclusion. Frequently this was accompanied by defensive 
responses suggesting a lack of interest in networking or socialising, 
 
Intervening in debates and talking  Im not good at that [] I dont do that. 
And I doubt whether I talked enough there, I doubt whether I strutted my stuff, 
such as it was, so I guess they didnt invite me back because I didnt contribute 
very much [] Im not very clubbable, I suppose, I wasnt much good from 
their point of view. (Interview 10) 
 
It wasnt a world I enjoyed and I didnt go out of my way to do it [] and 
since then, I havent sought it and they havent sought me out. (Interview 11) 
 
Once Id been there, quite frankly, I thought it wasnt what I thought it was 
going to be. I wouldnt be concerned if I was never invited again. Of course, 
theres a higher concentration of important, influential, people that there might 
otherwise be but Ive met these people in many other forums and events [] I 
personally didnt get much out of it but Im sure others did. Im not good at 
networking. (Interview 8) 
 
And for peripheral attendees brought into the group to provide expertise or facilitative 
support, the intensity of the experience and the challenge of dealing with self-
consciousness within such networks is more than sufficient to ensure that they are 
barely heard at such events. Thus reinforcing the perception that they are uninteresting 
and not worth inviting next time, 
 
I didnt really contribute to any of the panels. I could have done, it wasnt a 
decision, I just ended up not doing it. I made a decision which was that I was 
going to do everything I could there, that this is probably a once in a lifetime 
opportunity for me. It was very hard work, there was very little downtime, in 
fact, there was no downtime. Every meal was with people, and they went on 
quite late. There was one afternoon that was supposed to be free or you could 
go on this organised thing. Someone said that its a really nice thing to do so I 
thought Ill go and do it but, actually, I just wanted to lie down on my bed and 
 209
recover [] I didnt know a lot of these people and it was actually very hard for 
me because Im not part of their networks. I wasnt familiar with them.  
(Interview 2) 
 
I didnt participate in the discussions. Everybody was chatty and open or, at 
least, they gave you the impression of being chatty and open [...] but I was 
thinking, who the fuck do I talk to? Its slightly difficult to just sidle up to 
Kissinger at the bar. (Interview 1) 
I settled in my room with this excitement. I wore my best suit, put on my most 
stylish tie, and went down. My excitement intensified when I looked around 
me. I was surrounded by people who almost constantly made it in newspaper 
and television headlines [] I was dead-tired at the end of the three days. I got 
out of one meeting to go into the next. I needed to participate, ask questions, 
and watch attentively. Everyone took the meetings seriously. Nobody would 
leave the sessions to go outside, stroll around, and have coffee. (Interview 17) 
The expectation, therefore, that aspiring members of such networks should somehow 
impress at the outset is, perhaps, a little unrealistic for the vast number of first-time 
attendees. Leaving aside obvious difficulties, where English is a second language for 
instance, it is clear that such environments can be intimidating and unforgiving. And 
this sense of intimidation begins well before formal attendance, 
 Some woman came to see me, American, terribly flattering and said, we want 
to invite the four ablest people under thirty-five in Europe to come and speak to 
us. Would you do it? I felt flattered so I said yes. And then, about a week 
before, I looked them up and found out they were a really terrifying, 
prestigious, organisation. The previous speakers had been the President of 
Turkey and the Deputy PM of India. I completely panicked and spent the whole 
of the next week with friends trying to think of something to say. And, boy, was 
I relieved when it was over [] But I was interested in people so, when an 
intelligent Ivy League type woman working for the Council on Foreign 
Relations (CFR) came along, I, like a complete idiot, was flattered into saying 
Id do it. Ive always respected them but Ive never been back, never done 
anything and wasnt a member. (Interview 10) 
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 I was a bit freaked out. I was asked if Id heard of Bilderberg and I said, no. I 
thought Id heard of some slightly shady conspiracy theory stuff but that was 
really hazy. So, yes, I was a little freaked out. In fact, a friend of mine called 
who I hadnt spoken to for about three months and said, how are you doing? 
And I said, Im freaking out, Ive just been invited to Bilderberg. And he 
started laughing and said thats absolutely fantastic. (Interview 2) 
The consequences of these reputational effects are somewhat difficult to interpret with 
limited data but it seems fair to suggest that, aside from exciting and intimidating many 
prospective elite members, the desire to make a good impression, and be respected by 
the wider group, becomes, not unnaturally, an immediate concern for invitees. After all, 
full membership of such networks bestows access, connections, recognition, invitations 
and a sense of personal self aggrandisement. However modest or civic-minded the 
individual, and leaving aside various justifications for participation, there are few 
people of ambition in positions of influence that might, or would, resist the seductive 
quality of elite network participation.  
4.6.4 The seductive lure of elite membership 
Given the powerful appeal of elite networks to potential members, the critical question 
is what effect this lure has upon the cognitive predisposition of aspirant participants; or, 
more specifically, what calculations do prospective members make concerning how best 
to ingratiate themselves with existing members of the network? It was in this area, that 
participants were at their most defensive with most denying the possibility that such 
processes were at play; while others were clearly uncomfortable with the suggestion and 
its implications,  
One thing I want to state is that I have participated in Bilderberg a number of 
times. I am not a full member of Bilderberg. I would be happy to just cross out 
Bilderberg from this, basically, I just used Bilderberg as an example. Ive been 
to other forums as well. (Interview 6) 
Well, I dont want to go that deep into psychology. I think you just get 
accepted after two or three years because you are part of the group and each 
time so many are new. Actually it doesnt take a lot of time to become one of 
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the senior people there [] But I dont think you have toits not that a young 
man has to go through on their knees to be accepted; no, no, you are 
immediately part of the group. Im just saying before you really start, well, 
playing a certain role and youre part of the integration elements it probably 
takes some years, theres no doubt about that. (Interview 16) 
Nobody is going to change my way of thinking, my approach, my wishes. I 
learned lots of things. Maybe there are some effects of that but, for my part, I 
got lots of benefits. I learned lots of things, I met several people, and 
established good relations, its an opportunity. Its a golden opportunity. Mark, 
if you say that this is the Bilderberg meeting and there are some question marks 
in your mind, and you approach the meeting in this way, its quite different. But 
I didnt do that. (Interview 7) 
It is possible that this line of questioning was perceived as threatening on a number of 
levels: firstly, for those attempting to defend the activity of such groups, it was too close 
to suggesting an actual mechanism of control; secondly, it suggested a form of personal 
weakness, something that elite participants might find difficult to discuss or concede; 
and, thirdly, for those not entirely comfortable with their position within the network, it 
represented a line of enquiry that might elicit criticism of such groups. Whatever the 
reason, it was clear that interview participants were defensive in this area which, in 
itself, might suggest that there is some degree of truth to the suggestion that individuals 
are, indeed, attempting to ingratiate themselves with those they perceive to be 
established within such networks. And while none of the interview participants in this 
study admitted to consciously modifying their views in order to curry favour with 
influential elite members, an unconscious adjustment, in line with what one might 
consider to be the common sense of more respected members of the group, is an 
almost certain consequence of elite fraternisation. And this, despite the fact that core 
members of elite networks emphasise free-thinking and independence as key attributes 
of successful membership.  
As if to support the view that participants were aligning their views with those of 
influence within the network, there was considerable evidence of hierarchal awareness 
 212
in the participant interviews, something that, not unnaturally, might lead to a degree of 
self-consciousness and reverence in discussions with such people,  
 You look at them and you get to understand it. Whos there?  Whos a regular 
and whos there for just a year? Theres no problem with that. (Interview 5)  
 Well, I mean, every time a group like this convenes, you look around the room 
and, for a given time in the world, you can almost say, out of these hundred 
people, these ten guys are important to me.  (Interview 6) 
Is there a hierarchy? Yes, Im at the bottom of it. (Interview 1) 
I got to talk to people I wouldnt have access to normally [] or rarely at 
least. A guy said to me, I wouldnt talk to you normally. As I say, it was quite 
difficult for me because everyone was of a quite high status. Its difficult to go 
up to people and say, what do you do? And when they say, Im the Queen of 
the Netherlands, it can be pretty hard work. (Interview 2) 
I do remember the number of recently retired Prime Ministers and Presidents 
seriously impressed me and also made me feel quite shy. Lloyd Bentsen, for 
instance, who had been US Treasury Secretary, and I remember thinking, shit, 
this man in the cowboy boots is the US Treasury Secretary.  (Interview 10)  
As stated previously, however, participants were reluctant to admit to modifying their 
views but, at the same time, they were happy to discuss the significance of learning and 
information within such settings. Perhaps the implication that they might have been 
swayed by the personality or stature of those doing the communicating was just too 
personally difficult to concede. 
4.6.5 Summary of theme five 
The idea that elite forums and networks are, in some way, permeable clubs of elite free 
thinking simply does not stand up to close scrutiny. No matter what the intention, elite 
discourse is structurally biased at source and, consciously or otherwise, has the effect of 
amplifying its biases. 
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There are a variety of ways in which voluntary and unconscious forms of compliance 
within the participant group are brought about. Some of these occur out of necessity, for 
instance, the desire to create private spaces for reflection and interaction among elites 
creates a sense of detachment and exclusivity, and for those entering the network, 
breathing such air is both intoxicating and addictive. Other factors are related to a 
very human desire to be accepted and welcomed into social networks that one perceives 
to be of importance. Dealing with personal insecurities, which are no doubt heightened 
by self-consciousness and a desire to impress with such environments, undoubtedly has 
a bearing on the predisposition of new entrants to certain personalities and types of 
thinking. It goes without saying, of course, for reasons already outlined earlier in the 
analysis (see 4.5.2 The mobilisation of bias within elite interactions) that many invitees 
are predisposed at the outset. Uncoupling the effects of these various mechanisms of 
compliance is both impossible and unnecessary; it is sufficient, for the purposes of this 
exercise, to simply demonstrate the existence of such complimentary determinants.  
It is important to state, once more, that such predisposition is not necessarily achieved 
through any form of conscious intent; instead, it is more likely the product of a complex 
set of processes that unconsciously lead to adapted preferences and beliefs, beliefs that 
are unquestioningly associated with common sense and enlightened thinking. 
Establishing oneself when invited into such circles becomes an important concern for 
aspiring participants for, to do so, becomes a reflection of ones own worthiness and 
enlightenedness. Being rejected, no matter how seemingly unconcerned the individual, 
is a deep personal slight implying unworthiness within such settings. The cold, hard, 
nature of such rejection is, of course, presented as a desire for dynamism and fresh-
thinking but, ultimately, it is a reflection of the collectives belief that the entrant will 
not fit in or add value. The frequent characterisation of such people as dull is, in many 
ways, the ultimate elitist dismissal.  
 
Elite networks and forums do not necessarily set out to create private clubs of tightly-
knit individuals; indeed, many of the most elite organisations would say that this is 
precisely what they do not try to do. The fact remains, however, that, consciously or 
otherwise, private clubs of core members do form over time and this inner-core 
formation has consequences for group functioning and thinking. In fairness, it is 
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difficult to know what more such groups could do to facilitate a sense of inclusiveness 
for new entrants or aspiring members but, at the same time, it is important to recognise 
the failure all the same.  
 
4.7 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has presented the findings of an analysis of transcripts of interviews with 
sixteen, post-Cold War, Bilderberg attendees. The accounts of these transnational elite 
participants suggest a number of tentative conclusions. 
 
While traditional economic and security alliances remain important in international 
relations, legitimacy building has emerged as a fundamental activity in the 
contemporary political setting. Elite consensus formation activity, although largely 
unconscious, is a contested process governing the pervasiveness, and hence legitimacy, 
of certain paradigms. A comprehension of discrete power relations is, therefore, crucial 
to our understanding of preference formation within such settings. 
 
The rationale for collaboration between transnational elites is so readily accepted by 
participants that to question such logic is seen as incomprehensible. A curious aspect of 
such collaboration is that it exists primarily between business and political elites; non-
business and non-political elites are, very much, the minority within transnational elite 
networks and it is highly questionable whether such participants enjoy equal standing. 
Similarly, representatives of policy institutes, think tanks and the media are at a 
significant disadvantage within such networks because of a dependence upon the 
patronage and goodwill of both the business and political elite. 
 
Transnational networks, despite considerable boundary spanning activity, are some way 
from being truly global. There are, however, increasing linkages taking place between 
regional and national networks. Not all elite members are interested in network or group 
participation, indeed, not all feel that they like it or are suited to it. That being said, 
there are clearly significant advantages to such membership and personal interest is as 
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critical to an understanding of elite interaction and network activity as any sense of civic 
mindedness.  
 
The number of people involved in transnational policy forums and networks is limited 
and considerable interlocking between groups exists. An old boy network, for want of 
a better description, appears to play a significant role in the organisation and 
membership of certain networks. This inner group is disproportionately powerful within 
the whole and has, consciously or otherwise, a considerable influence on more aspirant 
members of the elite. Transnational elite organisations are highly institutionalised 
arrangements and successful entrants are those who can skilfully navigate the 
requirements of group membership in such settings. 
 
The notion of consensus formation is overly simplistic and misleading as a description 
of actual processes. Rather than being seen as the purpose and outcome such activity, it 
should be applied as a description of the momentum and consequence of elite 
interactions. It is unclear what the stimulus for such activity is but it is suggested that 
economic interest, civic mindedness and self interest all play a significant role.  
 
Transnational elite discourse is structurally biased at source and, through the conscious 
and unconscious activities of its members, has the effect of amplifying its biases. 
Establishing oneself within such networks is an important concern for many aspirant 
elite members and to be rejected is a considerable personal slight. Processes of 
communication, socialisation, acculturation and fraternisation play a sizable role in the 
perpetuation of group logic and the pervasiveness of certain consensuses. Much of this 
effect is unconscious and not consistent with the stated intentions of the groups 
concerned; it is, nevertheless, critical to any understanding of consensus formation 
within elite groups and networks in the transnational arena.  
 
The findings of the research will be explored further, and situated within the literature, 
in the following discussion chapter.  
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5.0 DISCUSSION 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter explores the findings of the research and situates them within the context 
of a multi-disciplinary literature domain. Its objective is to draw out the meanings and 
relationships that exist within, and between, the findings presented in the previous 
chapter. It will consider how such findings fit within the existing body of knowledge 
and, specifically, whether they are consistent with, or represent a challenge to, current 
conceptions of such activity. Crucially, it will reflect on how the findings of the research 
address the pivotal research question (see 2.6.1 Research opportunity), namely, 
 
How have discrete power relations shaped transnational elite thinking 
related to political problems and acceptable public policy responses in the 
post-Cold War period? 
  
In order to answer this question it is important to consider how accurate, coherent and 
meaningful the notion of a transnational policy elite actually is; and, furthermore, 
whether consensus formation is a useful description of the purpose of elite interactions 
in the transnational setting. This requires special consideration of the nature of elite 
interactions and collaboration, the purposeful extent of such activity, and how processes 
of communication, socialisation, acculturation and fraternisation contribute to shared 
understanding within such networks.  
 
The chapter addresses these questions through discussion of five interrelated themes 
(see 5.2 Situating the findings within the current body of knowledge) and draws upon 
the contributions of chapters 2 & 3, as well as supportive literature from the fields of 
international relations and social network theory, to enable a thorough exploration and 
understanding of elite interactions in the transnational arena. It then considers the 
relationship between the themes and presents a dynamic conceptual model of structure 
and agency, and articulation and interpretation, in transnational pre-policy formation 
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processes. The chapter concludes with a consideration of how such results address and 
the pivotal research question.  
 
5.2 Situating the findings within the current body of knowledge 
 
In order to provide a framework for consideration of how the findings inform, and are 
informed by, the current body of literature, this section is divided into five interrelated 
categories: legitimacy and action in international relations; the politics of collaboration 
in elite transnational networks; centrality in transnational networks; consensus, power 
and identity; and the dynamics of third dimensional power in the transnational setting. 
 
5.2.1 Legitimacy and action in international relations 
 
A crucial question related to transnational elite interactions, in particular, informal 
networked interactions, concerns where such activity fits within the context of a much 
broader conception of international relations at the end of the twentieth century and the 
beginning of the twenty-first. A clue, perhaps, exists in the emergence of legitimacy as a 
key topic within the field of international relations; indeed, it is very much, an idea 
whose time has come (Clark, 2005). The findings highlight the significance of 
transnational forums for the legitimisation of values, perspectives and identities within a 
structural context that is highly uncertain and dynamic. This is consistent with 
constructivist depictions of international relations in which 
 
 the structures of human association are determined primarily by shared ideas 
rather than material forces and [where] the ideas and interests of purposive 
actors are constructed by these shared ideas rather than given by nature. 
(Wendt, 1999:1) 
 
Within the international and transnational settings, legitimacy is critical to the notion of 
shared values and structural context; indeed, within these spheres, the establishment of 
socially constructed reality (Berger & Luckman, 1966) might best be seen as a product 
of a contest for legitimacy. It is important, therefore, to recognise that legitimacy cannot 
be viewed simply in terms of normative prescriptions such as legality and morality; 
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instead, it is a complex, and inherently more political, condition (Barker, 2001; Clark, 
2005). As a consequence, if we are to understand the actions of elite participants within 
the field of international relations, we must first understand their conceptions of the 
legitimate. In the words of Ian Hurd (2007:2-3), 
 
the power of legitimacy to define actors goals and interests, as well as 
construct what actors take for granted, means that observers of the international 
field need some way to monitor and decipher actors senses of the legitimate 
and illegitimate. To read international relations without paying attention to the 
competition over legitimacy would leave one with no way to understand such 
common acts of saving face, offering justifications, using symbols, and being in 
a position of authority. 
 
The findings of this study lend additional weight to the suggestion that increased 
complexity in international relations, in the contemporary setting, has led to a much 
greater emphasis on legitimacy as a basis for action (Shinoda, 2000). And, while much 
of the focus of international relations research has been on formal institutions in the 
international arena, this study suggests that contests over legitimacy are very much a 
feature of interactions within the wider transnational policy community. Furthermore, 
such activity is seen as underpinning the formation and adaptation of dynamic cognitive 
frameworks, or structured realities, within such arenas.  
 
The study also finds that transnational elite interactions take on additional significance 
when the formal instruments and mechanisms of international relations fail or reach an 
impasse. In the case of Bilderberg for instance, it is telling that waning interest in such 
activity, in the years immediately following the fall of the Berlin Wall, was replaced 
with considerable enthusiasm in the years preceding and during the occupation of Iraq. 
It is clear that the capacity for private dialogue within such settings provides an 
important forum for the creation of shared understanding between, otherwise, 
irreconcilable actors, or, at the very least, provides an effective mechanism for the 
mobilisation of legitimacy behind one paradigm rather than another. The findings 
suggest that, aside from the transcendental quality of market-based motivations, this 
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capacity is made possible through the absence of any immediate need to placate 
constituents or stakeholders.  
 
What the findings also make clear is that traditional alliances are, by no means, 
irrelevant to consideration of transnational elite interactions; indeed, they remain critical 
to an understanding of prevailing paradigms within such contexts. This finding 
challenges those who see such relationships as increasingly irrelevant to the demands of 
contemporary world politics (see, for instance, Menon, 2007). Certainly within the 
context of the European transnational elite, transatlantic alliances, initially based on 
security and development, have broadened into mutual economic relationships fuelled 
by a shared appreciation of the neo-liberal globalisation agenda. There are 
disagreements over the application of this agenda, and considerable fractures in the area 
of social policy, but transatlantic partners share a mutually advantageous vision of free 
trade and free markets. This vision is peculiarly transatlantic and we remain some way 
from what might be described as a, truly global, transnational policy elite. This finding 
lends support to Kees Van der Pijls (1985) depiction of an Atlantic ruling class and, at 
the same time, suggests that the portrayal of a global capitalist communications 
infrastructure (see, for instance, Carroll & Carson, 2003) is, at best, premature. A 
primary focus on the quantitative significance of interlocking, rather than the qualitative 
substance of elite networked interactions, has led to an overstatement of such cases. The 
findings of this study go some way to redressing this imbalance.  
 
5.2.2 The politics of collaboration in elite transnational networks 
 
This study finds that the logic of collaboration is a pervasive feature of elite 
transnational networks; indeed, such logic is so cognitively embedded that to question it 
is to challenge a fundamental precept of elite rationality within the transnational arena. 
While there is a pragmatic basis to this rationality, based upon a general belief in the 
benefits of inclusion, it is clear that the legitimacy claims of collaboration have been 
overstated. Consistent with the observation that literature in the collaboration domain is 
more concerned with process outcomes than governance outcomes (Ansell & Gash, 
2008), the findings of this study demonstrate how a belief in the superiority of 
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collaborative and consensual processes among transnational elite participants underpins 
a much wider, and intrinsically suspect, claim to governance legitimacy. They point to 
the existence of an implicit political relationship between a belief in the legitimacy of 
collaboration in the transnational setting and the emergence of legitimacy as a basis for 
action in international affairs. In other words, since consensual and collaborative 
approaches are normatively imbued with legitimacy, the product of collaboration is, by 
definition, imbued with the same characteristic legitimacy. And it is this resulting sense 
of the legitimate that defines membership and action in the international arena.  
 
The implications of this relationship for those seeking to understand democratic 
legitimacy beyond the nation state are neatly captured by Schneider (2005:8), 
 
 consensus and legitimacy are mutually constitutive, only consensus on the 
core principles of legitimacy in a world or global society, that includes state as 
well as non-state actors, will determine this society as democratic or not. 
 
Critically, however, such an understanding is absent any consideration of the socio-
political determinants of collaboration, consensus and, ultimately, legitimacy itself. An 
understanding of power relations within such settings is critical, therefore, to an 
understanding of rightful membership and conduct if we are to, 
 
understand why, and under what circumstances, democratic procedures matter 
in international politics as a source of legitimacy; and why certain actors, such 
as transnational  especially economic  actors or individuals are, together with 
states, accepted as legitimate participants in decision making. (Schneider, 
2005:11) 
 
The findings of this study suggest that concerns about the nature and substance of 
collaboration are suppressed by an overwhelming acceptance of the logic that underpins 
it. In other words, the notion of collaboration has achieved a transcendental legitimacy 
within the social context of elite interactions, a legitimacy that influences the wider 
values and beliefs of participants within such settings. It is interesting to note, for 
instance, that for elite participants, such collaboration is universally held to be in the 
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public interest; concerns related to democratic accountability and authority are 
subsumed within a collective inclination to view transnational collaboration and 
consensus as essential to the development of a more equitable global governance 
regime. And the suggestion that transnational collaboration is representative of various 
societal interests adds further weight to the idea that such activity is, in some way, 
legitimate. As this study demonstrates, however, multi-stakeholder collaboration is an 
illusion within informal transnational contexts, even where a variety of stakeholders are 
represented, the socio-political dimensions of such interaction are largely overlooked in 
participant accounts. Importantly, this finding may have implications for consideration 
of NGO and civil society influence in formal transnational policy processes where 
questions of legitimacy and influence are frequently levelled at such activity. Rather 
than considering the question of legitimacy in terms of state and non-state power, or 
representation of interests, it is as important, instead, to recognise the significance of 
enduring and fair institutions to questions of legitimacy in transnational affairs 
(Collingwood, 2006:441). 
 
This research finds that the principal collaboration within informal transnational elite 
networks is between business and political elites. The complex interweaving of business 
and political interests in polyarchal systems of governance has been noted for some time 
(Lindblom, 1977; Dahl, 1989) but contributions in the field of international political 
economy have demonstrated how the advance of globalisation has brought with it a 
considerable pressure to rethink the nature of the relationship between market and state 
in the domestic and international settings. Indeed, it is clear that the politics of market 
organisation is a fundamental starting point for public policy consideration in the 
international arena. It represents, to all intents and purposes, the infrastructure of the 
infrastructure (Cerny, 1994) and results in a peculiar, market driven, form of politics 
(Leys, 2003). The evidence of this study, however, suggests a more nuanced depiction 
of market determination than that suggested by many in the fields of political economy 
and global systems theory.  
 
Clearly market interests are of critical importance to policymakers, but the response of 
international policy elites to a perceived civil society backlash, in the wake of the Rio 
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Earth Summit of 1992 (Hirschland, 2006), has meant that the management of legitimacy 
has become as critical to business leaders as it has always been for policymakers. 
Understanding the various dimensions of consensual legitimacy in the transnational 
setting and, indeed, participating in the social construction of the legitimate within such 
contexts, enables business to play a fundamental role in the fashioning of soft 
governance regimes that will, in time, frame downstream debates related to the social 
legitimacy of business within given contexts. The question of whether this amounts to a 
strategic objective for those who participate in such activity, or whether it is an 
unconscious bi-product of structural collaborative arrangements is unclear; what is 
clear, however, is that business enjoys premium partner status within such consensual 
collaborations. This status has, undoubtedly, been enhanced in the post-Cold War period 
as a corporate bias to the management of international organisations has had far 
reaching consequences related to the relationship between state and non-state 
organisation within such settings, 
 
the recent practice of certain international organisations [particularly those 
involved in economic or market-related and technical functions] of engaging in 
direct consultations with various stakeholder groups is the most recent form 
of organisational activity based on corporate analogies. [It is] undermining the 
assumption that individuals have no direct access to, or role in, international or 
transnational governance [] it establishes a direct and more formalised 
relationship between the organisation and its stakeholders, thus bringing the 
organisation closer to the people and enhancing the perceived legitimacy of its 
decision making. (Heiskanen, 2001:10) 
 
This study challenges those who point to multi-stakeholder collaboration in the 
international arena as evidence of a form of direct, and more democratic, representation. 
Such a view significantly underestimates the differences in influence enjoyed by various 
parties. As Heiskanen observes (2001:12), we are witnessing the emergence of a 
corporate democracy in international and transnational governance, where  
 
 the international organisations request to participate in the consultative 
process is not addressed to the people, nor to the collectivity of universal 
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citizens, but rather to those that are likely for professional rather than for 
ideological or personal reasons, to be interested in the subject or issue covered 
by the process  in other words, the stakeholders. 
 
Such a depiction, however, continues to emphasise some form of inclusiveness but the 
findings of this study question the popular suggestion that the number, role and 
influence of NGOs in transnational policy affairs is as meaningful as it might first 
appear (Collingwood, 2006). Their presence in informal elite forums such as Bilderberg, 
The Council on Foreign Relations and the Trilateral Commission is much more 
peripheral than the depiction of NGO activity in formal international policy arenas. 
And, while it is true that senior representatives of civil society groups do attend such 
gatherings, they are usually present in the capacity of invitee rather than as a regular 
attendee or member. This raises some interesting questions about the differences that 
exist between various types of policy discourse that take place in the transnational arena 
and the findings of this study suggest that caution should be applied to generalisations 
concerning NGO influence in transnational policy affairs. Any such depiction needs to 
include consideration of the informal collaboration between transnational policy elites 
as well as formal consultation processes in international policy settings. The 
representation and cooptation of multi-stakeholder interests in formal international 
policy forums has become a prerequisite of legitimacy; it would appear that the same 
consideration is not entirely true of informal policy communities.  
 
In contrast to the limited presence of NGOs, the cooptation of media interests and the 
presence of elite representatives from notable think tanks, policy institutes and academic 
communities are interesting inclusions within informal elite policy circles. The findings 
of the study suggest significant resource dependency on the part of media and research 
participants and a considerable role in the legitimisation of elite thinking. Think tanks, 
policy institutes and academics all play a role in the definition, support and challenging 
of existing, and emergent, paradigms but, it is important to note that, such input is one 
aspect of a wider contest for legitimacy within such environments. To view such 
contributions as value neutral represents a gross misreading of socio-political conditions 
within such settings. Likewise, the suggestion that the media is invited because of its 
ability to reflect public opinion, rather than shape it, is a curious cognitive reversal of 
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the role played by the media in influencing public opinion and, consequently, the policy 
agenda (Dearing & Rogers, 1996).  The findings suggest that the cooptation of media 
interests into elite policy forums in the transnational setting provides a valuable 
mechanism for the dissemination and diffusion of elite perspectives related to global 
issues. The meaningful effects of such dissemination and diffusion are unclear, and far 
from absolute, but it is suggested that it represents a significant element within the 
structural milieu of formal policy processes at the nation state level. In this sense, the 
findings support the view that media interests are biased by resource dependency and 
serve the needs of a policy elite (Gandy, 1982; Herman & Chomsky, 2002): a policy 
elite that is less concerned with the detail of public policy than the broad brush 
direction of it.  
 
5.2.3 Centrality in transnational networks 
 
As stated previously, the findings of this study suggest that we are some way from a 
truly global, transnational policy community. Instead, a more accurate depiction of the 
transnational policy network is that of an interconnected, and at times disparate, 
community of business and political elites that are primarily active at the national and 
regional levels. The findings suggest, however, an increasing degree of boundary 
spanning activity between such networks  most often at the level of the individual. The 
objective of building bridges between networks does appear, all the same, to be part of a 
more general strategy among elite leaders to create greater homogeneity among the 
wider transnational policy elite. It is suggested that a whole raft of globalising forces, 
including, of course, improved communications, are creating the preconditions and 
momentum that are necessary for the emergence of a meaningful global policy network.  
 
While the implications of these developments for an understanding of international 
relations and pre-policy processes are potentially profound, it is important to also situate 
the findings within a broad based literature related to network perspectives in 
organisational theory. Since network organisation has emerged, during the course of this 
study, as central to an understanding of elite interactions in the transnational setting, it is 
essential to address the question of how such contributions have informed the findings. 
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Not least because of the way that power is located within such analyses. Summarising 
the significance of network contributions to our understanding of power, Nohria 
(1992:9) observes that, 
 
Explanations for what gives an individual power in an organisation have 
usually focussed, among other things, on the individuals personal 
characteristics; socio-economic profile; formal position within the organisation; 
attitudes and values; control over critical resources; and control over critical 
contingencies [] However, it has always been recognised that these factors 
are not sufficient from an explanatory standpoint, and that an individuals 
position in various networks of relationships can be a source of power quite 
independent of other factors.  
 
The importance of recognising interactions between actors rather than simply 
considering the attributes of actors has emerged as a key theme in contemporary social 
network theory (Freeman, 2004). Of particular relevance to this study, given the 
suggestion that an inner core within elite networks holds disproportionate levels of 
power and influence, are those contributions related to centrality and leadership within 
networks. A common finding, for instance, in social network analysis is that power and 
influence are commonly correlated with positions of centrality within networks (Brass 
& Burkhardt, 1992) as is, unsurprisingly, leadership (Neubert & Taggar, 2004; Balkundi 
& Kilduff, 2006).  
 
Cook, Emerson et al (1983) were among the first to challenge the more superficial 
aspects of this observation with evidence to suggest that centrality was not the most 
important power determinant in exchange relationships. This spawned a considerable 
amount of debate on the subject and has led, in turn, to more sophisticated 
understanding and measurement of centrality. Drawing upon this earlier work of Cook, 
Emerson et al (1983), for instance, Bonacich (1987) suggests that ones centrality is not 
simply a product of volume of connections; instead, it is a function of the centrality of 
those one is connected to. For Bonacich (1987), the status of ones connections 
determines ones own status and centrality within social networks. In essence, ones 
influence is determined by the status or value of ones connections. This is a theme that 
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has found significant purchase in a number of related fields  and notably that of social 
capital.  And Bonacichs (1987) simple idea holds considerable appeal for consideration 
of connections and centrality within elite networks. Certainly, the findings of this study 
support the contention that a desire for increased status is, very much, at the heart of the 
lure of elite membership. The pursuit of status, and consequential centrality within the 
network might, therefore, be viewed as a desire for power, value and influence within, 
and beyond, such settings.  
 
Similarly, when considering the differences in status and power between central and 
peripheral members of elite networks, the notion of reputational influence must be 
addressed. The centrality of an actor within a network is strongly influenced by the 
perception of reputational influence attributed to him by peers within the system; such a 
reputation reflects a belief in the latent ability of an actor to affect outcomes (Knocke, 
1983). This contention was supported by studies of community power in the 1970s 
which revealed that members and organisations with greater reputational influence 
enjoyed stronger positions of centrality within local social exchange networks 
(Laumann & Pappi, 1976; Galaskiewicz, 1979; Knoke & Wood, 1981). Laumann & 
Pappis (1976) quantitative findings of elite social structure in Altneustadt is of 
particular relevance to the findings of this research, and, most especially, their 
observation that spatially central members of elite networks tended to perform 
integrative and coordinative functions while peripheral members perform a less 
important integrative role. They found that the central positions of the elite network 
were occupied by the most senior members of the business, political and financial 
communities who were occupied in matters of general problem solving. While 
peripheral members, including small business, religious, education and research 
representatives, held more specialised knowledge and were poorly connected with the 
centre and with each other.  
 
The findings of this research present a similar picture to that depicted by Laumann & 
Pappi (1976). There is a well integrated business and political elite at the centre of the 
transnational elite network. Peripheral members do not enjoy equal status with the most 
senior members of the elite and are not as well integrated within the group as a whole. 
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This lack of integration reinforces peripheral status and suggests at an ancillary role for 
such members. New entrants to the network are expected to impress and it is 
suggested that it is the well integrated, inner-core, members who collectively make 
judgments concerning individual worth. As interviewee 16 observed, the process of 
acceptance and integration can take two-three years, if it is to happen at all; thereafter, 
the entrant emerges as a fully actualised member of the network recognised by 
peripheral members as having some degree of status (centrality) within the group.   
 
Central to an understanding of how and why certain entrants to such groups and 
networks, and not others, are assimilated into the fold are considerations of personal 
liking, trust and cognitive accuracy. Personal liking has emerged as a considerable topic 
within the field of social psychology and has significant implications for social network 
analysis because, ultimately, the extent of ones personal liking determines the 
motivation to create and maintain relationships and move towards more meaningful 
personal communication (Altman & Taylor, 1973). Furthermore, the incorporation of 
liking into considerations of social interaction provides greater explanatory value than 
approaches based upon purely cognitive or economic exchange principles (Abelson, 
Kinder et al, 1982). The creation of emotional attachment, and an understanding of the 
global affective attachment one person has for another (Nicholson & Compeau, 
2001:5) is, therefore, important to any consideration of acceptance into elite forums. 
Likewise trust, the confidence that parties to an exchange relationship have in one 
another (Bateson, 1988), is a cornerstone of cooperation within such settings. Indeed, 
trust is seen as an essential pre-requisite to elite membership. If a transnational elite 
member loses the confidence of those within the network, contingent upon his resource 
advantages, it is unlikely that he will be welcomed into such forums again. A crucial 
aspect, however, of elite assimilation relates to what Krackhardt (1990) describes 
cognitive accuracy within network settings. In short, those with the political skills to 
understand power relations within the network are more likely to accrue power and 
influence within the informal organisation, 
 
 knowing who the central and powerful actors are in an organisation is essential 
political knowledge [] knowing where the coalitions are, how large they are, 
and where their support comes from gives one an edge in anticipating resistance 
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and in mobilising support for action or change. An accurate assessment of the 
network can also reveal the weaknesses in political groups by exposing holes, 
groups, and locations of lack of support for any particular coalition [] 
cognitive accuracy of the informal network is, in an of itself, a base of power. 
(Krackhardt, 1990:343) 
 
Since elite networks are essentially social environments, it is unsurprising that the 
findings of this study should reflect the findings of many studies concerned with 
personal network interaction. It is possible, however, given the emphasis placed upon 
personal relationships and trust within elite contexts, that these factors are even more 
critical. Elite networks are particularly unforgiving and, since ones credentials are 
already known in advance, the only reason for rejection can be on personal or social 
grounds. It is for this reason that the findings of the study emphasise issues of social 
acceptance and the importance of having the cognitive and political skills to navigate 
the requirements of elite membership. Even so, assimilation takes time and acquiring a 
central position within such networks requires a degree of displacement.  
 
The reluctance of influential members of elite networks to relinquish positions of status 
means that inner elite groups develop a club-like aura and, over time, come to resemble 
something of an old boy network. A danger, of course, is that ties between such 
members become so strong that they prevent or distort effective communication with 
extended members of the elite network. Indeed, there is evidence of, at least in terms of 
group organisation, a significant resistance to the idea of change. That being said, the 
strength of extensive weak ties enjoyed by inner-elite members ensures the capacity, at 
the very least, for effective communication and dissemination throughout such networks 
(Granovetter, 1973). And it is this capacity for leveraging and coordinating weak ties 
that ensures an inherently personal dimension to elite network activity, a dimension that 
transcends the idea of group identity and purpose.  
 
5.2.4 Consensus, power and identity 
 
The process of consensus formation outlined in this study is fundamentally different 
from that depicted in constructivist depictions of issue definition and framing in formal 
 230
policy design processes (Blumer, 1971; Stone, 1989b; Entman, 1993). A crucial 
distinction is that there is no obvious requirement for any form of consensus to be 
reached in transnational policy circles and, even if there were, the effects of any 
resulting consensus would be very difficult to interpret.  
 
Consensus formation activity within the context of more formal policy processes is 
essentially related to the management of political issues and challenges; responding 
with a degree of immediacy is critical to demonstrating political control in times of 
uncertainty. Consensus emerges not only because it is important to define the nature of 
the problem but, out of political expediency, it is critical to agree policy oriented goals 
related to it. In this sense, consensus formation within formal policy processes is 
primarily about reaching accords and binding understandings in order that the formal 
processes of policy formation can take place. It is underpinned by a pluralist or soft-
statist conception of the role of policymakers, namely, that they assume either an 
arbitrative role or, alternatively, the role of a stakeholder within the ensuing 
collaborative framework. Importantly, the output of such consensus formation activity, 
the bartered accords or shared understandings that are reached, forms the basis of 
discourse parameters within the subsequent policy design process. In other words, and 
employing the heuristic device of a politics/administration dichotomy (Wilson, 1941), 
consensus formation is a broad political process that precedes the more defined 
administrative function of policy design. In reality, of course, there is no such 
distinction to be made between politics and administration; the process is not only 
seamless, but continuously political. Indeed, consensus formation remains a legitimising 
political activity, normatively imbued with the values of inclusiveness and 
representation, in many areas of the policy design process. Its purpose is reasonably 
well understood, even when it is perceived as a device for cooptation, as a mechanism 
for manufacturing legitimised constructs that allow the process to advance.  
 
As this study demonstrates, however, the pretext for consensus formation activity 
among transnational elites is less clear. Indeed, elite participants do not consider their 
participation in terms of consensus formation at all; instead, it is viewed as a bi-product 
rather than an objective of such interactions. And, even then, consensus is too strong a 
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description of the vague understandings, and often inconclusive dialogue, which 
characterise the outcomes of such interactions. In short, therefore, consensus formation 
is a misleading description of the process but one that is recognised by elites as broadly 
capturing the nature of narrowed differences that frequently result as a consequence of 
interactions of this kind.  
 
It is tempting, therefore, to view consensus formation as an accidental and natural 
consequence of elite personal interactions. In a sense, a product of becoming, rather 
than the product of power determinants within such arenas, but the findings of this study 
suggest that such a conclusion is onerous. This study finds considerable evidence of the 
discrete dynamics of power that subtly drive shared understandings between elite 
participants in the transnational setting. In so doing, it fundamentally calls into question 
Hindesss (2006) suggestion that Lukess (1974) third dimensional power is 
inappropriate to certain configurations of contemporary government, including informal 
networks, because they cannot be reduced to competitive factions and interests. If any 
configuration of informal network is likely to conform to Hindesss pre-interest model, 
it is surely that of the transnational elite. Functioning outside of the parameters of the 
formal state, and comprised, in private capacity, of the most influential of elite 
members, it is, indeed, difficult to understand such activity in terms of factional 
interests, competition, winners and losers. But to view interests within such contexts as 
the product rather than the stimulus for such activity overlooks the crucial driver of 
networked activity in the first place: namely, the recognition that interests, personal and 
collective, can be enhanced through such activity. Networks of this kind are not 
immaculately conceived; they are the product of design. And the dynamics of power 
within such settings are of critical importance to an understanding of identity and 
interests within such settings.  
 
In a recent paper, Adamson (2006:10) notes that, 
 
the emergence of collective identities and constituencies that are non-territorial 
in nature, but that can still be viewed as exerting corporate agency  as 
exhibiting the qualities of a collective actor  in international politics, has been 
an important feature of world politics over time [] Thus, a focus on processes 
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of transnational mobilisation by political entrepreneurs can help to shed light on 
the process by which new actors in international politics are constituted. During 
the process of transnational mobilisation, political ideologies are deployed as a 
means of uniting disparate networks and identities into a coherent corporate 
agent at the level of the international system.  
 
Adamsons (2006) analysis presents a highly instrumental depiction of political 
entrepreneurship in, otherwise, passive transnational communities and, rather narrowly, 
conceives of coherent corporate agents as formally recognisable representatives, bodies 
or institutions. The evidence of this study suggests that such agents are only loosely 
affiliated and far from coherent. Even if we accept the premise of identity formation as a 
product of networked interactions, 
   
 we have been led by our [social] theories often to underestimate the struggle 
involved in forging identities, the tension inherent in the fact that we all have 
multiple, incomplete and/or fragmented identities [and sometimes resistances], 
the politics implied by the differential public standing of various identities or 
identity claims, and the possibilities for our salient constructions of identities to 
change in the context of powerfully meaningful, emotionally significant 
events. (Calhoun, 1994:24) 
 
This study suggests that transnational elite participants are fiercely resistant to the idea 
that their interests, or identities, might have altered or adapted as a consequence of 
interactions within such settings. While they are, for the most part, prepared to accept 
the suggestion of influence from exposure to new information and compelling 
arguments, participants view this form of persuasion as dissociated from any notion of 
power. The findings of this study suggest that the reason for this is that the dynamics of 
such power within transnational elite settings are so discrete that those subject to them 
are largely unaware of their influence. As such, elite participants have a peculiarly 
uncontaminated sense of their own self-identity and adapt their preferences in 
accordance with influences they consider to be of their own making.  
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5.2.5 The dynamics of third dimensional power in the transnational setting 
 
It was stated in section 2.5.4.1 Recent debate and revisions of third dimensional power, 
that a key challenge in utilising the third dimensional power approach was to reliably 
identify interests and factional roles within the transnational elite network. Aside from 
the obvious identification of elite participants by various measures of status, it has been 
relatively straightforward to identify interests ranging from the national and regional to 
those based upon political, financial, commercial, media, academic, policy institute or 
NGO orientation. Perhaps the most significant distinction, however, identified by this 
study is that which exists between those with centrality, those that aspire to centrality, 
and those that will only ever exist at the periphery of the network. Notwithstanding the 
fact that centrality within elite transnational networks is largely dependent upon 
determinants of status, reputation and recognition within such settings, it is in the 
hierarchy of influence related to central network proximity that we can gain a better 
understanding of the influence of discrete social mechanisms of third dimensional 
power.  
 
The lure of elite membership is, indeed, seductive. With very few exceptions, members 
of national and regional elites feel themselves compelled to participate in transnational 
networks when invited.  To be invited is both flattering and humbling. On the one hand, 
an invitation is an acknowledgment or affirmation of ones standing, on the other, it 
represents entry into a higher level of elite interaction in which the participant is most 
likely at an initial personal disadvantage. Aspiring members of transnational elite 
networks are acutely aware of the hierarchical implications of membership and, for 
many, the initial experience of interacting in such settings can be somewhat daunting. It 
is interesting to note, all the same, that the elevated status of ones connections has an 
immediate potential bearing upon the participants wider standing and centrality in the 
elite social network (see Bonacich, 1987). This provides an important potential insight 
into the appeal of transnational elite membership and, significantly, its capacity to 
induce compliance among aspiring members of the network.  
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Seen in this way, the complex social arrangements that induce compliance are not 
simply structural or accidental, although they can be, they are implicitly connected with 
the powerful (Lukes, 2006). This capacity is reinforced by the unwritten norms, rules 
and rituals of membership. Whether by accident or design, aspiring members feel 
themselves to be very much tested in such environments, and, it is clear, that a large 
number of network entrants fail this examination. This failure is presented by elite 
groups as evidence of dynamism, and a reluctance to become staid, but a curious aspect 
of such dynamism is that it only occurs at the periphery of the network. The inner core 
of the transnational elite network is both secure and undeniably elitist, and, knowingly 
or otherwise, perpetuates elitist myths, symbols, norms and rituals within such 
environments. Of course, this may be part of the appeal for many entrants to such 
networks: a desire to ingratiate oneself with members of an exclusive, transnational, 
inner core and, moreover, a desire to become a fully actualised member of the group is, 
itself, a powerful mechanism of social compliance. Certainly the findings of this study 
suggest a degree of deferment to established members of the elite and, given the 
significance of information within such settings, it is critical to recognise the social 
dimensions of knowledge transfer. Information and opinions emanating from 
established members of the network are likely to have a greater degree of legitimacy in 
the eyes of those looking to establish themselves within such settings. A reluctance to 
question established sources, coupled with a more general lack of confidence, could 
easily result in elite participants unconsciously aligning their own preferences with 
those they consider to be more established, and, hence more legitimate, in such settings.  
 
At the heart of elite membership in the transnational setting lies a curious paradox. 
Many elite participants cite free thinking as a prized asset in such arenas; and those who 
are perceived to be repeating common views, or not speaking at all, are seen as dull 
and, as a consequence, are unlikely to be invited again. At the same time, however, elite 
interactions of this kind take place within a structural setting that, to some extent at 
least, defines legitimate behaviour and thinking. Within such a context, it is important to 
consider what exactly constitutes an acceptable form of free thinking behaviour. After 
all, it is possible that this notion of free thinking has more to do with social skills, 
perceived intelligence, powers of articulation and cognitive accuracy than any ability to 
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contribute wildly innovative ideas. In short, the findings of this study suggest that the 
inner core of the elite transnational network has, over time, created a largely 
unconscious collective sense of its entrance requirement. This requirement, which is 
epitomised in the self-reflective notion of free thinking, has embedded an affirming 
elitist logic that not only has the effect of self-selecting those with a broad 
predisposition to certain values but, also, has the effect of subtly inducing further 
preference and value compliance as members become more ingratiated within the elite 
network.  
 
It is important to state, at this point, that none of these processes is, in any way, 
absolute. Neither is it fair or accurate to think of all transnational elite members as 
having the same views or preferences. Indeed, they do not. What they do share, for the 
most part however, is a belief in the role of elites and, importantly, their own role within 
such forums. They unquestioningly accept the logic of elite collaboration and, almost 
without exception, subscribe to a pragmatic, centrist, market-oriented view of liberal 
democratic society. The only form of ideological predisposition likely to be encountered 
within elite transnational arenas is the internationalist commitment to free markets and 
global trade. The benefits associated with such developments are seen as self-evident 
and beneficial to all.  
 
As the relationship between states and regions becomes inextricably entwined, certain 
forms of global governance are seen as emerging and, indeed, have emerged, as a 
natural consequence of the need to control and regulate market developments and issues 
within such settings. The role of elite transnational elites might be seen, therefore, as 
one of cementing relations and smoothing the abrasive edges of formal resistance to 
such change.  In this sense, the informal dynamics of consensus formation within 
transnational elite networks might be viewed as a critical legitimacy building 
accompaniment to the more formal club model of international relations (Keohane & 
Nye, 2001a). Within such a depiction, largely transparent clubs of unaccountable 
policy mandarins can be seen to have developed in the international sphere, comprised 
of representatives of national governments, whose role has been that of creating ever 
stronger frameworks to facilitate the global regime for trade and money circulation. 
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While the legitimacy of such groups in international relations has been called into 
question (Keohane & Nye, 2001b), the role of informal transnational elite interactions 
has gone largely unnoticed.  
 
Gaventa (1980: 27), in his own application of third dimensional power, observes how 
current consensus may well have been influenced by historical power relations that 
continue to provide symbols, cues, or routines [...that form part of a discrete] language 
of power without knowledge of their antecedents. The idea of cementing relations 
through elite interactions in the transnational setting is not new and it is possible that the 
prescriptions embedded in organisations like Bilderberg, during tensions at the height of 
the Cold War, continue to have symbolic relevance to the ongoing forms of consensus 
formation within such groups today. The historical development of an Atlantic 
consensus, for instance, certainly within organisations such as Bilderberg, the Atlantic 
Institute and the Council on Foreign Relations might, in part, explain the ready 
acceptance and proliferation of free market principles throughout the transatlantic 
community. Certainly, Gills (1990) study of the role of the Trilateral Commission 
suggests precisely this role for the group in facilitating an ongoing hegemonic 
dominance for the United States in world economic affairs. This study finds 
considerable evidence of ongoing attachment to principles of security and mutual 
economic advantage within such settings. The composition and internal dynamics of the 
Atlantic transnational community continues to reflect past relationships and, 
notwithstanding the significant internal fractures of recent years, participants still 
recognise and embrace the notion of a meaningful, and transcendental, Atlantic 
relationship. Again, the capacity of such structural patterns of membership to induce 
compliance among elite participants is considerable.  
 
5.3   Considering the relationship between collaboration, power, centrality, 
consensus and legitimacy 
 
It was suggested at the beginning of this chapter that the themes of the discussion were 
interrelated. When considered together, it is argued that they provide an insight into the 
interplay that exists between articulation and interpretation, and structure and agency, in 
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the formation of legitimacy as a basis for action in international and transnational 
affairs.  
 
The discursive sphere of the transnational elite network is not a perfect and 
uncontaminated vision of enlightened social construction. It is a subtly contested sphere 
in which power relations play a crucial role in determining the social context that 
defines action as legitimate or illegitimate. More than ever before, the contest for 
legitimacy in international and transnational affairs has become a critical factor in the 
determination of action or inaction. The social construction of legitimacy in 
international and transnational settings is, therefore, an implicitly political activity. 
 
In order to better understand the processes of social construction within the 
transnational setting, it is important to recognise the existence of a number of significant 
inter-relationships. A conceptual model of these inter-relationships is presented in 
Figure 5.1. 
 
The critical inter-relationship is lineal and leads from collaboration through consensus 
formation and legitimacy to eventual forms of action (E, F, K). Crucially, however, it is 
the interplay that exists between legitimacy building processes and issues of network 
centrality (A, G, B) and discrete forms of power (C, H, D), at points along this lineal 
progression, that highlight the socio-political dynamics of constructionism within such 
settings. Of particular interest, are the bi-directional and mutually constitutive 
arrangements that cement this process of social construction. Among the transnational 
policy elite, for instance, notions of collaboration are normatively imbued with a set of 
fundamental legitimising constructs (I). As a consequence, the product of collaboration, 
consensus formation, is, by definition, imbued with the same characteristic legitimacy. 
It is these legitimisations that define the nature of membership and action within elite 
transnational communities. Similarly, existing legitimised constructs will have some 
bearing upon the nature of future collaborative exercises and will likely impact the 
nature of downstream consensus formation. The strength of the existing, collectively 
legitimised, construct is the social structural context within which ongoing collaboration 
and consensus formation activity is defined. Consequently, it is argued that power 
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relations that define and sustain existing social constructs within elite networks, 
discretely influence further processes of collaboration (A, C). They also have a 
considerable bearing, directly and indirectly, on the shape and tenor of eventual 
consensus (G, H). 
 
Figure 5.1 The social construction of legitimacy as a basis for action  
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Source: Compiled by the author 
 
Another important relationship determining the nature of eventual consensus is that 
which exists between legitimacy and centrality (B) and legitimacy and power (D). 
Existing forms of consensus within elite communities naturally exhibit a transcendental 
legitimacy. Those who are seen to advocate, and articulate, these consensuses are those 
with greater familiarity with each other and the network - in short, those with centrality. 
Central members of the network unconsciously create legitimacy for their views simply 
by articulating them; peripheral or aspirant members of the network, keen to ingratiate 
themselves with the inner core, are responding to the inextricable inter-relationship 
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between the legitimacy of the participant and the legitimacy of the discourse. Likewise, 
third dimensional forms of power which manifest themselves in various processes of 
socialisation, acculturation and fraternisation are rooted in conceptions of the legitimate. 
Indeed, it is the transcendental legitimacy of dominant discourse and setting that 
unconsciously leads to some degree of preference compliance within elite transnational 
settings.  
 
The complex, and highly dynamic, nature of consensus formation activity within 
transnational elite networks exposes a fundamental relationship between structure and 
articulation within such environments. As one moves from policy processes at the 
nation state level through policy processes at the regional level to, ultimately, policy 
processes in the global setting, the structural context of policy discourse becomes more 
uncertain and dissipated.  While there are some undeniable historic, socio-economic, 
geographic and cultural dimensions and tensions to world politics, there are few 
universally accepted, or static, structural realities. The role of elites within this setting, 
therefore, is to create certainty, however temporal, where there is little or none. This 
certainty, which is the result of transcendental legitimisations, is made possible through 
the interaction and discourse of elites. But legitimised constructs, however vague, are 
not produced by some kind of mystical and apolitical process of social construction. 
They are, instead, articulated by the powerful. And the mutually constitutive, and 
implicitly political, settings of elite social construction ensure that they achieve a 
meaningful and workable, if not always absolute, structural quality. In short, the 
relationship between structure and agency within such settings is much closer and 
immediate than that found in other policy arenas. Meaningful agency within the 
transnational elite community is not related to the interpretation of structural context, it 
is related to its articulation.  
 
5.4  Discrete power relations and transnational elite thinking in the post-Cold 
War period 
 
The end of the Cold War marked a significant shift in the way that consensus was 
reached in international relations. During the period after the Second World War, and 
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leading through to the collapse of the Berlin Wall, international consensus was 
characterised, in Atlantic terms, by structural alliances heavily influenced by issues of 
ideology and security. Informal elite networks, as well as formal international 
institutions, were designed to cement relations in the face of mutual threats and 
challenges. As these perceived threats lessened, the role of elite policy networks and 
institutions in international and transnational arenas was dramatically called into 
question. Aside from obvious questions related to purpose and membership, this new 
era of international relations brought with it considerable issues related to the nature of 
structural context in the international setting. The certainties of earlier alliances, while 
not entirely absent, had been replaced by a period of more fluid cooperation and 
partnership in international affairs. During this period, the formation of consensus and 
legitimacy, as a basis for action, emerged as a key principle in international relations.  
 
In the absence of a global government, and with the failure of multilaterism to transcend 
the protectionist agendas of member states, clubs and networks of policy elites in the 
international and transnational arenas have emerged as primary mechanisms for the 
development of transcendental forms of consensus and legitimacy. In more formal 
international organisations, this frequently relates to the establishment of common 
ground or normative regimes in which the basis for more formal agreements can be 
anchored. In the case of informal transnational elites, consensus formation activity 
might be seen to facilitate formal international efforts by integrating non-state interests 
into the policy milieu, or it might take an alternative trajectory altogether. Unburdened 
by formal constituencies, transnational collaborative elites, in discursive terms at least, 
are capable of not only transcending the limitations of statehood in international affairs, 
but legitimising an entirely separate conception of global governance. In this sense, it is 
important to recognise that transnational elite networks represent something more than 
the sum total of their international multi-stakeholder members. Consensus formation 
and legitimacy within such settings has the capacity to challenge and adapt more formal 
processes of international cooperation.  
 
This capacity, however, has not yet been fully realised. The transnational policy elite 
has yet to evolve into a truly global entity. Instead, it continues to reflect traditional 
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alliances with an emphasis on regional cooperation. The recognition, among some 
members of the transnational elite, that integrating transnational communities should be 
a priority, reflects the significance that a global transnational policy elite might have in 
shaping legitimacy as a basis for action in world affairs. While this rather 
instrumentalist depiction suggests a degree of intent on the part of elite members, much 
of what passes for consensus formation in elite circles is seen as an unconscious bi-
product of elite discourse and familiarisation. Any attempt to integrate transnational 
elite networks is based largely on an unquestioned belief that such a move would be a 
force for good in world affairs. The requirement for a global transnational policy elite is 
viewed as a progressive and essential response to the threat of regional protectionism 
and a means of overcoming structural obstacles to the emergence of ever tighter global 
integration. It should be noted that the findings of this study are specific to the Atlantic 
transnational elite; it remains to be seen whether such sentiment is shared by other 
regional transnational networks.   
 
Although far from homogeneous, this study finds the notion of a transnational policy 
elite to be a coherent and meaningful one although the policy effects of collaboration 
are unclear and, it is suggested, highly idiosyncratic. Transnational elite members are 
not consciously representing or advocating the views of a group or network. In many 
ways, they feel themselves to be independent agents acting beyond the influence of 
crude forms of preference formation. All the same, they accept that preferences can 
change as a consequence of elite interactions and information interchange but, 
curiously, they hold a rather apolitical view of this process. Likewise, they see 
consensus formation, or the narrowing of differences, as a natural consequence of 
familiarisation and interaction within elite settings. Many take issue with the 
implications of consensus formation as a description of elite activity but, at the same 
time, accept that it broadly describes the momentum and outcome of such interactions. 
 
The depiction of elite interactions presented by the findings of this study suggests a role 
for transnational elites in the development of legitimised constructs. A fundamental 
question, not satisfactorily addressed by this study, relates to the purposeful nature of 
such activity. It has not been possible to understand the extent to which elite 
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transnational networks are designed or intended to produce consensus outcomes. That 
said, there is considerable evidence that inner core members view such an outcome as 
an obvious and desirable reason for such networks to form and function. In other words, 
when asked why elite networks exist and what they do, inner core members tended to 
emphasise the desirability of creating common ground, building bridges and 
understanding one another. Such benefits are not articulated as part of the rationale for 
joining elite networks, they are, however, cited as a defence of such activity.  
 
This study suggests that many of the processes that lead to some degree of consensus 
formation within elite transnational circles are unconsciously deterministic. They are the 
result of discrete third-dimensional power relations embedded within such settings and, 
despite the protestations of long standing members of elite networks, such relations 
have a considerable bearing upon those entering the highest echelons of elite 
interaction. There is an historic socio-political bias to the Atlantic transnational elite. 
This bias continues to be mobilised through the norms, rules and rituals of networked 
interaction in the Atlantic transnational arena. Recognising the, often subtle, 
implications of these embedded routines is a key requirement for those looking to 
successfully navigate full membership in such settings. Added to which, an undeniable 
elitism reinforces bias within the elite group. Entrants must correctly interpret the 
significance of this elitism if they are to transcend its devices.  
 
A key finding of this study relates to the role of vulnerability and insecurity in elite 
settings. While flattered and excited by the prospect of being invited, very few elite 
participants are immediately comfortable with the elevation into transnational elite 
circles. Reputational influence and network centrality reinforce feelings of insecurity 
and create mechanisms of compliance within such settings. Elite participants do not 
conform to prevalent views because they are instructed to do so; they do so because 
they come to realise that such views are legitimate. It is their understanding of the 
legitimate within such arenas that leads to preference compliance. If they understand 
their own preferences to be illegitimate in the face of such overwhelming evidence, the 
complex nature of conflicting personal preferences will discretely ensure some degree 
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of compliance. Such compliance is not absolute and, as has been stated, is highly 
idiosyncratic.  
 
Transnational elite thinking has been discretely shaped during the post-Cold War period 
by largely unconscious, third dimensional, power prescriptions embedded in the 
traditions, organisation and processes of elite interaction. These prescriptions have the 
effect of perpetuating dominant logic within such settings and are reinforced by 
complex networked relationships. As a consequence, elite transnational participants 
have, to some extent, had their views of political problems, and acceptable public policy 
responses, shaped by the dynamics of power within such environments.  
 
5.5 Summary 
 
This chapter has discussed the findings of the study and addressed the pivotal research 
question. In short, the study finds evidence of the dynamics of third dimensional power 
in transnational elite networks. It suggests, as a consequence, that transnational elite 
participants have, to some degree, adapted their view of political problems and public 
policy responses in line with conceptions of the legitimate within transnational network 
settings. It highlights the idiosyncratic nature of this alignment and does not seek to 
suggest that such influences are conscious or absolute. They are, nonetheless, significant 
to an understanding of the relationship between pre-policy processes in the transnational 
arena and more formal processes of policy formation in the national, regional and global 
settings.  
 
The nature of this studys contribution to knowledge will now be considered.  
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6.0 CONTRIBUTION AND CONCLUSION 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
This study has explored the question of how dynamics of third dimensional power have 
shaped transnational elite thinking related to political problems and public policy 
responses in the post-Cold War period. This chapter summarises the key findings of the 
research before considering how the study has contributed to existing knowledge in the 
areas of theory, method and practice. The limitations of the research are then described 
and suggestions for further research outlined. The chapter concludes with a personal 
postscript that describes further thoughts and reflections related to the research. 
 
6.2 Summary of key findings 
 
This exploratory study of transnational elite interactions has involved interviews with 
European members of the Atlantic policy elite. Identified through their participation in 
Bilderberg conferences, this highly networked group of elite individuals has provided a 
panoptic view of transnational elite activity during the post-Cold War period. Aside 
from membership of numerous formal public and professional bodies, the majority of 
study participants had experience of several of the major informal transnational policy 
networks and gatherings. Leaving aside country and issue specific organisations, those 
identified during the course of the study included the Trilateral Commission, the 
Council on Foreign Relations, the Circle, the Deutsch-Britische Gesellschaft 
(Konigswinter), the Anglo-French Callot, The Ditchley Foundation, St Georges House, 
Chatham House, Da Arrabida and various committees of the World Economic Forum.  
 
The notion of a transnational policy elite is, indeed, meaningful although the precise 
consequences of elite transnational interactions remain unclear. The absence of a 
binding, and universally enforceable, regulatory regime in the global setting, has led to 
the emergence of literally hundreds of interconnected policy related organisations and 
informal networks. The most elite of these organisations are responsible, often 
indirectly, for the development, or at least reinforcement of, legitimised constructs that 
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serve to create a basis for action in world politics. These legitimised social constructs 
are not the product of perfect and harmonious discourse within an uncontaminated 
public sphere. They are, instead, the product of an inherently political contest.  
Consequently, the nature of power relations within transnational, as well as 
international, settings should be of considerable interest to those concerned with 
constructivist depictions of international relations.   
 
The transnational policy elite is not, yet, a truly global entity and we do not know 
whether a desire to create links between regional networks, on the part of certain elite 
members, will translate into a more significant interlocking between informal networks. 
Traditional alliances, certainly within the Atlantic network, remain crucial to an 
understanding of legitimacy and power relations within such settings. While earlier 
relationships based on ideology and security have been replaced with a broader, and less 
structured, basis for cooperation, this study suggests that the demise of such alliances 
has been exaggerated in certain quarters.  
 
Consensus formation is a misleading description of the purpose and nature of elite 
transnational interactions although it broadly describes the momentum and ultimate 
outcome of such activity. Those at the centre of the elite network highlighted the 
importance of such interactions for the creation of shared understanding and mutual 
cooperation while others were clear that it did, indeed, lead to better understanding and 
more narrowed differences. The idea, however, that a consensus exists across the 
board on policy matters is spurious. While participants were undeniably centrist in 
orientation, and clearly advocated free trade and open markets, they reflected a diversity 
of position ranging from more neo-liberal perspectives at one extreme to more social 
and distributive models of capitalism at the other. Within the European participant 
group, advocates of more tempered forms of capitalism were the norm.  
 
Elite membership is far from dynamic. While elite groups and networks emphasise the 
importance of new members and ideas, membership is largely rotated at the periphery of 
the network. Established members of elite networks, consciously or otherwise, form part 
of an inner core membership, something resembling an old boy network, and have a 
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disproportionate level of influence within the organisation and functioning of elite 
groups. Elitism within the inner-core is a feature of such environments and, aside from 
being part of the allure for aspiring members, has a considerable role to play in the 
selection of participants and the advancement of aspiring members within the group. 
New members to the elite network are acutely aware of hierarchies of influence both 
within the network and in a wider sense. They unconsciously adapt their behaviour and 
preferences to the demands of the environment.  
 
The dynamics of third dimensional power are a feature of elite interactions in the 
transnational setting. So insidious are the mechanisms of such power that those subject 
to them are not only defensive at the suggestion that their preferences may have 
changed but are, ultimately, unaware of the fact. This is partly the result of multiple, 
often conflicting, preferences but also the result of a political awareness and sensitivity, 
on the part of new and aspiring elite participants, to notions of the legitimate within the 
elite social context. A degree of insecurity and an acknowledgement of hierarchy 
creates subtle mechanisms of compliance within such environments. This form of 
compliance is not absolute and is highly idiosyncratic.  
 
Elite thinking, in the transnational arena, has been subtly shaped during the post-Cold 
War period by third dimensional power relations embedded in the traditions, 
organisation and processes of elite interaction within such settings. Dominant logic, or 
legitimised constructs, within this community have been perpetuated, rather than 
challenged, by complex, and highly personal, networked relationships. The view of 
political problems and acceptable public policy responses held by members of the 
transnational policy elite have almost certainly been coloured, to some extent, by 
discrete power relations within such settings.  
 
6.3 Contribution to knowledge 
 
Scholarly research is expected to make a significant and original contribution to 
knowledge in the selected field. In order to make such a contribution, doctoral research 
should 
 248
 work at the boundaries of knowledge, and [should be] characterised by a 
contribution to the conceptual or theoretical development of a research 
discipline. (Finn, 2005:14) 
 
It is important, at this stage, to evaluate both the contribution to knowledge and the 
originality of the contribution represented by this study (Oliver, 2004). For the purpose 
of this exercise, the evaluation is divided into theoretical, methodological and practical 
contributions.  
 
6.3.1 Theoretical contribution 
 
The theoretical contribution of this study is comprised of two interrelated parts: the first 
concerned with the nature of consensus formation and collaboration between policy 
elites in the transnational setting and the second related to the application of Steven 
Lukess (1974) third dimensional power in elite settings. Each is now considered in 
turn. 
 
6.3.1.1    Transnational elite interactions 
 
The findings of the research represent an original contribution to our understanding of 
the purpose and possible implications of elite interactions in the transnational setting. 
They are of particular relevance to the literature domains of international relations, 
international political economy and policy science.  
 
This study is the first qualitative research to specifically analyse the purpose and effects 
of transnational elite interactions during the post-Cold War period. Historical, mainly 
archival, accounts of policy elite interactions relate to a period preceding the end of the 
Cold War and are primarily concerned with the cementing of relations between the 
United States and Western Europe, as well as the nature of the interrelationship between 
government and policy networks during that period. While these accounts provide a 
starting point for consideration of the role of transnational policy forums and networks 
in contemporary world affairs, it is important to note that the structural context for such 
activity has altered beyond recognition. In place of earlier ideological and security 
 249
based alliances, this new era of international relations has witnessed more fluid forms of 
cooperation and partnership. Crucially, the importance of consensus and legitimacy, as a 
basis for action, has emerged as a key requirement in international affairs. This study 
finds that transnational elite networks are contributing to the definition of consensus and 
legitimacy in the domain of international relations. Moreover, the inclusion of multiple 
stakeholders, and business and financial interests in particular, has potentially profound 
implications for the precise nature of such legitimacy.   
 
Structural, and highly instrumental, depictions of elite networks in the fields of 
international political economy and global systems theory have tended to emphasise the 
significance of quantitative links, and the capacity for diffusion of hegemonic neo-
liberal ideology, rather than the qualitative substance of elite relationships and 
interactions. The qualitative findings of this research suggest that this is a considerable 
oversight and that elite interactions are significantly more nuanced and idiosyncratic 
than they might first appear. In particular, it is important to recognise that consensus 
formation within such networks, while characterised by a general move towards greater 
shared understanding, is more contested than neo-Marxist depictions of the 
transnational capitalist class appear to suggest. Power relations within elite settings may 
tend to reinforce and perpetuate dominant logic but it is important to recognise that the 
legitimised constructions that form the social context of transnational elite interactions, 
are far from absolute and have a fundamentally dynamic quality.  
 
This study of elite collaboration considerably extends our understanding of processes of 
social construction within elite contexts. While constructivist depictions of formal 
international relations activity may have become commonplace, there has been little 
corresponding application of constructivist inquiry into informal transnational networks. 
This study therefore extends our knowledge of constructivism in international relations 
to the largely uncharted territory of transnational elite interactions. In so doing, it 
presents a conceptual model of the social construction of legitimacy as a basis for action 
in transnational politics. The crucial contribution of this model relates to the socio-
political interplay that exists between legitimacy building processes and issues of 
network centrality and discrete forms of power. Of critical interest are the bi-directional 
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and mutually constitutive arrangements that cement this contested process of social 
construction. Each of the relationships identified in the model will form the basis of 
further research.  
 
The study also represents an extension of the longstanding tradition of interest in policy 
elites by elevating the discussion beyond the boundaries of local communities and 
nation states and into the transnational context. Neo-Marxist interest has centred on the 
existence of an emergent transnational class and the instruments of class oppression that 
accompany it. Elite contributions, on the other hand, have only recently begun to 
empirically address the development of an international or transnational policy elite. 
Early studies on specific states in the USA, and subsequent interest in national policy 
elites, have yet to be mirrored by substantial development of empirical material in the 
transnational arena. This study, therefore, delivers an original contribution to an 
otherwise sparse literature related to elite interactions and collaboration in the 
transnational setting. Indeed, Leslie Sklair, Emeritus Professor of Political Sociology at 
the London School of Economics and a leading contributor on the emergence of a 
transnational capitalist class, recently described the topic of this research as being of 
great importance and interest.49 
 
Finally, the study provides an original theoretical contribution to consideration of the 
structural dynamics of pre-policy formation activity and, specifically, challenges 
interpretive portrayals of issue definition and reactive conceptions of initiation in the 
policy process. Instead, it suggests that the legitimised constructs of policy formation  
its structural determinants - are not as ethereal as previously imagined; and neither are 
they beyond the scope and control of a coordinated policy elite. Consequently, structural 
manipulation has less to do with interpretation than articulation and represents a 
contested mechanism for control of system-wide tolerances of change. Given such a 
depiction, dynamic policy outcomes are viewed as increasingly beyond the scope of 
policy designers and their collective citizenries. The normative parameters of policy 
discourse are, instead, defined by elite interactions in the national, international and 
transnational settings. Demand for change that exists outside of the structural tolerances 
                                                
49 Personal correspondence 19th June 2008 
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of the policy process will, out of necessity, require the support of elites. Contested 
arenas of elite interaction, notionally exogenous to the formal processes of policy 
formation, are a key forum for the preservation and adjustment of the socio-structural 
determinants of political change. Aside from identifying the role of elites in defining 
structural legitimacy, this contribution significantly emphasises the function of elite 
interactions in mediating the role and influence of concurrent structural determinants.  
 
6.3.1.2 The application of third dimensional power 
 
This is not the first study to utilise Steve Lukess (1974) third dimensional form of 
power. However, it is believed that it represents the first application of his theoretical 
lens within the context of an elite setting. Previous applications have tended to concern 
power dynamics in a variety of contexts that were perceived to exhibit unequal relations 
between the powerful and powerless. Although Lukes has never placed limitations on 
the contextual application of his approach, empirical treatments of third dimensional 
power have consistently reflected a rather literal view of power as dominance. While it 
is true that elite interactions do not seem to present an ideal context for such an analysis, 
this study clearly indicates that application of the lens can be invaluable in dispelling 
myths related to the nature and development of elite homogeneity. Indeed, this study 
finds that the application of a third dimensional power lens within elite settings helps 
explain complex social processes related to consensus formation and legitimacy 
building within such environments. The research, therefore, extends knowledge related 
to the application of the third dimensional power lens within given contexts. 
 
Another key contribution of the study concerning third dimensional power relates to 
how meaningful the approach is when applied in its amended form. There are very few 
faithful applications of Lukess original approach (1974) and this study is among the 
first50 to apply Lukess (2005a; 2005b) revised conception of the framework. Given the 
criticism of the revision levelled by some, it is important to consider whether, in light of 
its application, it remains a valuable methodological instrument.  
                                                
50 At the time of writing, no other study incorporating the revised form of third dimensional power was 
identified. 
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This study adopted a very light treatment of counterfactuals. Indeed, identifying 
individual counterfactuals was deemed unnecessary to an understanding of preference 
deviation.  While this is unlikely to satisfy third dimensional purists, or those who take a 
more constitutive perspective of elite interactions, identifying dynamics of third 
dimensional power within such settings was infinitely more revealing and interesting 
than endlessly debating the plausibility of real interests. It was sufficient, for the 
purposes of this exercise at least, to demonstrate how real interests might be influenced 
by third dimensional power relations within the context of transnational elite 
interactions. And while the study inevitably falls short in providing evidence of the 
actual consequences of such activity, it has successfully delivered what was within its 
empirical grasp: namely, evidence of the mechanisms of preference compliance within 
such settings.  
 
Steven Lukes has still to provide a working description of how to best apply an 
empirical examination of his third dimensional power framework. The vagaries of his 
theoretical perspective allow for some degree of interpretation and flexibility. This 
study provides one, rather liberal, interpretation of how to apply the theoretical 
framework within a given context and, in so doing, finds considerable evidence to 
support the contention that such an empirical approach is not only meaningful, but 
extremely valuable. The findings of the study provide a timely contribution to current 
power debates in the field of political sociology. 
 
6.3.2 Methodological contribution 
 
This exploration of the interactions of transnational elites has not sought to develop or 
utilise an innovative research design although the application of a qualitative and 
interpretive methodology is something of a novelty within the multi-disciplinary 
domain. Set against a heavy dependency on quantitative, and highly structural, 
depictions of elite interconnections, this qualitative study has contributed significantly 
to our understanding of the precise nature of elite interactions within the transnational 
arena. As a consequence, a far more nuanced picture of elite membership has emerged: 
a picture that has enabled a greater appreciation of socio-political dimensions within 
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such networks. For instance, the finding that consensus formation activity is far from 
absolute, and highly idiosyncratic, is only made possible through the use of such a 
methodology.  
 
Similarly, the use of elite interviewing can hardly be described as groundbreaking but 
there were some extremely interesting discoveries made during the course of the 
research that extend our understanding of such activity. In particular, those discoveries 
related to access, disclosure and power. Bilderberg attendees are among the most elite 
group of policy related individuals in the United States and Western Europe. In addition 
to being extremely difficult to access, the study had to circumvent problems associated 
with strict non-disclosure rules. Bilderbergs members are extremely respectful of the 
groups rules and traditions and are very reluctant to discuss the group, or group 
matters, outside the confines of the elite network. These constraints present an 
extremely challenging context for a study dependent upon elite interviews.  
 
The most obvious discovery was that such people did not respond to direct approaches 
for an interview. It was tempting to interpret rejections at this stage as a reflection of the 
content of the proposed interviews but, unconvinced of this, I attempted to reach 
Bilderberg attendees via the introductions of more accessible policy elite members. The 
key finding, related to the use of intermediaries, was that personal introductions usually 
resulted in an interview, irrespective of the perceived sensitivity of the subject. Another 
extremely valuable discovery was that members of the policy elite establishment 
appeared to subscribe to an informal code concerning personal introductions. In the first 
instance, they evaluated the credibility of the interviewer and then, satisfied that there 
was no danger of embarrassment, were more than willing to make further introductions.  
Interestingly, I observed the same process of name selection on three separate 
occasions: elite participants were willing to make introductions to three further contacts 
but no more. Even in situations where the interviewee had not warmed to the process, 
and appeared guarded throughout the interview, a request for introductions usually 
resulted in an offer of help. This is especially surprising given the nature of the subject 
under investigation but it demonstrates the importance of asking the question however 
uncomfortable the circumstances.  
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While not the focus of this study, a fuller account of the interview experiences 
encountered during this study will form the basis of a paper concerned with the 
interviewing of defensive elites. At that point, a more meaningful methodological 
contribution will have been made.  
 
6.3.3 Practical contribution 
 
Although the major contribution of this study is theoretical, the research has 
considerable implications for policymakers.  
 
The policy process is undoubtedly complex and the relationship between structure and 
agency is far from satisfactorily explained in the policy science literature. On the one 
hand, structuralist and institutionalist contributions have highlighted the role of setting 
and rules to processes of policy formation and change while more recent post-structural 
contributions have drawn attention to the role of agency in the identification and 
definition of political problems and solutions. While frameworks such as structuration 
(Giddens, 1984) succeed in theoretically reconciling the previously irreconcilable in this 
area, this study implies that agent manipulation and articulation of the legitimate or 
structural, in a transcendental policy sphere, has potentially profound implications for 
downstream cognitive reasoning in the more formal processes of policy formation. In 
essence, the formal policymakers interpretation of structural influences has, itself, been 
the subject of discrete forms of influence related to the framing of policy issues and 
responses. There is a danger of infinite regress with such reasoning but to ignore the 
possibility of such influences, in favour of more binary conceptions of structure and 
agency, is to ignore significant implications for those tasked with policy design. The 
key contribution of this study, therefore, for practitioners, is to highlight the role of 
influences related to normative policy prescriptions. These third-dimensional influences 
are embedded in the assumptions that policymakers make related to matters of policy 
design. They are distinct from institutional influences in so far as they are not 
constituted of formal rules or symbols associated with appropriate response within such 
settings. Instead, they are constituted by an appreciation of more ethereal forms of 
common sense. The relationship between policymaker preferences and these sources of 
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common sense is critical, therefore, to an understanding of definition and choice within 
such settings. In short, policymakers should give thought to how the shape of their 
preferences materially impacts the definition and design of public policy and, moreover, 
whether such an impact is truly aligned with their real interests.  
 
6.4 Limitations 
 
As with any research, there are limitations to this study. Some of these limitations relate 
to the more general aspects of qualitative and interpretive analysis but some are, 
unquestionably, specific to the subject of the study. The most important of these relate 
to researcher bias, sampling, elite interviewing and the generalisable nature of the 
findings. 
 
6.4.1 Researcher bias 
 
It would be futile to deny the significance of the possibility of researcher bias to a study 
of elites. Such a study implicitly reflects a set of normative predispositions, on the part 
of the researcher, concerned with how society should be organised and who should be 
organising it (Moyser & Wagstaffe, 1987). In some sense, this bias might be viewed as 
a strength since it motivates the researcher to conduct, at times, very challenging 
research; but, equally, it calls into question the possible validity of interpretive results.  
After all, the social knowledge created as a consequence of this study is the direct result 
of interpreted meanings derived through personal interactions, individual analysis and 
highly idiosyncratic coding. The role of the researcher is pivotal, therefore, to an 
understanding of the eventual findings of the study (Easterby-Smith et al, 2002).  
 
6.4.1.1 Statement of interest 
 
Given the above, I believe it is important to outline how my own interests may have 
served to bias the interpretation of interviews and interview data. I came to the PhD 
process having spent several years as a senior executive in the European specialist 
media and new media sectors and I was, for some time, interested in the development of 
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public policy related to the internet. In fact, it was because of the disappointment I felt 
at the direction and tone of regulation within the industry that I first became aware of an 
underlying interest in the emancipatory promise of the media. In short, I believed that 
the internet had the ability to transform existing relationships between government and 
citizenry but, for whatever reason, was fast being dominated by interests that had every 
reason to resist such transformation. I consider myself, therefore, a democrat with a 
belief in democracy as it should be, rather than what it has become. There is nothing 
more to my motivation to explore elite interactions than a desire to understand 
democratic or undemocratic processes that enable or prevent transformational change in 
society. And while, at first glance, this suggests a belief that such activity is inherently 
bad rather than good, I personally do not believe that such an assumption naturally 
follows.  
 
To the extent, therefore, that I have a political interest in the subject matter, I accept that 
there is an undeniable degree of normative bias to the research. The suggestion, 
however, that such a bias might have tainted my interpretation of the value of such 
activity is one that I would strongly refute. Indeed, I have at all times attempted to 
understand how transnational elite interactions represent a force for good in society as 
well as how they are theoretically married with democratic principles. Reconciling these 
two aspects of elite interactions is not straightforward but it would be naïve, and 
somewhat foolish, to deny the importance of elite interactions to the wellbeing of 
society. I believe, for this reason, that the research represents a mature appreciation of 
the subject matter. It is, no doubt, motivated by an interest in democracy but its 
assessment of elite interactions in the transnational setting has, at all times, remained 
circumspect in its appreciation of the value of such activity. 
 
6.4.1.2 Interpretation and validity 
 
This interpretative research is exploratory in nature and elicited a substantial quantity of 
rich interview data related to transnational interactions in the post-Cold War setting. As 
previously noted, in this type of research the interpreter is central to any understanding 
of the social knowledge that emerges. Throughout the research process, therefore, self-
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awareness has been essential in order to counter the possible influence of personal bias. 
A process of self-reflection has preceded, and occurred throughout, all stages of the 
research process.  
 
The sampling procedure will be covered shortly but significant efforts were made to 
ensure as faithful a delivery of participant accounts, and as accurate a reflection of those 
accounts through analysis and reporting, as feasibly possible. In the case of interviews, 
for instance, the broad semi-structured format utilising grand tour questions (Leech, 
2002) at the beginning of sessions, and then relying on probing techniques to elicit 
further details and guide the interview, ensured that transcripts were extremely rich and 
not overly directed. This resulted in a breadth of material that, at times, was difficult to 
manage but, ultimately, the interviewer was able to avoid the suggestion that accounts 
were largely a function of directional and closed questioning. Similarly, the findings 
section of this thesis has produced extensive, and largely unedited, extracts from 
interviews with a view to demonstrating contextual support for the conclusions being 
drawn. It is hoped that this demonstrates, therefore, the self conscious application of an 
emergent thematic approach rather than the imposition of a pre-existing normative 
framework. In short, it is believed that these strategies have enhanced the reliability and 
validity of the study.  
 
6.4.2 Sampling 
 
Although this study makes no claims to statistical validity, it is an exploratory study 
designed to create tentative understanding of power dynamics in transnational elite 
interactions, there are some obvious limitations to the sampling design. For the purposes 
of this research, the accounts of one participant were as valid as any other but, 
notwithstanding this observation, a number of difficulties related to access may have 
introduced an unquantifiable degree of bias into the findings. The necessity for 
convenience sampling, the use of intermediaries and the eventual adoption of 
snowball sampling all ran the risk of introducing bias of some form or another. 
Attempts were made to reach as diverse a group of participants as possible, both 
sectorally and nationally, but, ultimately, control of this process was a secondary 
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consideration to the securing of valuable interviews. In the event, the final sample was 
reasonably reflective of the general composition of the Bilderberg group but there was 
no systematic process for ensuring representation. Given the manifest difficulty 
associated with accessing elite participants of this kind, it was felt that the introduction 
of some degree of bias was an unavoidable consequence of such activity. Under normal 
circumstances, the securing of further interviews may have helped to counter sample 
bias but, since the primary means of increasing interview numbers would have been 
further snowball sampling, it is possible that biases may have been reinforced rather 
than moderated.    
 
A key limitation, not just of this study but any concerned with identifying the activities 
and interactions of transnational elites, is related to the difficulties associated with 
defining the elite itself. In this study, a decision was taken to utilise panoptic accounts 
of members of the elite Bilderberg group but this raises certain implications for the 
study and its findings. The most important is that the transnational elite defined by this 
study is, in fact, comprised of members of the Atlantic transnational network - and, 
importantly, only European members of this network. Whether the accounts of this 
sample accurately reflect the views of part, or whole, of the Bilderberg group are 
unknown at this stage. Also, to what extent Bilderberg members are capable of 
representing an accurate panoptic sense of elite interactions in the transnational arena, is 
a matter of some conjecture. Ultimately, however, decisions related to the definition of 
the transnational elite had to be made and, on reflection, it was felt that there was no 
better example of this kind of elite interaction than that provided by the Bilderberg 
group. Since its members are frequently active in other networks, it was decided that 
they were best placed to provide accounts of a wide variety of elite networking activity. 
As an aside, when asked to rank the importance or hierarchy of elite networks and 
groups, elite participants consistently cited Bilderberg as the preeminent network 
gathering.  
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6.4.3 Elite interviewing 
 
Many of the limitations associated with elite interviewing are covered by considerations 
of bias but there were some additional factors that are worthy of discussion.  
 
Power relations in the interview situation are clearly not equal. The interviewer is 
frequently sitting before someone he or she recognises and who is widely regarded as 
having connections and power of some description. No amount of preparation can 
enable the interviewer to know exactly how they will respond when confronted by 
certain individuals. Likewise, a general desire to be respected and liked by the 
participant, coupled with an acknowledgement that the subject might be able to 
significantly benefit future research, can lead to an overly deferential interview.  I tried 
throughout the process of meeting with intermediaries, and eventual interviewees, to be 
as challenging as I might without offending or irritating the interviewee. Mostly, this 
balance was successful and interviews were generally respectful, informative and open. 
Occasionally, an overly helpful, or authoritarian, participant might take the interview off 
at a tangential angle for some time, but it was always possible to bring the discussion 
back to the general area of inquiry. At no point did I feel that it was impossible to get 
beyond overly romantic or self-aggrandising recollections and, once reassured about 
non-disclosure, participants were, for the most part, genuinely open about their 
experiences.  
 
The final point, related to disclosure rules, raises the important issue of ethics. All 
interviews held by the researcher were conducted according to the Chatham House 
Rule. Not all participants insisted on this requirement but, where they were willing to 
allow free use of the data, approval of copy was demanded. On balance, the less onerous 
approach was to provide anonymity to all participants and to take care to ensure that 
corresponding data would not reveal identities. In this way, it was possible to produce a 
considerable volume of interview material in the findings and avoid complications 
associated with retrospective approval. All participants were clearly informed of the 
terms of the use of interview material and agreed to such use both before, and during, 
the interview.  
 260
6.4.4 The generalisable nature of the findings 
 
The findings of this research are specific to the sample group of Bilderberg attendees 
interviewed during the course of this study. While their accounts relate to a panoptic 
assessment of transnational elite activity, they are not generalisable. This is a limitation 
leveled at many qualitative studies and the research presented here is no exception.  
 
6.5 Directions for future research 
 
While the findings of this study cannot be generalised in their current form, several 
further lines of inquiry might significantly increase the applicability of the research. The 
most pressing, from the perspective of addressing immediate questions related to the 
sample group, is to conduct a comparative study of post-Cold War, North American, 
Bilderberg attendees. This would help to provide an understanding of findings that 
transcend the geographical divide in the Atlantic network and may reveal interesting 
insights into the peculiar interpretations of American and European elite members.  The 
next stage of the research would be to compare the results of Bilderberg attendees with 
other elite networks within the Atlantic territory. This is potentially more complicated 
than it first appears since many members of Bilderberg are, coincidentally, members of 
other groups. The challenge, therefore, would be to identify senior elite participants of 
such groups who are not yet members of the Bilderberg network. An ambitious final 
stage of this research agenda would be to identify comparable non-Atlantic networks 
and conduct comparative research in order to identify similarities and differences in 
approach. Ultimately, the objective of such a research agenda would be to provide a 
truly global, and generalised, view of transnational elite interactions and the dynamics 
of power that exist within, and between, them. Such an agenda is of critical importance 
as transnational policy processes assume ever greater significance in the development of 
a global regulatory framework. The dearth of scholarly contributions in this field 
represents a substantial research opportunity. 
 
Another significant line of inquiry presented by the findings of this research relates to 
the socio-political nature of collaboration, consensus and legitimacy, as a basis for 
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action in transnational and international policy affairs. The conceptual model identified 
in this study (see Figure 5.1: The social construction of legitimacy as a basis for action) 
highlights the interdependent and mutually constitutive nature of binary relations that 
cement the process of social construction within elite contexts. Not only is the 
underlying legitimacy of collaborative logic highly suspect, but its role in underpinning 
the creation of further forms of legitimacy, must become the subject of further critical 
empirical inquiry. The contestedness of legitimacy within such settings, and the 
relations of power that underpin notions of consensus in elite networks, are areas that 
demand immediate and pressing scholarly attention. A starting point would be to further 
investigate the critical binary relations between issues of centrality and power and each 
of the constitutive stages of consensual legitimacy. A crucial next step, and one that 
exists outside of the immediate concerns of the agenda outlined above, would be to 
consider the inter-relationship between informal transnational and formal international 
policy processes.  
 
6.6 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has outlined the key findings of the research and considered the 
contribution that the study makes to knowledge in the areas of theory, method and 
practice. The limitations of the study have been discussed and recommendations for 
future research presented.  
 
This study explored the role played by dynamics of third dimensional power in shaping 
transnational elite thinking during the post-Cold War period. In order to do this, it was 
necessary to consider the coherency of the transnational policy elite and just how 
meaningful the notion of consensus formation is as a description of transnational elite 
activity. The findings of this study provide the first qualitative depiction of precisely 
how mechanisms of discrete power in transnational elite environments have resulted in 
aligned elite preferences during the post-Cold War period. This cognitive alignment, 
while naturally indicating narrowed differences, does not imply outright consensus on 
all matters of policy. The process of consensus formation, such as it is, is highly 
idiosyncratic and by no means absolute. The study concludes that the transnational 
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policy elite is, indeed, a coherent policy network comprised of selected members of the 
national and regional business and political elite. It is some way from representing a 
truly global network but conscious efforts are being made, at the most senior levels, to 
establish links between regional networks.  
 
6.7 Postscript 
 
As the PhD process draws to a close, I reflect with a certain degree of sadness that the 
past four years have disappeared quite so quickly. The decision to abandon a successful 
career and return to full time studies was not an easy one to make and was greeted, at 
the time, with surprise, and even derision, by some that I know. But I have never 
doubted, for one moment, that this was something that I simply had to do. For me, this 
process has been the most expansive, rewarding and fulfilling of my life. It has also, at 
the same time, represented an enormous personal struggle.  
 
Adapting to the demands and rigors of an entirely different discipline and culture, after 
many years in business, has not always been straightforward. There have been moments 
where Ive questioned whether it was going to be possible and, but for the intervention 
and support of some very close friends and colleagues, Im certain my ambitions would 
have remained unfulfilled. As it is, Ive been reinvigorated by the PhD process and 
inspired by the people Ive had the good fortune to work alongside. I look forward to 
the future with optimism and a genuine level of excitement related to my field of 
inquiry. 
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Appendix A.  Informal transnational groups/free text search 
 
 
Please note that all results are free text searches which means that even the most 
tangential inclusion is returned. The total includes press references and, in the case of 
Bilderberg, a significant volume of scientific articles related to an entirely different 
phenomenon. As of February 2009, there were less than a dozen scholarly articles that 
referenced the Bilderberg group. The Trilateral Commission has considerably more 
coverage than Bilderberg and the Council on Foreign Relations, which isnt included 
here, produces many reports that garner wide press attention. In all cases, the amount of 
scholarly material available on the actual functioning of the groups and networks 
concerned is minimal.  
 
 
Bilderberg 
 
Results by Resources 
Search for "Bilderberg" found 127 results 
 
Resource Name Status Hits   
ABI/Inform (ProQuest)  DONE  98  
View 
Business Source Complete 
(EBSCO)  DONE  6  View 
Emerald Fulltext journals 
(Emerald)  DONE  0     
Social Sciences Citation Index 
(ISI)  DONE  2  View 
SpringerLink journals 
(MetaPress)  DONE  21  View 
Combined Results First 57 records 127   View 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 288
The Trilateral Commission 
 
 
Results by Resources 
Search for ""Trilateral Commission"" found 561 results 
 
Resource Name 
 
Status 
 
Hits 
  
ABI/Inform 
(ProQuest)  DONE  323  View  
Business Source 
Complete (EBSCO)  DONE  25  View  
Emerald Fulltext 
journals (Emerald)  DONE  0     
Social Sciences 
Citation Index (ISI)  DONE  24  View  
SpringerLink journals 
(MetaPress)  DONE  189  View  
Combined Results First 107 records 561   View 
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Appendix B. Interview Themes/Pilot study 
 
 
Individual level perspectives on the relationship between economic and 
state interest 
  
How inter-related are economic and state interest? To what extent, do they 
depend upon one another? 
What justifications do you see for the involvement of business interests in the 
formation of public policy?  
At what point in the process, do you believe, it is appropriate for the interests of 
business to be taken into account?  
To what extent, do you think, that business or economic interests colour the 
existing thinking of policy actors? 
  
Core assumptions that underpin an existing sense of shared purpose 
  
            What are the underlying objectives of public policy? 
What is the role of national government? 
On what basis might decisions between alternatives be based? 
What measures of performance are appropriate to the consideration of public 
policy effectiveness? 
How much consensus, would you say, exists on the overall direction and 
purpose of public policy? 
Leaving aside the detail of public policy, what substantive differences exist in 
terms of the overall strategic direction or objectives of public policy between 
parties active at this stage of the process?  
             
Perspectives on who, or what, is driving policy initiation  
  
Why are some objectives/initiatives taken up and others ignored? 
Where does the sense of what is and isnt acceptable come from? 
How might a radically new policy find its way into the consideration process? 
What support would such a policy proposal require to be taken seriously? 
What role do the media and key advocates play in this process? 
  
View of personal role and key motivations  
  
            How do you perceive your own role in the policy formation process? 
What personal or professional influences might have a bearing upon the 
execution of your role? 
To what extent are your activities governed by established rules or practices? 
Are formal expectations outlined in advance? If so, by whom? 
How able to influence the shape of policy proposals do you feel? 
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Policy initiation and the political process 
  
How do the parties active at the initiation stage of the process differ from those 
active in the formal development of public policy proposals, consultation, and 
the eventual crafting of legislation? 
To what extent does a strong and broad consensus of policy objectives between 
parties facilitate the development of public policy?  
How would you describe the nature of this policy initiation activity?  
How are the various processes and activities formalized?  
  
Public opinion and public interest 
  
In what sense might a shared understanding related to the objectives of public 
policy inform political, public, and media agendas?  
How is the public interest preserved and furthered in this process? 
Do you view public opinion and the public interest as the same thing? 
To what extent should public opinion inform policy initiation?  
How does the public interest inform or influence policy initiatives? 
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Appendix D.   Coding/Thematic Categories 
 
 
    
         Nodes  References 
 
 
Interview 1   30 63 
Interview 2   43 137 
Interview 3   23 63 
Interview 4   41 105 
Interview 5   44 79 
Interview 6   43 101 
Interview 7   56 109 
Interview 8   31 38 
Interview 9   62 156 
Interview 10   47 134 
Interview 11   42 76 
Interview 12   45 86 
Interview 13   29 44 
Interview 14   59 161 
Interview 15   21 36 
Interview 16   34 56 
 
     
 
 
Type Name Sources References 
    
Free Node Consensus 16 69 
Free Node What do people get out of it 15 42 
Free Node The Role of business in policymaking 13 41 
Free Node Other groups 13 53 
Free Node Networking 12 42 
Free Node Inter-relationship of business and politics 12 33 
Free Node A mechanism for change 12 40 
Free Node Economic motivation 11 25 
Free Node Invitation  11 20 
Free Node Collaboration legitimacy 11 19 
Free Node Globalization 11 22 
Free Node Bilderberg personalities 10 26 
Free Node Bilderberg hierarchy 10 30 
Free Node Bilderberg management 10 17 
Free Node Personal relationships 10 20 
Free Node Interconnectedness of networks 10 31 
  312
Free Node Information interchange 10 21 
Free Node Purpose of Bilderberg 9 25 
Free Node What people talk about at Bilderberg 9 13 
Free Node Acceptable parameters 9 23 
Free Node The influence of influential people 9 16 
Free Node Bilderberg administration 9 30 
Free Node European American relations 9 17 
Free Node Learning 9 21 
Free Node Discussion helps to agenda set 9 14 
Free Node Elitism 9 21 
Free Node Conspiracies 9 17 
Free Node Composition of Bilderberg 8 15 
Free Node Seductive appeal 8 24 
Free Node Secrecy and privacy 8 13 
Free Node A new international relations paradigm 8 29 
Free Node Dissent in the international arena 8 13 
Free Node Importance of Bilderberg vs other groups 8 12 
Free Node Geriatric ramblings 8 11 
Free Node Establishing discourse parameters 8 9 
Free Node Europe 7 16 
Free Node How much diversity is there  7 15 
Free Node Open and frank 7 13 
Free Node Views of criticism of Bilderberg 7 7 
Free Node Possibility of introductions 7 9 
Free Node Social hierarchy 7 12 
Free Node Think tanks 7 15 
Free Node Communication hubs 7 12 
Free Node Power 7 17 
Free Node Changing minds 7 9 
Free Node They're always talking to each other 
anyway 
6 8 
Free Node Not part of the network 6 15 
Free Node Media relationships 6 18 
Free Node Personal survival 6 11 
Free Node Who speaks 5 6 
Free Node How is the public good enhanced 5 7 
Free Node Fear 5 12 
Free Node Encouragement of contentiousness 5 13 
Free Node Discussion agenda 5 9 
Free Node Star spotting 5 7 
Free Node Opinion formation 5 12 
Free Node Civil society influence 5 6 
Free Node Conclusions 5 9 
Free Node Old boy network 5 15 
  313
Free Node Atlanticist European club 5 14 
Free Node Iraq - American foreign policy 5 7 
Free Node Valuable experience 4 6 
Free Node Importance of going 4 9 
Free Node Fascination of group 4 8 
Free Node Hard soft regulation 4 15 
Free Node Structural context for policymaking 4 12 
Free Node Political settlements and middle ground 4 7 
Free Node Evasive 4 7 
Free Node Politicians and incremental change 4 6 
Free Node Democracy 4 10 
Free Node Dynamic membership 4 5 
Free Node Steering force within Bilderberg 4 6 
Free Node Independence of media 4 6 
Free Node Washington consensus 4 6 
Free Node Membership screening 4 8 
Free Node Why do people join groups 4 11 
Free Node Not interested in networking 4 6 
Free Node Intimidating 3 16 
Free Node Depth of thinking 3 4 
Free Node Subjects of debate 3 8 
Free Node Individualized zero support 3 7 
Free Node End of Cold War  3 3 
Free Node Not that interesting really 3 5 
Free Node Political agenda 3 3 
Free Node Must say something 3 5 
Free Node Paternal grandees 3 3 
Free Node Fundamentally political gatherings 3 4 
Free Node Understanding 3 4 
Free Node Norms 2 2 
Free Node Rules of the game 2 2 
Free Node Not that earth shattering really 2 5 
Free Node Social responsibility and development 2 4 
Free Node Building credibility 2 11 
Free Node The spread of ideology 2 2 
Free Node Not good at networking 2 5 
Free Node Interlockers 2 3 
Free Node Board interlocks 2 2 
Free Node Absence of cultural dimension 2 5 
Free Node Consciousness of activity 2 2 
Free Node Establishment 2 4 
Free Node NGOs 2 3 
Free Node Personal skills 2 2 
  314
Free Node Trust 2 5 
Free Node Complexity 2 2 
Free Node Intensity of experience 1 1 
Free Node Hard work 1 4 
Free Node American vocalism and unity 1 2 
Free Node Scale of event 1 2 
Free Node Maintain contact 1 1 
Free Node In private capacity 1 1 
Free Node Group demands 1 1 
Free Node Representing your country 1 1 
Free Node Bilderberg ups and downs 1 1 
Free Node Timing 1 1 
Free Node Political class 1 1 
Free Node Acceptable language 1 1 
Free Node MDG's 1 3 
Free Node Global regulation and institutions 1 3 
Free Node Filling a vacuum 1 1 
Free Node Special skills 1 3 
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